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PREFACE 
The Ethics of Meaning 
 
 
On September 10, 1989, two days before her son’s eighth birthday, Ann Weiss drove to the local 
shopping center to order a cake for the party. She chose chocolate, her son’s favorite, and had his 
name, “SCOTTY,” inscribed under an image of a spaceship and launching pad, with a backdrop 
of frosted white stars. 
 On the morning of his birthday, walking with a friend to catch the school bus, Scotty was 
hit by a car. Though he managed to walk home on his own power and tell his mother what had 
happened, he soon fell into a deep, unresponsive sleep. Ann and her husband, Howard, took 
Scotty to the hospital, where, after conducting some tests, the doctor assured both parents that 
Scotty was simply suffering from a concussion and a shock, and would wake soon. 
 After twenty four hours, Scotty still wasn’t awake. This was no cause for serious concern, 
Dr. Francis said: they’d run extensive tests, and, aside from a small hairline fracture in the skull 
(not itself life-threatening), nothing seemed to be wrong. Extended sleeps like these can be a 
symptom of shock. Both Dr. Francis and Howard encouraged Ann to take a break from her vigil 
at Scotty’s bedside—to return home, have something to eat, take a shower. (Howard had done the 
same a few hours earlier.) Sensing that Howard wanted some time alone—a respite from worrying 
and talking together—Ann reluctantly agreed. Maybe if she wasn’t watching Scotty every second, 
she thought, he’d finally wake up and be alright.  
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When Ann returned to the hospital a few hours later, just after sunrise, Scotty finally 
opened his eyes. He glanced at his parents, who were speaking to him tenderly, but showed no 
sign of recognition. Then, “his mouth opened, his eyes scrunched closed, and he howled until he 
had no more air in his lungs. His face seemed to relax and soften then. His lips parted as his last 
breath was puffed through his throat and exhaled gently through the clenched teeth.” The doctors 
later told Ann and Harry that Scotty’s death had been caused by a hidden occlusion: a “one-in-a-
million circumstance.” 
The doctor walked them to the hospital’s front door. People were entering and leaving the 
hospital. It was eleven o’clock in the morning. Ann was aware of how slowly, almost 
reluctantly, she moved her feet. It seemed to her that Dr. Francis was making them leave 
when she felt they should stay, when it would be more the right thing to do to stay. She 
gazed out into the parking lot and then turned around and looked back at the front of the 
hospital. “No, no,” she said. “I can’t leave him here, no.” She heard herself say that and 
thought how unfair it was that the only words that came out were the sort of words used 
on TV shows where people were stunned by violent or sudden deaths. She wanted her 
words to be her own.1 
 
 
§1 Introduction 
If you followed the endnote, you’ll know that the story I just told is a fiction, adapted from a short 
story by Raymond Carver. I began that way for two reasons. First, the scene evokes the problem 
that motivates the three essays collected in this dissertation. As Stanley Cavell described it,  
The problem is no longer how to do what you want, but to know what would satisfy you. 
We could also say: Convention as a whole is now looked upon not as a firm inheritance 
from the past, but as a continuing improvisation in the face of problems we no longer 
understand. Nothing we now have to say, no personal utterance, has its meaning 
conveyed in the conventions and formulas we now share. In a time of slogans, sponsored 
messages, ideologies, psychological warfare, mass projects, where words have lost touch 
with their sources or objects, and in a phonographic culture where music is for dreaming, 
or for kissing, or for taking a shower, or for having your teeth drilled, our choices seem to 
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be those of silence, or nihilism (the denial of the value of shared meaning altogether), or 
statements so personal as to form the possibility of communication without the support 
of convention—perhaps to become the source of new convention. And then, of course, 
they are most likely to fail even to seem to communicate. Such, at any rate, are the choices 
which the modern works of art I know seem to me to have made.2 
 
 Second, I think that beginning as I did was an ethical risk. I’m not sure that what I did 
was right, or fair. For instance, I tried to disguise my source material: the precise date at the 
beginning of the story is my fabrication, not Carver’s. I hoped it would lead readers to wonder 
whether I was relaying a news story. I didn’t quote directly until the end of my adaptation, when I 
reached the point that mattered for my own rhetorical purposes. I drew on someone else’s 
imaginative brilliance to begin a piece that should be my own. Finally—and, I think, most 
troublingly—the subject is so difficult. When I read it, in Carver’s words, I feel terrified. 
Sometimes I cry. I empathize with Ann, and I know the desperate frustration she feels at the 
emptiness of her culture’s expressive resources matters much less to her, standing in that hospital 
parking lot, than it does to Carver, or to me. She has deeper sorrows. 
 Writers want to draw their readers into the emotional universe that animates their efforts. 
Readers want to feel the person on the other side of the text, and to be acknowledged as partners 
in communication. But the line between craft and manipulation can be difficult to locate, and it’s 
hard not to take more than you deserve. My deliberation about how to begin this dissertation was 
one of the countless exercises in the ethics of meaning that we owe to one another as members of 
a shared community of meaning. This dissertation is about those obligations, and the nature of 
the relationships that generate them. I don’t think I’ve earned my opening. I hope in this case I 
was right to conclude, finally, that it would be alright to ask for your generosity. 
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§2 Methodology 
In “Philosophy and Civilization,” John Dewey argues that the work of philosophers is tied, 
inextricably, to the predicaments of their own cultural and historical moment. The movement of 
time, and the study of philosophy’s history, he says, have revealed as illusion the conviction of 
past philosophers that their own work had finally transcended local bias, and captured eternal 
truths. “Philosophers are parts of history, caught in its movement; creators perhaps in some 
measure of its future, but also assuredly creatures of its past.”3 If this is true, Dewey thought, 
philosophers should embrace their obligation to help their societies negotiate “the enduring 
junctions of a stubborn past and an insistent future,” recognizing that their “problems and subject 
matter grow out of the stresses and strains in the community life in which a given philosophy 
arises.”4 Bertrand Russell admired Dewey, but disdained what he thought was an abdication of 
philosophical ambition. Truly “scientific” philosophy, Russell argued,  
is something more arduous and more aloof, appealing to less mundane hopes, and 
requiring a severer discipline for its successful practice…Philosophy is general, and takes 
an impartial interest in all that exists. The changes suffered by minute portions of matter 
on the earth’s surface are very important to us as active sentient beings; but to us as 
philosophers they have no greater interest than other changes in portions of matter 
elsewhere.5 
 
Russell’s position is out of style, but I think they both have a point. Still, it’s easier (and less lonely) 
for me to imagine filling the role that Dewey prescribes. A Deweyan philosopher, then, should be 
alert to “the stresses and strains” in her community life—the challenges that new developments 
pose to our old strategies for understanding ourselves and cooperating with one another. A 
philosopher who shares this Deweyan conception, and who wants to do useful work, should 
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therefore begin by asking: what are today’s new problems, which require of us adjustment, 
clarification of meaning, new understanding? 
§3 Can We Mean What We Say? 
I read David Foster Wallace as having developed one particularly compelling answer to that 
question. His novel, Infinite Jest, begins with a waking nightmare. Hal, one of the novel’s two 
main characters, is being interviewed for an athletic scholarship by a trio of university deans. 
Narrating the scene for the reader, Hal is grotesquely articulate. The room’s polished conference 
table, he tells us, shines “with the spidered light of an Arizona noon,” and bits of dust and 
sportcoat lint, excited by the air conditioner vents, “dance jaggedly in the slanted plane of 
windowlight, the air over the table like the sparkling space just above a fresh-poured seltzer.” The 
dean to Hal’s left wears a smile with “the impermanent quality of something stamped into 
uncooperative material”; the dean at center “seems to have more than the normal number of 
eyebrows.” But, within the scene, Hal suffers from a terrible condition. Whenever he attempts to 
communicate, he appears to his audience to be suffering an awful psychotic episode. After 
witnessing Hal attempt to speak, one dean likens him to “a writhing animal with a knife in its 
eye”; another compares the experience to watching “a stick of butter being hit by a mallet.”  
 “Try to listen,” Hal pleads, as the panicked deans, trying to immobilize him, push his face 
into the room’s parquet floor. “I’m not a machine. I feel and believe… I am not what you see and 
hear.”6 
The scene is a dramatic expression of a strain of meaning skepticism that runs 
throughout David Foster Wallace’s work: he worried that many of us were coming to share Hal’s 
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condition. Midway through the 20th century, Stanley Cavell famously wondered if we must mean 
what we say. By the century’s end, Wallace had replaced Cavell’s “must” with his own “can”. 
 Specifically, Wallace’s skepticism is comprehensive, historical, and tragic. Comprehensive 
because the skepticism is of “meaning” across its many senses: not just linguistic meaning, but, for 
example, the kinds of meaning we often speak of lives and of artworks as having. Historical 
because the skeptic’s claim isn’t eternal: he doesn’t claim that the target of his skepticism never 
was; he claims, instead, that it no longer is. Finally, tragic, because unlike a benign skepticism, in 
which the skeptic reassures us that we are just as well or better off once freed from the tyranny of 
his target, conceding to the tragic skeptic means acknowledging a tragic loss. 
§4 Contents 
The title of this dissertation is at least as aspirational as it is representative. Nonetheless, the three 
essays that follow form the beginning of a response to the predicament Wallace dramatized. 
Chapter 1, The Comprehensive-Interpretive Account of Meaning, develops a theory of 
meaning, grounded in the practice of interpretation, that that integrates meaning’s several senses 
(e.g. natural, linguistic, and ethical meaning), and provides the conceptual foundation for an 
ethics of meaning. A fully comprehensive account should show, for example, how the kind of 
meaning a sentence can have relates to the kind of meaning a life can have, and it should 
illuminate what the enterprise of historical natural science, concerned to uncover truths about 
long-past token events on the basis of the traces they have left, shares with the enterprise of 
cultural anthropology, whose hope is to make sense of “social expressions on their surface 
enigmatical.”7 (It should show, that is, the connection between natural and cultural meaning.) 
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The comprehensive-interpretive account of meaning I develop in Chapter 1 lays the foundation 
for both of the dissertation’s subsequent essays, on the ways we use “meaning” in ethical 
discourse, and on the nature and ethics of irony. 
 Chapter 2, on Ethical Meaning, applies the comprehensive account of meaning presented 
in Chapter 1 to advance our understanding of the way we use meaning, in ethical discourse, to 
articulate a particular set of aspirations and anxieties—as when we hope to lead meaningful lives, 
or worry that our lives our meaningless. The account of meaning I advocate explains the depth 
and elusiveness commonly associated with ethical meaning, and complicates the common 
assumption that meaning in life is necessarily desirable or valuable. It clarifies the sense in which 
ethical meaning is “objective,” and recasts the relationship between meaning and characteristic 
subjective states (like fulfillment in its presence, and alienation or anxiety in its absence) as 
symptomatic rather than constitutive. It also clarifies the relationship between meaning, moral 
duty, and value in general. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the processes by which we 
come to find and to lose meaning in our own lives. 
 Finally, the third chapter, Irony as Dynamic Reversal, develops a new account of irony. 
The dynamic reversal account of irony improves on the leading contemporary accounts by 
distinguishing irony’s form from its mechanism, providing a basis for continuity between irony’s 
kinds (e.g. verbal, dramatic, and situational irony), and offering a richer understanding of irony’s 
uses. One important insight that arises from these clarifications is that ironists can be sincere in 
ways that traditional accounts, which identify irony with the insincere mechanisms often used in 
its production, obscure. This, in turn, suggests that irony has ethical potential that’s 
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unappreciated by critics like Wallace, who famously considered it “an agent of great despair and 
stasis in U.S. culture.”8 As Jonathan Lear has recently argued, irony is also a fundamental mode of 
human experience.9 The dynamic reversal account of irony shows how irony in language can be 
used sincerely to understand and share ironic experience. It connects the discourse about irony in 
language with discourses about irony in culture, politics, literature, and self-understanding, giving 
us a more complete picture of irony’s nature and uses. 
§5 Conclusion 
Describing his musical ambitions in an interview, John Coltrane said:  
I want to be able to bring something to people that feels like happiness. I would love to 
discover a process such that if I wanted it to rain, it would start raining. If one of my 
friends were sick, I would play a certain tune and he would get better; if he were broke, I 
would play another tune and immediately he would receive all the money he needed. But 
what those pieces are, and what way do you have to go to arrive at knowing them, I don't 
know.10 
 
Originally, I’d hoped this dissertation would give a definitive answer to Wallace’s anxieties about 
meaning disintegration. Instead, it manages only to lay the groundwork for a response. In the 
meantime, there’s some consolation to be found in Viktor Frankl’s observation, that “insofar as 
the feeling of meaninglessness is concerned, we should not overlook and forget that, per se, it is 
not a matter of pathology; rather than being the sign and symptom of a neurosis, it is, I would say, 
the proof of one’s humanness.”11 
Still, it can’t hurt to hope for something more. My own hope is that the project I’ve 
started here will be one small contribution to a joint effort that renders our community of 
meaning less like the one Hal experienced on the office floor, being smothered by the panicked 
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dean with too many eyebrows, and more like the one Dewey described in one of my favorite 
passages in philosophy: 
Not only is social life identical with communication, but all communication (and hence 
all genuine social life) is educative. To be a recipient of a communication is to have an 
enlarged and changed experience. One shares in what another has thought and felt and in 
so far, meagerly or amply, has his own attitude modified. Nor is the one who 
communicates left unaffected. Try the experiment of communicating, with fullness and 
accuracy, some experience to another, especially if it be somewhat complicated, and you 
will find your own attitude toward your experience changing; otherwise you resort to 
expletives and ejaculations. The experience has to be formulated in order to be 
communicated. To formulate requires getting outside of it, seeing it as another would see 
it, considering what points of contact it has with the life of another so that it may be got 
into such form that he can appreciate its meaning. Except in dealing with commonplaces 
and catch phrases one has to assimilate, imaginatively, something of another’s experience 
in order to tell him intelligently of one’s own experience. All communication is like art. It 
may fairly be said, therefore, that any social arrangement that remains vitally social, or 
vitally shared, is educative to those who participate in it.12 
 
Or, as one Paolo Freire’s students put it: “Before this, words meant nothing to me; now they speak 
to me and I can make them speak.”13 
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THE COMPREHENSIVE-INTERPRETIVE ACCOUNT OF MEANING 
Understanding “Meaning” across Discursive Contexts 
 
 
§1 Problem(s) of Meaning 
“Meaning” enjoys a broad range of usage in everyday discourse—so broad that it can present 
ambiguously even in a single context. Consider the following late-night electronic chat between 
Alice and James, who are old friends. As usual, Alice is having problems with her on-again, off-
again boyfriend, Larry: 
 
BAD BOYFRIEND 
 
Alice: arthur and i were reminiscing last night and i just felt like wow, i am old. 
 James: yeah, you are old, there's no denying it. 
  you're almost as old as I am 
 Alice: i know. 
 James: we both should already have kids and be preparing for death 
Alice: no shit. 
  i need a baby daddy. :) 
 James: luckily advanced technologies have facilitated long empty lives for us utterly 
divorced from nature or meaning 
 Alice: just find the right girl -- and throw yourself into it and love her with all your 
might. thats what i'd advise you 
James: sure I'd be happy to. "find a billion dollars on the street and then just SPEND THE 
SHIT OUT OF IT" 
  I mean, OK, will do. 
 Alice: thats what kills me with larry. 
  i found the billion dollars 
James: yeah, that is truly tough 
 Alice: and so did he - i question many things but i don't question how 
much he leaves me. that part seems pretty true. 
  and when we are together its like lighter than light 
 James: pretty bad Freudian slip there Alice 
  possibly the worst one I've ever seen, no offense 
 
What should we say is the meaning of 
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(1) i question many things but i don’t question how much he leaves me. 
 
—Alice’s Freudian slip? There’s a perfectly respectable sense in which (1) means that Alice doesn’t 
question how much Larry leaves her. But, in the context of the conversation, we, like James, 
recognize easily enough that’s not what Alice really meant by (1)—she meant, instead, that she 
doesn’t question the strength of Larry’s love for her (the implication being that Larry’s love is 
strong, whatever other problems they may have). But if we ask Alice’s therapist, she might tell us 
that (1) really means that, despite Alice’s protests, Alice isn’t secure in Larry’s love at all. A 
psycholinguist, meanwhile, might take (1) to mean that Freudian slips can occur in written as well 
as spoken discourse. Yet few if any of these various interpretations of (1)’s meaning are genuinely 
at odds: the psycholinguist, depending on her sensibilities, might be perfectly happy to assent to 
the therapist’s interpretation of (1) without feeling obligated to recant her own; and the therapist 
relies on (1)’s literal meaning to discern its true psychological import.  
Things don’t end there. Just as a single object (like Alice’s utterance) can mean many 
different things, in many different ways, so lots of different sorts of things (not just linguistic 
expressions) can mean—at least if everyday language is any guide. A deceased father’s wristwatch 
means a lot to his daughter; the dark clouds in the distance mean to the hikers that it’ll rain later 
that afternoon. Events can have meaning, too, in the way that Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon 
meant the end of the Roman Republic. And, as one of James’s cynical remarks above suggests, we 
sometimes think of human lives as having a kind of meaning, as well. 
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Despite the usual pressures, in theoretical discourse, for terms to be used more narrowly, 
“meaning” has managed to replicate its apparent versatility in philosophical discourse. In his 1954 
Presidential Address to the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, Paul 
Henle declared that “the problem of meaning is the problem of this century,” marshaling as 
evidence the centrality of the theory of meaning to both pragmatism and positivism, as well as the 
powerful way the concept of meaning was being used as “the key to the solution of other 
problems.”1 Henle’s claim hasn’t lost much plausibility since the century’s turn: meaning still 
confronts philosophers of language and mind as a central problem (or, as we’ll see later, as a set of 
related problems), and philosophers across the sub-disciplines continue to regard meaning as a 
powerful tool for addressing other problems. In ethics, for example, Susan Wolf finds in meaning 
the right notion to illustrate the poverty of prevalent models of moral psychology, while Kwame 
Anthony Appiah uses meaning to explain one important way in which social identities like race, 
gender, and nationality matter for our ethical projects.2 Meaning has even enjoyed a theoretical 
renaissance beyond philosophy’s institutional borders. As the cultural anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz observed in 1973 (with a sense of chagrin that belied his own enthusiasm), “Meaning, that 
elusive and ill-defined pseudoentity we were once more than content to leave philosophers and 
literary critics to fumble with, has now come back into the heart of our discipline. Even Marxists 
are quoting Cassirer; even positivists, Kenneth Burke.”3 
Confronted by a concept with such broad purchase and enduring significance, however, 
we might reasonably suspect that meaning has won and held its “problem of the century” status 
by adopting the same attitude of benign indifference to issues of integrity that politicians find 
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useful when they’re running for office. Instead of a single, crucial “problem of meaning,” then, the 
suggestion is that there’s a gaggle of problems of meaning, loosely and unsystematically related—a 
different face for each constituency. Jerry Fodor, for instance, thought the problem of meaning 
was to answer the question “How can anything manage to be about anything?” and argued that 
this question applies, in the first place, to individual mental representations.4 On this view, the 
issue of linguistic communication becomes a secondary, largely derivative affair. Donald 
Davidson, in contrast, thought the right way to construct a theory of meaning was to begin by 
asking for a theory of what a competent speaker of a particular natural language would need to 
know to successfully interpret any meaningful string of that language, taking special care to 
account for the fact that language users have finite mental resources, but natural languages allow 
for the production of an infinite set of meaningful strings.5 Both versions of the problem sound 
daunting until we consider Max Weber’s: to meet the disenchanted intellectual’s “inner need…to 
endow his life with a pervasive meaning, and thus to find unity within himself, with his fellow 
men, and with the cosmos.”6 Good luck with that one. 
The worry is analogous to one that Appiah recently expressed about “culture,” a notion 
he thinks “has attained ubiquity: but at the cost of conceptual purchase. What shall it profit a 
word if it shall gain the whole world and lose its own soul?”7 Is there, on top of the apparently 
many problems of meaning, a problem of “meaning”? 
 
§1.1 Two Approaches: Restrictive and Ecumenical 
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Broadly, there are two ways to address the worry. One is to take a restrictive approach, limiting 
meaning’s theoretical ambit to a single, paradigm domain. (Once we have an account that works 
there, we may or may not find it worthwhile to extend the notion, perhaps metaphorically, to less 
central domains.) In philosophy, restrictivism was already the dominant trend by 1954, when 
Henle noted that all of the approaches to meaning he intended to discuss “take language as the 
typical or even the only case of meaning to be considered.”8 As Quine put the point in his pithy 
survey of the philosophical origins of the problem of meaning in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”: 
“Only linguistic forms have meanings.”9  
Alternatively, we can take an ecumenical approach to meaning, taking seriously the 
breadth of “meaning”’s everyday use, and trying to develop a theory of meaning consonant with 
that versatility. 10 From this perspective, linguistic meaning is a special case of a broader category, 
and should be explained, at least in part, in terms of the features of that broader category. John 
Dewey’s work offers a useful illustration of an ecumenical approach. In Democracy and 
Education, for example, Dewey writes as if all sorts of nonlinguistic entities have meanings, 
including experiences, actions, and objects. In order to properly communicate an experience 
we’ve had, he says, we need to “get outside of it, seeing it as another would see it, considering 
what points of contact it has with the life of another so that it may be got into such form that he 
can appreciate its meaning.”11 Later, he distinguishes mental acts from mere “adjustment[s] to a 
physical stimulus” according to the fact that the former “involve response to a thing in its 
meaning”—so, when someone “bump[s] into a stone,” he “kicks[s] it to one side purely 
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physically”; but when he “put[s] it to one side for fear some one will stumble upon it,” he 
“respond[s] to a meaning which the thing has.”12 
You might wonder, however, if we need to choose between these approaches at all. Isn’t 
keeping in mind that both theorists and everyday speakers use “meaning” in different ways all 
that’s necessary? When Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn, for example, assert that “like the Loch Ness 
Monster, meaning is a myth,” we shouldn’t read them as casting aspersions on W. E. B. Du Bois’s 
ambition, in The Souls of Black Folk, to “show the strange meaning of being black here in the 
dawning of the Twentieth Century.”13 (They only want to cast aspersions on philosophers who 
persist in believing that concepts have senses, or intensions.) Solving the problem of “meaning,” 
then, might require nothing more than some good common sense and a willingness to restrain 
your inner middle-schooler, resisting the temptation to contrive substantive disputes from 
harmless semantic variance. 
This is certainly a sensible prescription, but there are interesting dimensions of the 
problem of “meaning” that it doesn’t address. We can grant that Du Bois would feel perfectly 
comfortable continuing to write about meaning, in his sense, even if Fodor and Pylyshyn’s 
skepticism about meaning, in their sense, were vindicated. Philosophers’ appetite for petty 
intellectual combat notwithstanding, we can even be reasonably confident that Fodor and 
Pylyshyn would be comfortable letting Du Bois go on as he did, as well. But Dewey has good 
reason to resist the sort of restrictivism we saw Quine express above. For Dewey, there’s nothing 
incidental about the fact that language, objects, and experience (even in the rich, general sense in 
which, for example, some people have experienced being black in America) can all be described as 
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meaningful: in fact, Dewey’s naturalistic account of linguistic meaning relies on that conviction. 
Conversely, from a restrictive perspective, the ecumenical ambition to provide a theory of 
meaning that accounts for anything approaching the full range of its everyday application seems 
likely to confuse more than it clarifies, creating an unhelpful incentive to glide thoughtlessly over 
important distinctions that everyday usage too rarely has a reason (or the resources) to notice. 
The problem of “meaning”, then, is a problem in what Alexis Burgess and David Plunkett have 
called “conceptual ethics”—a question about which concepts we ought to use and (depending on 
your views about the relationship between words and concepts) which concepts we should use 
our words to express.14  
 
§1.2 Agenda 
 
My goal in this chapter is to vindicate the ecumenical approach to the problem of “meaning” by 
providing an account of “meaning” that comprehends its various discursive modes. I contend, 
with Dewey, that the apparently diverse usage of “meaning” in everyday discourse is grounded in 
a deeper conceptual integrity; and, further, that appreciating the character of that integrity helps 
us better understand the special sorts of meaning—of objects, actions, artworks, events, sentences, 
lives—that are so related. Nonetheless, I hope also to accommodate the genuine insight that, I 
presume, provides much of the motivation for restrictivist approaches: the recognition that 
particular varieties of meaning, like linguistic meaning, raise important philosophical questions 
that can’t be answered simply by reflecting on the character of meaning in general. Instead, 
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answering these questions requires an appreciation of the special character of the variety of 
meaning in question. 
 The substance of my effort, below, is divided into two major parts. In the first, §2, I 
develop my comprehensive account of meaning, arguing that the basis of meaning’s conceptual 
integrity across its diversity of usage is the structural role it plays in the practice of interpretation. 
(For this reason, I call it the “comprehensive-interpretive account of meaning”—the “CI account” 
for short.) Roughly: meanings are the outputs of acts of interpretation.15 The second part, §3, aims 
to demonstrate that the CI account achieves the integration it advertises, focusing on its 
application to (and implications for) so-called “natural” meaning, and meaning in philosophy of 
language and mind. A subsequent chapter discusses “meaning” as it’s used in ethical contexts.   
 
§2 The Comprehensive-Interpretive Account of Meaning     
 
Dewey’s strategy for integrating the varieties of meaning is a familiar one, though he isn’t its 
familiar source. “It is the characteristic use to which the thing is put,” he says, “which supplies the 
meaning with which it is identified…meanings spring up because both persons are engaged as 
partners in an action where what each does depends upon and influences what the other does.”16 
Here, Dewey anticipates the organizing principle of one of the most important movements in 
20th-century philosophy of language: that we ought to think of meaning in terms of activity rather 
than ontology. According to this suggestion, understanding meaning requires, in the first place, 
characterizing a particular kind of action, rather than a peculiar sort of entity. Put grammatically, 
“meaning” as a verb is explanatorily prior to “meaning” as a substantive. 17  
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 The comprehensive account I propose below preserves the spirit of this suggestion, but 
treats interpretation rather than meaning itself as the fundamental practice in whose terms a 
theory of meaning is best articulated. As we’ve seen, even in its verb form, “mean” can take a host 
of (grammatical) subjects that aren’t themselves agents (as when written words or tracks in the 
snow mean), and the way those subjects mean doesn’t always derive straightforwardly from the 
way agents do or can mean by them. Many, in fact—like most instances of tracks in the snow—
aren’t even vehicles by which any agent means anything at all.18 Instead, what unites meaning 
across its varieties is the distinctive role it plays in the practice of interpretation. Because this is 
the fundamental commitment of the CI account of meaning, the substance of the CI account 
depends on a detailed account of the nature of interpretation. 
 In short: interpretation is a functionally structured, mentally mediated activity; undertaken 
by organisms in an environment for the purpose of guiding action, belief, or affection; subject to 
norms of validity and fruitfulness. I’ll unpack this definition in steps. 
 
§2.1 Dial “M” for Meaning 
 
This scenario is drawn, with slight modification, from the plot of Dial ‘M’ for Murder: 
 
BROKEN LOCK: Tony Wendice, a retired professional tennis player, wants to dispose of his 
wife, Margot. He knows Margot has been having an affair with Mark, an American 
mystery novelist, but it’s only Margot’s personal wealth that keeps Tony living in the style 
to which he’s become accustomed, so divorce isn’t a good option. He therefore arranges 
for Swann, an old college acquaintance with a checkered past, to murder Margot. On the 
fateful night, Tony invites Mark (who makes a poetic alibi) to a stag party, leaving Margot 
home alone. Tony’s provided Swann with a key, so that Swann can enter the apartment 
quietly after Margot has retired for the night, hiding, strategically, behind the telephone. 
Then, at a pre-arranged time, Tony calls Margot at home, waking her and luring her to 
the phone, where Swann is well-placed to strangle her. Tony has already broken the lock 
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on a large window that leads out to the garden, so that the killing will appear to have 
taken place in the course of a random robbery.  
 Unfortunately for Tony, Margot fights Swann off, ultimately killing him with a 
pair of sewing scissors. Unpleasantly surprised when he hears Margot’s panicked voice 
return on the other end of the line, Tony doesn’t lose his head. He instructs Margot not to 
do anything until he arrives, races home, and retrieves his spare latchkey from Swann’s 
pocket before calling the police. (He also formulates a new plan: to frame Margot for 
Swann’s murder.) Chief Inspector Hubbard of Scotland Yard is tasked with unraveling 
the circumstances of Swann’s death. 
 
Interpreting the evidence at the scene of the crime is one of the most important strategies 
Hubbard can employ to accomplish his task. The broken window lock, for example, is a salient 
detail—one that can be interpreted in several ways. One natural conclusion is the one that 
Wendice initially hoped Hubbard would reach, that  
(2) the window was Swann’s method of entry into the apartment.  
 
But Hubbard dismisses (2) on the basis of other evidence. The night of the killing was a rainy one; 
had Swann trudged through the garden to enter through the window, he’d have left footprints in 
the wet ground outside, and mud stains on the floor inside—but neither are present. 
Furthermore, Hubbard matches fibers left on Swann’s shoes with the doormat outside the flat’s 
front door, where Swann wiped his feet before entering. Hubbard therefore concludes, instead, 
that the broken lock means  
(3) someone attempted to create the misleading appearance that Swann entered by way 
of the window.19 
 
Working from this relatively simple scenario, we can unpack in phases the features of 
interpretation I listed at the outset of §2. 
 
§2.2 Agency and Environment 
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Interpretation is agential—undertaken by organisms, situated in an environment, who possess 
some general set of goals in light of which at least some of their behavior (including their 
interpretive activity) can be understood.20 We interpreters, in Dewey’s words, are “beings who 
suffer and endeavor.” “Since we are creatures with lives to live, and find ourselves within an 
uncertain environment, we are constructed to note and judge in terms of bearing upon weal and 
woe—upon value.”21 Acts of interpretation, then, take place in an evaluative context: a complex of 
the cognitive, affective, or practical goals that motivate or rationalize an act of interpretation, 
along with the constraints and potentialities presented by the interpreter’s environment. In 
BROKEN LOCK, for example, some salient features of the evaluative context are (1) Hubbard’s 
cognitive goal—to uncover more completely the circumstances of Swann’s death; (2) the potential 
unreliability of the testimony of the situation’s chief living participants, who, in many possible 
scenarios, would have good reason to lie; and (3) the presence of various pieces of physical 
evidence, like the broken lock, that might reveal to a sufficiently careful observer important facts 
about the circumstances of Swann’s death. 
 
§2.3 The Structure of Interpretation 
 
Next, interpretation is functionally structured, in the bare sense that it can be usefully described as 
taking an input and issuing an output (or, in incidentally apt terminology, taking an argument 
and issuing a value). I’ll refer to an interpretation’s input/argument as the object of interpretation, 
and to its output/value (if the interpretation goes well) as a meaning. 22 (An act of interpretation 
attributes a meaning to an object.) In BROKEN LOCK, the object of interpretation is the broken 
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window lock, and Hubbard considers both (2) and (3) as potential meanings. In the case as I 
described it, his interpretation does go well, and he correctly recognizes that (3) is a meaning of 
the broken lock, whereas (2) isn’t. 
 
§2.4 Validity and Fruitfulness 
 
Many processes are functionally structured in the capacious sense specified above, and we can 
appreciate the particular character of interpretation by comparing it to some of its neighbors. 
Consider, for example, inspiration, which can also (at least in many cases) be described as taking 
an argument and issuing a value.23 Sherlock Holmes, for example, is often presented as being 
inspired by some incidental object or event—say, a naïve or bumbling comment of Watson’s—
with a sudden insight that solves the case. But the content of Holmes’s insight, in such cases, is 
neither the meaning of Watson’s utterance, nor what Watson meant to convey by his utterance. 
What distinguishes cases of inspiration from cases of interpretation? 
 One good answer is that interpretation is subject to a norm of validity, but inspiration 
isn’t. An object of interpretation, qua object of interpretation, constrains the range of interpretive 
values (meanings) in a way that objects of inspiration (i.e., objects that inspire) don’t constrain 
inspirational values: it makes sense to call some instances of interpretation “invalid,” whereas 
calling an instance of inspiration “invalid” is a category mistake. Validity, in turn, is clearly 
determined by some sort of relationship that holds between an object of interpretation and the 
meaning attributed to it. Imagine, for example, that Hubbard interpreted the broken window lock 
to mean that 
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(4) Wendice was trying to frame his wife for Swann’s murder. 
 
(4) is both true and valuable to Hubbard’s project of uncovering the details on Swann’s death, but 
it’s nonetheless a bad interpretation of the broken window lock, because Wendice destroyed the 
lock to deceive the police about Swann’s method of entry (under the assumption that Swann 
would kill Margot successfully)—not as part of his plan, subsequently devised, to frame Margot 
for Swann’s murder. We can call the relation that an object of a valid interpretation must bear to 
its meaning a licensing relation. For the moment, I won’t specify exactly what sort of relation 
licenses a given interpretation (canons of validity might even vary by classes of interpreted 
objects). Noting that some licensing relation is necessary is sufficient for my current purposes. 
 In addition to being governed by a norm of validity, interpretation is governed by a norm 
of fruitfulness: its output ought to be relevant with respect to the evaluative context within which 
the interpretation is made.24 This feature of interpretation is reflected in everyday discourse by the 
way we call potential objects of interpretation “meaningless” if we think they afford no insight 
with respect to the implied evaluative context. The broken window lock is a meaningful aspect of 
the scene of the crime in BROKEN LOCK; the way the chairs are arranged around the dining table, 
by contrast, isn’t. It isn’t that the chairs’ arrangement carries no interpretively available 
information; it’s that none of that information is helpful (or relevant) with respect to Hubbard’s 
task of uncovering the circumstances of Swann’s death.  
Here, inference is an illustrative contrast case. Like interpretation, inference is subject to a 
norm of validity, but, unlike interpretation, inferences, qua inferences, are equally good regardless 
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of their fruitfulness. If (to return to the characters of BAD BOYFRIEND) Alice tells Larry to “take a 
hike,” both  
(5) Alice speaks English. 
 
and 
 
(6) Alice is ending their romantic relationship. 
 
are equally good inferences, but (presuming something like the usual ensemble of interests in 
exchanges like these) (6) is a better interpretation of Alice’s utterance than (5).25, 26 In everyday 
discourse we use a variety of terms for the quality that makes one interpretation more fruitful 
than another (relevance, significance, etc.), but I’ll generally refer to this quality as import. 
 
§2.5 Mental Mediation 
 
Finally, interpretation is mentally mediated, rather than mentally immediate. When Hubbard first 
observes the window lock, he simply sees that the lock is broken in a way that he doesn’t just see 
that someone has attempted to create the misleading appearance that the window was Swann’s 
method of entry. Items are objects of interpretation rather than, say, objects of perception when 
they are, in Clifford Geertz’s formulation, “on their surface enigmatical”: their import is not 
immediately apparent.27 NHL defenseman Mike Green’s vivid discussion of the intimacy a hockey 
player needs to have with his stick puts the point into relief: “If I pause to interpret what I’m 
sensing when the puck is on my stick, that extra split second can be the difference between a shot 
and a goal, a win or a loss or getting my head taken off. So the stick has to feel like a piece of 
you.”28 As Green implies, stereotypical interpretation involves a kind of conscious effort that basic 
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sensory perception, for example, doesn’t. Interpreters are aware of and attend to objects of 
interpretation as media, possessed of features independent of the meanings they disclose, in a way 
that perceivers (we now think) generally do not attend to the “sense data” posited by certain 
indirect theories of perception.29 
 This point, however, requires elaboration. In the next section of this chapter, I’ll turn to 
the task of showing the way the general account of meaning I’ve developed here applies to 
meaning’s more specialized senses, with a focus on meaning in the philosophy of language and 
mind. But the way I’ve described mental mediation above raises a worry. Subjectively, processing 
basic linguistic utterances, made in a language in which we’re fluent, doesn’t seem to require the 
sort of conscious cognitive effort Green worries will slow him down on the ice. This, I think, is 
what A.P. Martinich has in mind when, in his widely used philosophy of language reader, he 
registers some initial surprise that analytic work done on “linguistic understanding…has been 
presented under the rubric of theories of interpretation or translation”—three phenomena he 
thinks display significant “intuitive differences.” Interpreting an utterance, he thinks, seems to 
presuppose “knowledge of what the speaker clearly means,” instead involving a use of that 
knowledge to explain “those aspects of the speaker’s meaning that are difficult or dubious” or 
“what place the speaker’s utterances…have within a larger cultural context.”30 If the 
characterization of interpretation I’ve given above were to disqualify the process by which a 
hearer comes to understand a linguistic utterance from counting as an instance of interpretation, 
then an account of meaning couched in terms of interpretation would simply ignore large swaths 
of language comprehension. 
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 An elaboration of mental mediation should assuage this worry. Interpretation embraces 
certain instances of automatic processing in something like the way intentional action embraces 
certain instances of reflex. Usually, reflexive behaviors are presented in contrast to intentional 
action, as in a passage from Dewey that I quoted above: “A noise may make me jump without my 
mind being implicated. When I hear a noise and run and get water and put out a blaze, I respond 
intelligently; the sound meant fire, and fire meant need of being extinguished…When things have 
a meaning for us, we mean (intend, propose) what we do: when they do not, we act blindly, 
unconsciously, unintelligently.”31 But many reflexive behaviors—“reflexive” in the sense of 
automated, “automated” in the sense that they don’t involve conscious reflection on the 
“meanings” (in Dewey’s sense) that guide them—are nonetheless intentional and intelligent: 
consider the way that Roger Federer responds to a 130 mile-per-hour serve. His actions are as 
automatic (or nearly as automatic) as a patellar reflex, but, unlike a patellar reflex, they’re 
voluntary, sensitive to his conscious goals, and sensitive to background/contextual knowledge 
(like the particular strengths and weaknesses of his opponent). Information processing can be 
interpretive, even when it’s relatively automated, to the extent that it shares those additional 
features of reflex actions. Consider again the contrast class of basic visual perception. Knowing 
observers of the Müller-Lyer illusion may judge that the two lines are equidistant while still 
experiencing the appearance that one is longer than the other. Interpretations—even ones made 
relatively automatically—are revisable in a way that brute appearances sometimes aren’t.32 
 In this vein, a second point, mentioned above, bears repeating. Even in relatively 
automatic cases of interpretation, interpreters are aware of the objects of their interpretation as 
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media—objects with properties independent of (and sometimes even in some phenomenological 
disharmony with) those essential to their relevant meanings. A person who encounters a painting 
so life-like that she is deceived into believing that she sees, directly, the depicted scene hasn’t 
thereby interpreted the painting. As Richard Wollheim has observed, this “twofold” quality of 
interpretation—the simultaneous awareness of features of medium and meaning—is essential to 
our ability to appreciate poetry, and the harmonies it effects between the sounds and meanings of 
words.33 It also explains how even conventionalized, relatively automatically processed instances 
of figurative language like metaphor and irony can nonetheless still depend, in Elisabeth Camp’s 
formulation, “on a felt gap between what the speaker says and what she means.”34 
 
§2.6 The CI Account Summarized 
 
First, a clarification of the preliminary formulation of the CI account I offered in §1—that 
“meanings are the outputs of acts of interpretation.” Though that slogan captures the central idea 
that meaning, across contexts, should be understood in terms of the role it plays in the practice of 
interpretation, it also suggests, misleadingly, that an object’s meanings come into being only when 
it is actually so interpreted. That suggestion is misleading on two counts. First, as the norm of 
validity implies, interpreting an object as having a certain meaning doesn’t cause it to have that 
meaning—otherwise, misinterpretation would be impossible. Second, an object has the meanings 
it does relative to potential rather than actual acts of interpretation. Just as a substance can be 
nutritious for an organism whether or not it’s actually ingested and metabolized, an object can be 
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meaningful with respect to a potential interpreter in an evaluative context whether or not it is 
actually interpreted.35 
 An object’s meanings, then, are its distinctively interpretive affordances: the ways that it 
can be profitably used to guide action, theory, and affection by organisms with the ability to 
interpret it.36 Interpretation, in turn, is a functionally structured, mentally mediated activity, 
undertaken by an organism in an evaluative context, subject to norms of validity and fruitfulness. 
The former of these norms is met when a posited meaning is related, in the right way, to the 
object of interpretation; the latter is met to the extent that the posited meaning has import with 
respect to the evaluative context in which the interpretation is made. “Meaning” is unified across 
its broad range of senses according to its structural role in the practice of interpretation. 
 
§3 Demonstrating Comprehensiveness 
 
I hope that my efforts above have been sufficient to convince you that the comprehensive-
interpretive account of meaning deserves to be called “interpretive”; now I’d like to convince you 
that it deserves to be called “comprehensive,” as well. I’d like to show not only that CI account 
embraces meaning’s important varieties—natural, linguistic, literary, cultural, ethical—but also 
that it provides a rubric that helps us think through some of the important philosophical 
questions that these varieties raise. In other words, I want to vindicate a claim I made at the outset 
(§1.2), that appreciating the character of meaning’s integrity generates valuable insights into its 
particular varieties. 
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 I’m not going to distribute my attention evenly, though. Instead, I’m going to focus 
primarily on the question of how the general account of meaning I’ve provided bears on the 
discussion of meaning in the philosophy of language and mind. Initially I’d planned otherwise—
to show, in detail, the way the CI account applies to all the varieties of meaning I listed in the last 
paragraph—but equal treatment would have required something more like a dissertation than a 
dissertation chapter. Given the need to focus, I have two reasons for dedicating the bulk of my 
attention to the issue of linguistic meaning. First, restrictive impulses seem strongest—mostly, in 
fact, just taken for granted—in the case of linguistic meaning. Cultural and literary theorists, for 
example, are more apt to suppose that their theoretical target is “meaning” in some more 
expansive sense, while philosophers of language seem generally less inclined to suppose that 
considerations about other varieties of meaning bear significantly on their efforts, or that their 
conclusions about meaning in mind and language should be thought to apply to meaning in its 
other varieties (if there even are other “varieties,” speaking precisely). Nor do I think this 
asymmetry is merely a disciplinary idiosyncrasy: there are substantive reasons that make language 
a special case. Therefore, addressing “meaning” in the context of language and mind is the most 
challenging test case for an account that aspires to be comprehensive. My second reason is 
simpler: a subsequent chapter of this dissertation focuses on irony, and irony, like meaning, has 
often been treated as a primarily linguistic phenomenon. 
 Still, my attention will be disproportionate, not exclusive: I’ll have something to say about 
other varieties of meaning. In particular, I’ll begin with a moderately involved treatment of 
natural meaning, in part because that notion plays an important role in delimiting the domain of 
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the kind of meaning that, according to one major tradition, should primarily concern 
philosophers of language. And, in the process of addressing some questions about the nature of 
linguistic meaning, I’ll have occasion to note some interesting implications of the CI account for 
“meaning” as it’s used in other contexts.  
 
§3.1 Varieties of Meaning 
 
To this point I’ve been relying mostly on informal, commonsense intuitions to support the idea 
that “meaning” has at least superficially disparate senses, but the conceptual apparatus associated 
with the CI account provides the resources to differentiate between meaning’s varieties more 
systematically. In fact, the CI account provides several dimensions according to which meaning 
might be classified into kinds, but the most obvious of these is by object-type. The suggestion is 
that “natural” meanings arise when we interpret distinctively natural objects, “linguistic” meaning 
arises when we interpret distinctively linguistic objects, “literary” meaning involves the 
interpretation of works of literature as such, and so on. 
 This suggestion, however, raises questions. How should the relevant object types—
natural, linguistic, literary, and so on—be individuated? And, when we sort meaning into varieties 
using this strategy, how well do the resulting categories actually correspond with intuitive or 
theoretically significant kinds of meaning? For example, consider the way that the suggested 
object-type classification scheme intersects with Grice’s seminal classification of meaning, into so-
called “natural” and “nonnatural” kinds. Many objects that aren’t stereotypically “natural,” like 
quarterly business reports, can have “natural” meaning, in Grice’s sense.37 Moreover, Grice 
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argued that beginning an investigation into “the kind of meaning language has” by looking for 
something distinctively linguistic had led to significant errors, like a too-close identification 
between the meaning of a linguistic utterance and its conventionally-coded content. Instead, 
Grice argued, linguistic utterances are just one of many ways to convey nonnatural meaning.38 
 My task in §3—to show that the CI account of meaning does in fact comprehend 
meaning’s important varieties—would be challenging but straightforward if the important 
varieties were already well and uncontroversially defined, so that all that was necessary was to 
show how this or that particular definition of “meaning” falls under the more general account 
given in §2. The questions I just raised indicate, however, that the task is more involved. So does 
an observation I made in §1—that even within specialized discourses, like the study of language, 
“meaning” often functions ambiguously. For instance, in Interpreting Figurative Meaning, an 
important critical survey of the empirical study of figurative language, Raymond Gibbs and 
Herbert Colston claim that “understanding what any figurative utterance means is not simply a 
matter of getting to a particular figurative meaning, but understanding what a speaker 
pragmatically intends to achieve by use of that trope.”39 Readers might justifiably wonder what “a 
particular figurative meaning” could be, if it’s not what a particular “figurative utterance means”: 
clearly the two can’t be the same if understanding the former isn’t sufficient for understanding the 
latter.40 A significant part of the task of demonstrating that the CI account is genuinely 
comprehensive will be to achieve a clearer understanding of the varieties it aspires to 
comprehend. 
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§3.2 Natural Meaning 
 
In §1 we noticed that Dewey, our representative ecumenicalist, wrote without qualm about the 
“meanings” of nonsymbolic objects (like a loose rock lying on a walkway) and substances (like 
water). If any sense can be made of that way of talking, it likely involves an appeal to natural 
meaning—a notion that Grice influentially identified with the sense of “meaning” employed in 
sentences like 
(7) Those tracks in the snow mean that M3 [a wolverine living in Glacier National Park] 
recently passed this way. 
 
and 
 
(8) Dark clouds mean rain.41 
 
As we’ve already noticed, natural meaning (meaningN) is one half of the distinction at the 
foundation of Grice’s theory of meaning; nonnatural meaning (meaningNN) is the other. As Grice 
draws the distinction, natural meaning is factive: if x meansN that p, x entails p.  (If it was M3’s 
nemesis M6 who left the tracks in the fresh snow, then, no matter how misleading the appearance, 
they didn’t meanN that M3 had been on the spot within the past six hours.) Nonnatural meaning, 
by contrast, is nonfactive: x may meanNN that p without entailing that p.  (So, when uttered, the 
sentence “American Beauty is a wonderful movie” generally meansNN that American Beauty is a 
wonderful movie, despite the fact that it also meansN that the person who utters it has 
questionable taste.)42 
Natural meaning is an important notion for both restrictive and ecumenical approaches 
to meaning. On the restrictive side, Grice’s way of framing this distinction has provided one 
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extremely influential method for isolating the proper target of inquiry. The task for philosophers 
of language who hope to provide a “theory of meaning,” according to this way of thinking, is to 
provide an analysis, or grounding account, of nonnatural meaning—the distinctive (and 
distinctively mysterious) way that speakers use language to mean. On the (relatively) ecumenical 
side, Grice’s framework has seemed to provide a promising starting point for theorists interested 
in emphasizing the ways that the human ability to discern and communicate meaning 
(particularly in language) is continuous with (or, at least, emerged from) the way structures bear, 
and organisms recover, meaning in the rest of the natural world. Grice himself offered a rough 
outline of how he thought such a project might proceed in “Meaning Revisited,” and philosophers 
like Dorit Bar-On43 and Ruth Millikan44 (among many others) have made more thorough efforts 
in that direction since.  
An initial challenge that these more ecumenical projects face is that Grice, perhaps 
because his primary interest was in nonnatural meaning, never offered a full-fledged, substantive 
account of natural meaning. Instead, he contented himself with providing “recognition tests” for 
distinguishing cases of meaningN from meaningNN (like the factivity distinction above), along with 
occasional suggestive comments: meaningN, he says, is “closely related to the idea of [being] a 
natural sign,” and “meansN” is perhaps interchangeable with “has the consequence,” or 
“evidences.”45 But, as their vagueness suggests (“natural sign” is left undefined; the difference 
between “has the consequence” and “evidences” can, in relevant contexts, be momentous), these 
proposals are closer to marking the starting point of an inquiry than they are to expressing its 
deliverances. 
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Nor is natural meaning’s importance limited to its role in distinguishing (as a contrast 
class) and explaining (as an evolutionary development) nonnatural meaning. If, as Grice plausibly 
suggested, natural meaning is intimately associated with natural signs, then it is a central 
component of everyday activities like hunting and predicting the weather, as well as larger-scale 
theoretical enterprises like historical natural science, which Carol Cleland has described as the 
testing of “hypotheses concerning long-past, token events” according to “their capacities to 
explain puzzling associations among traces discovered through fieldwork.”46 For example, 
interpreting the theoretical import of the composition of the clay at the Cretaceous-Paleogene (K-
Pg) boundary of the geological record—unusually rich with iridium, shocked minerals, and Ni-
rich spinels—is the basis of our knowledge that a meteor strike, rather than disease or volcanism, 
was the primary cause of the extinction of the dinosaurs.47 
The CI approach to meaning offers a valuable guide for developing a substantive, 
independently attractive account of natural meaning. To show this, I’ll introduce two theoretical 
frameworks with some promise for assimilating Grice’s notion of natural meaning—Fred 
Dretske’s semantic theory of information, and James J. Gibson’s theory of ecological 
affordances—and evaluate each strategy according to the implications of the CI account. 
 
§3.2.1 Natural Meaning as Semantic Information 
 
One popular philosophical exposition of the relation between trace and event that underwrites the 
sort of inference discussed above—one that is, in fact, frequently associated with Grice’s notion of 
natural meaning—is Fred Dretske’s semantic theory of information.48 According to this strategy 
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of assimilation, the “natural meaning” of an object, event, or state of affairs is just the information 
it carries—where information, Dretske says, is “an objective commodity…whose generation, 
transmission, and reception do not require or in any way presuppose interpretive processes.”49 
The chief innovation of Dretske’s theory was to combine this robust objectivity (interpretive- and 
mind-independence) with certain semantic features: to extrapolate from Claude Shannon’s 
mathematical theory of information, which describes how information can be quantified, a 
method for specifying information’s quality—that is, its content.  
The strategy begins by explaining how the quantity of information at a receiver (r) (a 
measure of the extent to which the actual condition of r has reduced the possible conditions of r, 
abbreviated “I(r)” in Dretske’s notation) can be about a source (s). The quantity of information at 
r that is about s (“IS(r)”) is a measure of the extent to which the information generated at r 
depends on the information generated at s (the “degree of lawful (nomic) dependence between 
these two points”). Specifying the content quantified by IS(r) is then just a matter of offering a 
description, in propositional form, of the condition at s upon which IS(r) (lawfully) depends.50 
This content, under the assimilation we’re currently entertaining, is r’s natural meaning with 
respect to s: what r meansN about s is just the content quantified by IS(r). Roughly (but not 
misleadingly): a tree’s trunk having n rings meansN that the tree has lived n years because former 
depends causally (by processes governed by natural law) on the latter; the abnormal abundance of 
iridium in the layer of sediment at the K-Pg boundary meansN that a large meteor struck Earth at 
the time the sediment was deposited for the same reason. 
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§3.2.2 Natural Meaning as Ecological Affordance 
 
An alternative strategy for understanding natural meaning is to integrate it into the idiom of 
ecological psychology, a tradition pioneered by James J. Gibson. In The Ecological Approach to 
Visual Perception, Gibson argues that physics (among other disciplines) is insufficient to the task 
of explaining visual perception: its concepts work at the wrong “level of description” for the 
undertaking.51 Instead, he advocates an “ecological approach”—one constitutively attuned to the 
behaviors of organisms in their environment. The essence of the distinction, as Gibson makes it, 
is that “[t]he world of physical reality does not consist of meaningful things,” whereas “[t]he 
world of ecological reality does. If what we perceived were the entities of physics and 
mathematics,” he continues, “meanings would have to be imposed on them. But if what we 
perceive are the entities of environmental science, their meanings can be discovered.”52  
 The constituents of ecological reality, in other words, are distinguished by (organized 
according to) their implications for the natural activities of the organisms in the environment 
they compose: their “affordances,” as Gibson calls them. This is just a longer restatement of the 
claim that ecological reality consists of “meaningful things.” For example, “Water,” Gibson 
explains, 
affords bathing and washing, to elephants as well as to humans. Streams of water can be 
dammed, by beavers as well as by children and hydraulic engineers. Ditches can be dug 
and aqueducts built. Pots can be made to contain water, and then it affords pouring and 
spilling. Water, in short, has many kinds of meaning.53 
 
After providing a similar accounting of fire’s affordances, Gibson notes that it, “like water, has 
many kinds of meaning, many uses, many values.”54 The implication of assimilating an object’s 
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natural meaning to its ecological affordances manifests in this interchangeable use of terms—
“meaning…uses…values”: an object’s affordances, and hence, its meanings “are what it offers the 
animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.”55 
 
§3.2.3 The CI Approach to Natural Meaning: Critical Evaluation I 
 
Suppose that the CI account competently characterizes meaning in general, and that natural 
meaning is rightly understood as a variety of that general phenomenon. What should we conclude 
about the two assimilation strategies I’ve just described? For reasons I’ll detail below, neither 
proposal—that natural meaning be assimilated to information, in Dretske’s sense, or to 
affordances, in Gibson’s—is fully consistent with the CI approach to meaning. Ultimately, 
though, I think this is a virtue of the CI approach, rather than a defect. The revisions to each 
proposal required to make natural meaning consistent with meaning in general yield a clarified 
rather than disfigured understanding of natural meaning, and suggest more coherent ways of 
integrating natural meaning into the Dretskean and Gibsonian paradigms. 
 The disharmonies between understanding natural meaning as a variety of meaning on the 
CI model, on one hand, and as identical with Dretske’s semantic information, on the other, were 
probably readily apparent in my initial presentation of Dretske’s theory. Information, Dretske 
held, is “an objective commodity…whose generation, transmission, and reception do not require 
or in any way presuppose interpretive processes.”56 Meaning, I’ve argued, should be understood 
according to the structural role it plays in the practice of interpretation. This fundamental 
difference manifests in at least two important discontinuities between Dretske-information and 
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CI-meaning. First, as we saw in §2.4, meanings have import with respect to a broader practical, 
theoretical, or affective context. In BROKEN WINDOW, not all of the objects in the crime scene were 
equally meaningful, and this discrepancy was based not merely in the quantity, but on the quality 
of the information they carried—its relevance to the larger task in whose context interpretation 
was being undertaken. Second, as I argued in §2.5, the use of “meaning” implies something about 
the way import comes to be (or could come to be) appreciated: by interpretive effort.57 The 
question of what information a signal carries about its source is sensitive to neither of those 
considerations: “The receiver of the signal may be more interested in one piece of information 
than he is in any other, he may succeed in extracting one piece of information without another, 
but these differences are irrelevant to the information the signal contains.”58 So, the CI approach 
suggests we should resist identifying natural meaning with Dretske-information. Is the suggestion 
good? 
 It is. First, it strains intuition to suppose that a signal means p (in any sense) if p isn’t even 
in principle accessible to a potential interpreter on the signal’s basis. Yet Dretske underscores the 
point that not even in-principle interpretive accessibility is required for a signal to carry 
information about a source.59 (The same point applies to our intuitive resistance to calling useless 
information meaningful.) More importantly, distinguishing natural meaning from information in 
the ways the CI approach prescribes better respects the integrity of Dretske’s own theory. Dretske 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of “distinguish[ing] information sharply from the concept 
of meaning—at least the concept of meaning relevant to semantic studies of language and 
belief.”60 The discussion above shows not only that he was right, but that he needn’t have 
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qualified. Information’s status as an “objective commodity”—one that, perhaps, can provide at 
least a partial basis for a non-circular explanation of various mental and semantic phenomena—
can be preserved alongside the traditional association between meaning (even “natural” 
meanings) and relevance. 
 Moreover, although the CI approach discourages identifying natural meaning with 
information (an identification Dretske didn’t himself propose), it does suggest a way of 
integrating the two notions. We might, that is, regard Dretske’s analysis of carrying information 
as an account of the licensing relationship required for valid interpretations of natural meaning—
so that interpreting a signal/object x as meaningN that p is valid iff x carries the information that 
p. More fundamentally, distinguishing natural meaning from information makes it possible to ask 
whether “carries information,” in Dretske’s sense, is the proper account of the licensing 
relationship for natural interpretation. According to Dretske’s theory, a signal carries the 
information that a source is in a certain state only if the probability of the source’s being in that 
state, conditional on the signal, is 1. Though Dretske has good reasons for imposing this 
requirement on information transmission, it might be too stringent as a condition for the validity 
of natural interpretation. Suppose, for example, that paleontologists and geologists have rightly 
concluded, on the basis of their careful interpretation of the composition of the sediment at the K-
Pg boundary, that a meteor strike killed the dinosaurs—but that the conditional probability of a 
meteor strike given the sediment’s composition, even accounting for additional evidence 
possessed by the scientists, although very high, is less than 1.61 We might want to regard the 
scientists’ interpretation as valid nonetheless. Similar considerations have led theorists who try to 
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provide an account of the naturalistic emergence of intentional mental states in terms of “natural 
signs” to object to using Dretske’s stringent definition of information as their basis. For example, 
Ruth Millikan asks “what use signals carrying bits of natural information [in Dretske’s sense] 
could be to an organism,” noting that “the mere fact that a signal carries certain natural 
information seems not to bear on whether a creature could learn anything from encountering that 
signal or know anything by virtue of harboring that signal in its brain.”62 Instead, she argues, a 
theory that “will help to explain how real animals manage to obtain useful information will need 
to introduce statistical considerations about the environment in some controlled way…Nearly all 
the kinds of information needed by us, and by all other organisms as well, for securing what we 
need in an inclement world, is information that cannot possibly be acquired without leaning on 
certain merely statistical frequencies.”63 Distinguishing the natural meaning “closely associated 
with the idea of being a natural sign” (as Grice characterized it) from information makes it 
possible to ask important questions about how these notions relate, rather than discarding either 
because it doesn’t meet the requirements of the other. 
 
§3.2.4 The CI Approach to Natural Meaning: Critical Evaluation II 
 
The considerations introduced above make an assimilation of natural meaning to Gibsonian 
affordances look more promising. Import (value or relevance for an organism in an environment) 
and accessibility are, after all, central to the idea of affordances, which, in Gibson’s words, “point 
both ways, to the environment and to the observer.”64 An object that carries information either 
wholly inaccessible to an organism, or wholly irrelevant to any of its interests, affords nothing (so 
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far as it’s been described). But natural meaning (understood as consistent with the CI account) 
resists assimilation to ecological affordances for a different reason. 
 Put simply, affordances arise with respect to a broader range of activities than (CI) 
meanings do. For Gibson, the environment is “meaningful” with respect to the full range of 
interests and behaviors of the animals who inhabit it: air affords respiration for land animals, 
water affords locomotion for fish, cragged cliffs afford refuge for a mountain goat, but a 
frustrating obstacle for a predator, and so on. Furthermore, Gibson argues, most of these 
affordances can be perceived directly, as his Gestalt forebears suspected. The Gestalts rejected 
prevailing theories of perception according to which “no experiences were direct except 
sensations…Bare sensations had to be clothed with meaning,” recognizing, instead, that “the 
meaning or the value of a thing seems to be perceived just as immediately as its color.”65 This, 
Gibson argued, is because phenomenal objects (or, as he might prefer, ecological objects) are 
individuated by their affordances— 
what we perceive when we look at objects are their affordances, not their 
qualities...Phenomenal objects are not built up from qualities; it is the other way around. 
The affordance of an object is what the infant begins by noticing. The meaning is 
observed before the substance and surface, the color and form, are seen as such.  
 
Hence, “the theory of affordances is a radical departure from existing theories of value and 
meaning.” 66 
The CI account advises us to depart less radically. Rather than following Gibson in 
identifying the meanings of objects with their implications for the interested behaviors of an 
animal in an environment simpliciter, the CI account restricts meaning to affordances only with 
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respect to the practice of interpretation. Interpretation, meanwhile, is always undertaken in some 
broader practical, theoretical, or affective context: interpretation guides intelligent action, belief 
formation, and affection. Instead of being in the composition and layout of surfaces, as directly 
perceivable Gibsonian affordances are, meanings are about something other than the surface 
qualities of the objects that bear them; instead of being directly enjoyed or suffered, meanings are 
implicated in larger contexts of belief, action, or feeling. To the extent that an object is cognitively 
identified with or individuated by some immediate import, the need for any appeal to its 
“meaning” with respect to that import is obviated. (Judgments of an object’s meaning are 
revisable under critical reflection without ceasing to be judgments of (a) that object’s (b) 
meaning.) Water affords locomotion to a fish without recourse to any interpretive process, and 
there’s little to be gained by conflating meaning with this very general sense of the way features of 
an environment can facilitate or hinder an organism’s interested behaviors. “Affordance” already 
captures that important idea well. 
Parallel to our discussion of Dretske, then, a simple assimilation of affordances to natural 
meanings ultimately does Gibson’s own theory no favors. But, again, there’s a natural way to 
integrate an understanding of meaning consistent with the CI account into a broadly Gibsonian 
idiom: by regarding meanings as distinctively interpretive affordances. The suggestion is 
intermediate between Gibson’s style of treating meaning, value, and affordance as roughly 
interchangeable terms, and a finer distinction he makes within the category of affordances, when 
he picks out “a very special class of artificial objects” called “human displays”—“surface[s] that 
ha[ve] been shaped or processed so as to exhibit information for more than just a surface itself.”67 
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Gibson wrote as if the dichotomy between import trafficked in intentional communication and 
import perceived directly was exhaustive: 
The concept of information with which we are most familiar is derived from our 
experiences of communicating with other people and being communicated with, not 
from our experience of perceiving the environment directly. We tend to think of 
information primarily as being sent and received, and we assume that some intermediate 
kind of transmission has to occur, a “medium” of communication or a “channel” along 
which the information is said to flow… like the spoken and written words of language, 
man-made. The ambient stimulus information available in the sea of energy around us is 
quite different. The information for perception is not transmitted, does not consist of 
signals, and does not entail a sender and a receiver. The environment does not 
communicate with the observers who inhabit it. Why should the world speak to us?68 
 
But as Dretske hoped to explain, even objects that haven’t been intentionally processed for the 
purpose (and are hence “natural” in the relevant sense) may “exhibit information for more than 
just [their] surface[s].” When this information is relevant and accessible by means of 
interpretation to an organism engaged in a practical, theoretical, or affective project—when a 
surface has, to modify Gibson’s phrase, interpretive affordances—we have the basis for an 
understanding of natural meaning consistent with the CI account. 
Ultimately, then, natural meaning, understood according to the precepts of the CI 
account, resists strict assimilation to Dretske’s notion of information and to Gibson’s notion of 
ecological affordances. Instead, the CI account recommends an intermediate way of 
understanding natural meaning that draws powerful insights from both traditions, without 
disfiguring either. Unlike information, natural meaning isn’t insensitive to the environmental 
conditions, capacities, and interests of its interpreters; neither, however, is it implicated merely in 
the immediate doings, sufferings, or perceivings that environmental objects afford. Instead, 
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natural meaning is grounded in the informational relationships that natural objects, states, and 
events share with one another, whose basis Dretske strove to explain. Such relationships, however, 
precisely, they are understood, can generate interpretive affordances—meanings—without relying 
on the sort of intentional productions that give life to manufactured symbols, like strings of 
language. This is why, even if nature doesn’t speak to us, we can sometimes listen in. 
 
§3.3 “Linguistic” Meaning 
In Ursula Le Guin’s Earthsea stories, wizards work magic by their knowledge of the “Old Speech,” 
also called the “True Speech”—the language of dragons. The words of the Old Speech give their 
speakers power because they’re the words of original creation: they compose “the language Segoy 
spoke who made the islands.”69 Everything in Earthsea has one, and only one, true name in the 
Old Speech: the name by which it was made to be. The wizards of Earthsea spend their lives 
learning these names, and the methods by which they can be discovered—many for the power it 
gives them, some few simply to understand and to love the world in which they live. No wizard 
can use the Old Speech to lie. In Earthsea, like John’s Gospel, in the beginning was the word. 
 If we lived in Earthsea, I wouldn’t need to include a separate section on linguistic 
meaning—or, at least, the reason I’d have for doing so would be very different. The languages we 
know aren’t like Le Guin’s Language of the Making. Instead, we live in the world Galileo 
described, in which “names and attributes must be accommodated to the essence of things, and 
not the essence to the names, since things come first and names afterwards”;70 the world in which, 
as Juliet protested, “a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.”71 Like any other meaningful 
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object, linguistic utterances have interpretive affordances: under the right circumstances, they can 
tell us that M3 recently passed this way just as well as his fresh footprints in the snow, and they 
can inform us of a tree’s age just as well as the rings in its trunk. But footprints and tree rings 
relate to their meanings in a way similar to the way that the objects of Earthsea relate to their 
names: tracks of any other shape would not be M3’s. The relationship between units of language 
and the meanings they can be used to communicate seems more arbitrary, more contingent. 
Granted that the noises others make, and the shapes they inscribe, can have meaning, just as the 
CI account characterizes it; one difficulty is, how? As Paul Horwich puts the question, “How is it 
possible for…intrinsically inert ink-marks… to reach out into the world and latch on to a definite 
portion of reality?”72  
 Unfortunately, Horwich’s question isn’t the only one that philosophers of language and 
mind have supposed a “theory of meaning” (in these fields, usually meant restrictively) ought to 
answer. We’ve already seen that Davidson wanted to know how a system composed of finite 
elements, employed by agents of limited cognitive powers, could, in principle, be used to generate 
an infinite (or, at any rate, uncountably large) number of meaningful sentences. And Grice drew 
our attention to the peculiarly non-factive way that linguistic utterances can “mean”: the sense in 
which the sentence  
(9) “Cassio was muttering about Desdemona in his sleep”  
uttered by Iago to Othello, means that Cassio was muttering about Desdemona in his sleep—even 
if, in fact, Cassio never said anything in his sleep. More basically, there’s something extraordinary 
about the way that language apparently enables us to produce objects with relatively precise 
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interpretive affordances for one another at will. Nature may not speak to us, but how is it that we 
speak to one another? 
 This variety of questions (and the ones I mentioned above are just the beginning) helps 
explain my reason for using scare-quotes in this section’s title (“‘Linguistic’ Meaning”). It’s not 
that I find the notion suspicious; it’s just that it’s difficult to pin down. The object-type 
classificatory strategy I proposed in §3.1 makes the issue seem straightforward: “linguistic” 
meaning arises when we interpret distinctively linguistic objects. But as I noted then, that strategy 
is both provisional and incomplete. Provisional, because the strategy is only useful for current 
purposes if it tracks, at least roughly, the theoretically interesting kind in question; incomplete, 
because we still require a specification of what counts as a distinctively “linguistic” object. 
 Neither issue admits of a simple, uncontroversial resolution. It’s difficult to delimit the 
domain of the “linguistic” without begging many of the philosophical questions that a theory of 
meaning ought to adjudicate; moreover, as Elisabeth Camp has observed, even philosophers 
whose trademark claims rely on the distinction between language and nonlanguage haven’t 
always provided a sufficiently thorough accounting of the distinction’s supposed grounds.73 
Further, having arrived at some specification of the distinctively linguistic, we may discover that 
the features of linguistic meaning centrally in need of philosophical explanation aren’t uniquely 
possessed by linguistic objects after all, in which case “linguistic meaning” will have turned out to 
be an imperfect name for the philosophically relevant variety of meaning in question. 
 David Lewis offers a sensible suggestion about how to proceed: “In order to say what a 
meaning is, we may first ask what a meaning does, and then find something that does that.”74 The 
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problem is that meaning is supposed to do so much: to explain how language facilitates 
communication, to explain how inert marks or even brain states “reach out into the world and 
latch on to…reality,” to underwrite notions of translation, synonymy, analytic truth—and so on. 
Obviously, the theory of meaning in philosophy of language and mind is implicated in so broad 
an array of issues that an attempt to treat them all in a single section of a single dissertation 
chapter would be quixotic if it weren’t so certain to be bereft of romance and poetry. 
 Fortunately for us both, the purpose of this section isn’t to resolve (or even to address) all 
of the philosophical mysteries that the kind(s) of meaning associated with language generate. 
Instead, I hope only to show, in broad strokes, the way a notion of linguistic meaning can be 
integrated into the CI account, and, second, that this integration provides a useful rubric for 
ordering our thinking about some of the important issues at hand.  
 
§3.3.1 The Metaphysics of Meaning 
One question that has been relatively central to the theory of meaning in the last century or so is 
whether it’s appropriate to think of the meanings of linguistic objects as a kind of entity, and, if 
so, to say what kind of entity they are. Referential theories of meaning are among the simplest and 
most resilient sort of entity theory, with the basic, intuitive idea being that the meanings of words 
are the things in the world they refer to, or stand for.75 The British Empiricists, by contrast, 
thought that the meanings of words were mental entities. As Hobbes put the point, “Words so 
connected as that they become signs of our thoughts, are called SPEECH, of which every part is a 
name”;76 as Locke had it, “The use, then, of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas 
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they stand for are their proper and immediate signification.”77 Frege advanced influential 
arguments against the sufficiency of either position: meanings couldn’t be ideas because ideas are 
subjective, whereas meanings are publicly shared (“capable of being the common property of 
many people”); meanings couldn’t simply be the objects in the world words refer to because 
(among other reasons) this trivializes identity claims (like “water is H2O”) that state empirical 
discoveries rather than analytic truths. Instead, Frege taught philosophers to identify the 
meanings of words with their “senses”—abstract but objective “modes of presentation.”78 Finally 
there are the philosophers who find the effort to identify meanings with entities altogether 
misguided. For Quine, Fregean senses were “creatures of darkness”—ontological extravagancies 
without standing from a physicalist perspective, and therefore best exorcised.79 Davidson objected 
to positing entities in a theory of meaning not because such entities “are abstract or that their 
identity conditions are obscure, but because they have no demonstrated use.”80 Does the CI 
account shed light on these issues? 
 Not as directly as it might initially seem. In the introduction to §2, I associated the CI 
account with the tradition that advocates understanding meaning in terms of “activity rather than 
ontology”—an affiliation that seems to foreshadow an allegiance with the anti-entity position. I 
went on to develop an account of meaning, grounded in the structural role it plays in the practice 
of interpretation, according to which meanings are interpretive affordances—relational 
properties—of objects (grammatically understood). Isn’t that, then, what the CI account has to 
say about the metaphysics of meaning? Whether or not these relational properties get counted as 
“entities” of some kind will depend on the precise way that term (“entity”) is construed in one’s 
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metaphysics, along with the way that the favored metaphysical approach regards the various 
possible grammatical “objects” (events, experiences, states-of-affairs, relationships, artworks, etc.) 
of interpretation. But, regardless of the way those details are adjudicated, the basic contribution of 
the CI account seems clear: meanings are relational properties of objects, as detailed in §2. 
 The problem with this sort of direct application of the CI account to the issue in question 
is that it ignores the point I made in §3.3: that, at least in one of its important phases, the search 
for a theory of meaning in the philosophy of language assumes that linguistic utterances 
frequently have the sort of interpretive affordances the CI account associates with meaning in 
general, and asks, instead, how this can come to be, what contribution language makes to 
investing otherwise apparently arbitrary or inert sounds, gestures, or inscriptions with the rich 
interpretive affordances they apparently have. And it’s with respect to this question that the 
positions I canvassed above ought, at least in large part, to be understood. Associating meaning-
entities with words, for example, is usually part of an effort to explain how words can be 
combined to compose sentences that have the interpretive affordances that they do. 
 There are two things worth noticing about this observation. First, it highlights the danger 
of a thoughtlessly direct application of the CI account to every question associated with the theory 
of linguistic meaning (as well as the correlative point that restrictivism is overstated rather than 
unmotivated). Second, it’s a starting point for showing the value of understanding these more 
particular questions in light of a comprehensive understanding of meaning in general. By way of 
illustrating the first of those two points, consider two strings of inscriptions William Lycan 
introduces at the beginning of his introductory text on philosophy of language: 
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(10) w gfjsdhkj jiobfglglf ud 
(11) Good of off primly the a the the why.81 
Lycan calls both (10) and (11) meaningless, and an application of the CI account seems to be able 
to account for that judgment easily enough: it’s hard to imagine a context in which encountering 
an utterance of either would afford much guidance for affect, action, or theory.82 But how would a 
direct application of the CI account make sense of the intuitively clear distinction Lycan draws 
between (10) and (11)—that the latter contains “individually meaningful words,” whereas the 
former doesn’t? If an instance of (11) affords little or no import to an interpreter in a given 
context, and is thereby rightly called “meaningless,” on what basis do we rightly call the words it 
contains “meaningful”? If the whole has no import, then how could its parts? The point isn’t that 
there’s not a good (and relatively obvious) answer to this question; it’s that a flat-footedly direct 
application of the CI account to the question of linguistic meaning makes it seem as if there isn’t. 
 Arriving at the obvious answer involves returning to the suggestion I made in §3.1, and 
raised some difficulties with in §3.3: to regard linguistic meaning as arising from distinctively 
linguistic objects. We can still make sense, in CI terms, of the kind of “meaning” the word-
forming collections of letters in (11) have but the gibberish collections in (10) don’t: the 
collections in (11), regarded as types, have standard uses with respect to the general task of 
producing and interpreting English sentences; English sentences, in turn, have affordances for the 
task of interpreting utterances made by means of those sentences on particular occasions. If we 
begin with the (relatively) uncontroversial idea that language is a tool or set of tools that allows 
for the intentional production of objects with certain interpretive affordances (like one person 
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uttering to another “M3 recently passed this way” in a context in which that assertion would 
typically be made), the CI account identifies an object’s distinctively linguistic meaning with the 
general role it plays in facilitating that process. In this sense, the mistake of treating linguistic 
meaning as CI meaning simpliciter is analogous to the mistake I attributed to Gibson, above, 
when his overly broad use of “meaning” conflated interpretive affordances with affordances 
simpliciter. Complementarily, we should recognize a potential inadequacy of the suggestion, as 
formulated, that linguistic meaning arises from (should be identified with) the interpretation of 
distinctively linguistic objects. If I correctly infer a speaker’s nation of origin on the basis of the 
accent she has when she says  
(12) “M3 has just been by here” 
it’s implausible to deny that I have thereby interpreted a linguistic object: in fact, my 
interpretation seems overwhelmingly likely if not necessarily to have involved a recognition that 
(12) was a deployment of language. But “the speaker is from Bulgaria” is certainly no part of the 
linguistic meaning of (12) in the sense that interests philosophers of language—instead, what we 
want to isolate is the contribution language, understood as a generally available communicative 
tool, makes to (12)’s possessing the interpretive affordance that motivated the speaker to produce 
it.83  
 Subtracting the talk explicitly related to the way these issues might be integrated into the 
CI perspective, most or all of what I’ve said in the last few paragraphs will register for 
philosophers of language as, first, familiar, and, second, the entry-points (rather than resolutions) 
of longstanding controversies. This reflects the fact that my effort thus far has been to show that 
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these issues can be understood as falling within the scope of a general account of meaning along 
the lines of the one I offered in §2. I think this process, however, has already provided some 
evidence that strongly restrictive approaches to meaning are inadequate. Take two of the 
familiarities I canvassed above. The idea that the “meanings” of words (if there are such things) 
should be understood according to the way they contribute to the meanings of the sentences in 
which they appear traces back, at least, to Frege’s belief in the primacy of the sentence (also 
sometimes called his “context principle”):  
That we can form no idea of its content is therefore no reason for denying all meaning to 
a word, or for excluding it from our vocabulary. We are indeed only imposed on by the 
opposite view because we will, when asking for the meaning of a word, consider it in 
isolation, which leads us to accept an idea as a meaning. Accordingly, any word for which 
we can find no corresponding mental picture appears to have no content. But we ought 
always to keep before our eyes a complete sentence. Only in a sentence have the words 
really a meaning…It is enough if the sentence taken as a whole has a sense; it is this that 
confers on its parts also their content.84   
 
But why (or in what sense) do sentences deserve to be regarded as primary, if we (standardly) 
apprehend their meanings on the basis of our knowledge of the meanings of their parts? The 
answer is that only sentences, uttered in a context, have interpretive affordances in the broader 
sense discussed in §2: interpreters can use them to guide belief, action, or affect in an evaluative 
context, often in ways equivalent to the way they can use natural signs, like footprints in the snow. 
(In many evaluative contexts, the import of encountering footprints in the snow or an utterance 
of (12) will be roughly the same.) Words, by contrast, don’t generally have interpretive 
affordances in concrete situations unless they form part of a larger sentence: the interpretive value 
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they provide is parasitic on the interpretive value of the sentences in which they appear—and this 
latter kind of interpretive value isn’t possessed exclusively by linguistic items.  
A second familiarity I introduced above, by way of an attempt to isolate a distinctively 
linguistic sense of “meaning”, was related to Grice’s warning against conflating the “total 
signification” of an utterance with its conventional meaning: roughly, the distinction between an 
utterance’s full suite of interpretive affordances, and the subset of that full suite made directly 
available by an interpreter’s pre-existing knowledge of the language in which the utterance is 
made.85 So each of these important observations already relies for its justification (Frege) or 
articulation (Grice) on a concept of meaning not exclusively possessed by linguistic objects. 
 In §3.3, I claimed not only that linguistic meaning could be integrated into a more 
comprehensive approach, but also that taking a more comprehensive approach could enlighten us 
with respect to controversies about meaning that frequently arise within the philosophy of 
language and mind. I think the paragraph above does some work toward keeping that promise, by 
illustrating the fact that at least some of the central (if not wholly uncontroversial) insights of 
philosophy of language already involve a more ecumenical stance than statements like “only 
linguistic forms have meanings” allow. (And this observation, as I suggested in §3.2, is only 
amplified when we consider the explosion of recent work concerned with the evolution of 
language and the intricacies of animal cognition.) Nonetheless, to conclude, I’d like to return to 
aspects of the substantive questions I raised at the beginning of this section, considering not just 
how these issues can be understood in light of a more general approach to meaning, but also how 
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taking that more ecumenical perspective can generate worthwhile insight. The related questions 
I’ll address are: (1) are meanings “in the head”? and (2) is meaning inherently social? 
 
§3.3.2 Are Meanings “in the Head”? 
As we saw in §3.3.1, Hobbes had a simple, intuitive account of linguistic meaning, according to 
which names are “signs of our conceptions…not signs of the things themselves.” In fact, Hobbes 
thought, communication is only a secondary function of names; they are first and primarily aids 
for individual thought: “So that the nature of a name consists principally in this, that it is a mark 
taken for memory’s sake; but it serves also by accident to signify and make known to others what 
we remember ourselves.”86 A significant portion of 20th century philosophy of language (extended 
back, for convenience’s sake, to include Frege’s work in the late 19th century) was dedicated to 
refuting these claims, and the widespread dissatisfaction with the first (that names are signs of 
conceptions rather than things) is captured well by Hilary’s Putnam’s famous slogan, “meanings 
just ain’t in the head!”87  
 Putnam’s central reasons for protesting as he did are reflected in the CI account of 
meaning. He formulates his protest as a rejection of three claims, held jointly:  
1. Every word he uses is associated in the mind of the speaker with a certain mental 
representation.  
2. Two words are synonymous (have the same meaning) just in case they are associated 
with the same mental representation by the speakers who use those words.  
3. The mental representation determines what the word refers to, if anything.88 
 
Mental representations alone can’t fix reference, Putnam points out, because both environmental 
and social factors contribute to fixing a term’s reference, as well. For example, Putnam purports to 
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be personally unable to distinguish between elm and beech trees, yet he can use the terms “elm” 
and “beech” in discourse to refer to the two different types, because he can “always rely on 
experts” to do the necessary distinguishing for him. (This case is supposed to demonstrate that 
reference is socially determined.)89 More radically, Putnam claims that the environment itself 
contributes to the meaning of natural kind terms. He imagines a Twin Earth, identical in every 
respect with Earth, except that the stuff called “water” on Twin Earth is a fundamentally different 
chemical compound (though indistinguishable at the level of everyday phenomena) than the stuff 
called “water” on Earth. Even supposing that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings have not yet 
developed their chemistry sufficiently to recognize the difference between the two substances 
(and so associate the same mental representations with the term “water”), their respective “water” 
words, Putnam thinks, have different references. “Meaning is interactional,” Putnam concludes. 
“The environment itself plays a role in determining what a speaker’s words, or a community’s 
words, refer to.”90 
 The CI account lends some credence to these anti-mentalistic insights. Interpretive 
affordances aren’t “in the head”—they’re properties of objects (including words) as those objects 
relate to potential interpreters, situated in environments. Words, furthermore, have the 
interpretive affordances they do on the basis of the role they play in a system (language) that 
facilitates overt communication: the intentional production of objects that offer particular 
interpretive affordances to an audience. Given that the practical, theoretical, and affective projects 
that lead humans to engage in interpretation are often communal rather than individual 
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undertakings, it should be no surprise that we can often rely on one another’s expertise when we 
use terms to refer, sentences to assert, and so on. 
 The role that Putnam assigns to the environment in determining a term’s reference is a 
more complex issue. On the CI account, reference is, in the first place, something agents do. If 
objects can be said to “refer,” it’s because interpretive agents refer by them. To alter slightly 
another thought experiment of Putnam’s: if seaweed pulled out by a tide leaves channels in the 
sand that coincidentally inscribe “CHURCHILL,” those markings don’t refer to Churchill; but if 
Churchill himself, in an act of vanity, traced the same shape, it would.91 In the example about 
beeches and elms, speakers are able to use a communal tool to refer to objects they can’t 
themselves fully distinguish because they can rely on the abilities of other members of their 
community when they undertake joint action. But in cases like Twin Earth, Putnam suggests that 
speakers can refer to kinds that no one in the language community, nor any grouping of its 
members in concert, can currently distinguish with complete precision. Is that really possible? 
 Ultimately, from the CI perspective, this is a question about what can be done with 
language: a question that requires careful reflection on language and its use, rather than one that 
can be answered merely by appeal to a general account of meaning. Granted, the CI account of 
meaning regards an interpreter’s environment (including her social world) as generating the 
problems in which the need for interpretation arises, as well as providing her with meaningful 
objects and even the resources necessary for the intentional production of more meaningful 
objects. But it doesn’t follow from these generalities about the way that our environment 
contributes to meaning that speakers can index their terms to natural essences that no one can 
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currently characterize (as Putnam portrays pre-chemistry Earthlings as able to do, with respect to 
water).  
 Nonetheless, I think there’s reason to believe that speakers can do something like this, at 
least. An underappreciated fact about language (underappreciated in its theory, but not its 
practice) is the fact that we use language not merely to communicate to others what we already 
know about the world, but also to structure our (often collaborative) efforts to learn about the 
world. Scientific terms, for example, are often introduced into discourse long before anyone has a 
precise (or even wholly correct!) understanding of the full suite of their referents’ properties: 
consider the history of terms like GENE and ELECTRON.92 Nonetheless, Putnam is probably right to 
insist that the reference of these terms doesn’t change with every new piece of knowledge gleaned, 
or correction made, in the process of inquiry: Bohr’s theory of electrons in 1934 was a successor 
to his theory in 1900—both theories of electrons—rather than a new theory about something else. 
More importantly for my current purposes, whether or not processes like these ultimately 
vindicate Putnam-style externalism about reference-fixation, they proceed along the lines that the 
CI account should lead us to expect. Presenting her “cognitive-historical” approach to conceptual 
innovation in science, Nancy Nersessian notes that  
Novel concepts arise from attempts to solve specific problems, using the conceptual, 
analytical, and material resources provided by the cognitive-social-cultural context in 
which they are created…A naturalist recasting of the problem of conceptual change in 
science shifts the focus of the problem from the conceptual structures themselves to the 
nature of the practices employed by human agents in creating, communicating, and 
replacing scientific representations of a domain. That is, it shifts the focus from the 
products to the processes, from the structures to the practices… To be successful in 
building an account of conceptual innovation, thus, requires both a model of the scientist 
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qua human agent and knowledge of the nature of the practices actually used in creating 
and changing conceptual structures.93 
 
 Meanings aren’t just in the head. As the CI account insists, meaning, across its varieties, is 
a property of objects that compose an environment, understood in relation to the interpretive 
agents who inhabit that environment. A danger of studying meaning in purely linguistic contexts 
(or in mental contexts cashed out in linguistic terms) is the temptation it offers to focus 
exclusively on the semantic mappings between ready-made, abstract symbolic structures and the 
reality these structures seem to “represent,” as if such relations could ultimately float free of the 
natures of the practical agents who employ them, and the environmental and social conditions in 
which they arise and evolve. But even if we succeed in resisting the temptation to treat language in 
this incomplete way, we still risk misunderstanding meaning if we restrict our attention to the role 
it plays in language. So, at any rate, I’ll argue in the next section. 
 
§3.3.2 Is Meaning Necessarily Social? 
I started the last section by claiming that a significant portion of 20th century philosophy of 
language can be understood as a repudiation of Hobbes’s thoroughly mentalist, thoroughly 
individualist theory of meaning. According to Hobbes, not only are the meanings of the words we 
use ideas in our minds, rather than things in the world, but the role they play in overt 
communication is only “accidental”—they are, first and foremost, aids to individual cognition: 
“sensible moniments” for storing and ordering our otherwise inconstant, fading, and desultory 
thoughts.94 In response to claims like these, philosophers have more recently insisted on the 
fundamentally social nature of meaning. Perhaps the most famous instance of this sort of 
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insistence is Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: his recommendation in that work that we 
understand meaning in the context of the social interactions (“language games”) in which it 
arises, and his argument against the very possibility of a private language.95 We can find similar, 
anticipatory sentiments in Dewey’s work. According to Dewey, meaning comes into being with 
communication: “When communication occurs, all natural events are subject to reconsideration 
and revision; they are re-adapted to meet the requirements of conversation, whether it be public 
discourse or that preliminary discourse termed thinking. Events turn into objects, things with a 
meaning.” Furthermore, “When the introspectionist thinks he has withdrawn into a wholly 
private realm of events disparate in kind from other events, made out of mental stuff, he is only 
turning his attention to his own soliloquy. And soliloquy is the product and reflex of converse 
with others; social communication is not an effect of soliloquy.”96 
 With respect to language as it has evolved and actually exists, a picture like Wittgenstein’s 
and Dewey’s is almost certainly closer to the mark than Hobbes’s. Putnam’s observation about the 
linguistic division of labor shows one way that the social functions of language give rise to 
possibilities of meaning that are inexplicable in terms of a purely individualistic theory, and most 
current theories of the evolution of language (and the cognitive capacities underpinning it) place 
primary emphasis on its embeddedness in and facilitation of various sorts of social interaction.97 
Nonetheless, appealing to a more comprehensive view of meaning shows why objecting to 
Hobbes by claiming that meaning is inherently or necessarily social overstates the case. Instead, 
linguistic meaning inherits its sociability from the sociability of language. But because meaning in 
general, understood fundamentally in terms of the activity of interpretation, is a broader 
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phenomenon than the sort of “nonnatural” meaning characteristic of intentional communication, 
it’s a mistake to restrict all meaning-related phenomena to those who engage in social discourse. 
In fact, not even the intentional use of symbols (objects intentionally manufactured to possess 
interpretive affordances) needs to be social in the way that Dewey seemed to suggest. 
 The first point is simple: objects have interpretive affordances (meanings) with respect to 
a wide range of projects, and only some of these are essentially social undertakings. An organism 
might have many asocial interests, for example, in whose light an ability to predict changes in the 
weather by interpreting natural signs is useful. Even the sort of interpretation that might be 
involved in tracking prey on the basis of scent or footprints isn’t social, in Dewey’s sense—there is 
no “community of meaning,” no established “cooperation in activity in which there are partners, 
and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership.”98 If we’re right to 
conceive of language as a publicly available tool for intentional communication, then the 
evaluative contexts within which it is produced and interpreted will necessarily be social 
(parasitically when not directly), as Dewey and Wittgenstein argue. But this observation doesn’t 
extend to meaning in general. 
 If that argument doesn’t itself redeem Hobbes, who was, after all, making claims about 
language himself, it’s also worth noticing that even intentionally produced symbols can be used in 
the asocial way he suggests, even if such “marks” aren’t the primary use of linguistic items. There 
is no deep metaphysical reason to suppose (nor, as far as I know, any strong empirical evidence to 
believe) that a contrived system of “sensible moniments” wouldn’t aid the memory in just the way 
Hobbes suggests. A Robinson Crusoe figure, for example, might easily find it valuable to devise a 
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system of markings for differentiating the caves on his island—one mark for a cave that provides a 
useful storage space or shelter, another to indicate caves that are the dens of hostile animals, etc. 
These markings possess interpretive affordances but they imply no sociability, barring a 
trivialization of “social” to include the diachronic relations of a single self. 
 Tempering the critique of Hobbes in this way has implications for the familiar strategy of 
dismissing epistemological worries about “private” Cartesian mental states by observing that 
mental states have semantic content (on this strategy, a kind of meaning) and meaning is 
necessarily social, and therefore necessarily public. Clifford Geertz employs a strategy like this in 
his defense of the scientific credentials of cultural anthropology, which he characterizes as “not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.”99 Having 
provided a “semiotic” account of culture (that is, having defined culture in terms of meaning) 
Geertz justifies culture as a proper object of scientific study by arguing that culture is neither 
“inside the head” nor hopelessly subjective—“Culture is public because meaning is.”100 I suspect 
that Geertz has things the wrong way around: cultural meaning is public because culture is. The 
robust sociability that supports Geertz’s Ryle-inspired argument for the publicity of culture is a 
feature of the sort of object involved in cultural interpretation—using Geertz’s own term, “social 
expressions”—rather than a feature of meaning itself.  
 
§3.3.4 Meaning and “Content” 
My goal in this chapter was to show that the varieties of meaning manifest in such a broad range 
of our discourse can be coherently understood as species of a common genus, and, consequently, 
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that an ecumenical approach to meaning—one that recognizes rather than ignores or denies 
MEANING’s conceptual integrity—ultimately clarifies rather than obscures many of the issues we 
use “meaning” to articulate. For a concluding illustration, I want to return to one of the 
provocative claims I began with—Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn’s pronouncement that “like 
the Loch Ness Monster, meaning is a myth.”101  
 Fodor and Pylyshyn occasionally write as if they expect to be the subjects of the next 
Michael Lewis explainer-turned-Hollywood-blockbuster: 
As we understand the jargon of Wall Street, a “contrarian” is someone whose practice is 
to buy when everybody else sells and to sell when everybody else buys. In effect, 
contrarians believe that what more or less everybody else believes is false more or less all 
of the time. This book is an essay in contrarian semantics.102 
 
So it’s dispiriting to learn, twenty pages after the Loch Ness Monster comparison, that (“of 
course”) Fodor and Pylyshyn don’t intend to deny that communication, paraphrase, translation, 
or (as far as I can tell) any other everyday activity that involves meaning or its preservation “really 
happen.” Instead, they just warn us not to expect a “first-class” scientific theory that will tell us, 
definitively, which of two translations of Pride and Prejudice is better, or whether two terms are 
“strictly speaking” synonymous.103 When we discover that the sense in which Fodor and Pylyshyn 
deny that meaning exists leaves nearly all of the ways that “meaning” is deployed in everyday 
discourse unaltered, the comparison with the Loch Ness Monster seems a lot less swashbuckling. 
It might also lead us to question the utility of using the term “meaning” as they do—defined in 
terms of a relatively technical theory of “conceptual content,” rather than with respect to the way 
the word is used in far more heavily trafficked (and important) discursive contexts. Things might 
53 
 
be clearer (and ultimately less dispiriting, even if momentarily less exciting) if they just said that 
they don’t think that the content of mental representations is best understood in terms of 
intensions. 
 In fact, this is another area where the mistake of understanding meaning primarily 
according to its linguistic manifestations causes confusion. From the CI perspective, the issue that 
concerns Fodor and Pylyshyn isn’t an issue about meaning at all. The kind of primitive, innate, 
purely individualistic “concepts” posited by the representational theory of mind Fodor and 
Pylyshyn advocate are not themselves objects of interpretation: we don’t encounter superficially 
opaque “mentalese” symbols and then interpret their import. Setting aside the question of 
whether this sort of representationalist program is ultimately the right paradigm for the study of 
the mind, gliding thoughtlessly between the way that mentalese symbols have “content” and 
terms in natural language do is dangerous. If there are mentalese symbols, they are neither the 
objects nor the tools of public dispute (consider “freedom”), nor pieces of our cultural inheritance 
(like “gene”); we don’t use them, together, in shared enterprises; we don’t use them to insult one 
another, or to express our sense of irony; they aren’t a medium in which we make art. As we’ve 
already noticed, the social functions of language give its objects special interpretive features, and 
the fact that we do interpret language raises distinctive questions. Except insofar as we identify 
thought with subvocalizations of natural language, then, the strategy of modeling the medium of 
thought on our medium of communication needs to be undertaken carefully—neither can be 
straightforwardly read off of the other. Importing the term “meaning” as a residue from debates 
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about linguistic content, only to adopt a nihilistic stance, is therefore likely to confuse much more 
than it clarifies. 
 
Conclusion   
Though the concept MEANING is versatile, a fundamental integrity underlies its deployment across 
discursive contexts. That integrity, I’ve argued, is best understood according to the structural role 
that meaning plays in the practice of interpretation. Meanings are the (licensed) outputs of 
potential acts of interpretation: an object’s distinctively interpretive affordances. Interpretation is 
a functionally structured, mentally mediated activity; undertaken by organisms in an 
environment for the purpose of guiding action, belief, or affection; subject to norms of validity 
and fruitfulness. 
Instead of obscuring important distinctions, taking an ecumenical approach to the theory 
of meaning—one that integrates, rather than segregates, meaning’s varieties—helps us make the 
important distinctions clear. Varieties of meaning can be classified according to various features 
of the kind of interpretation in question—most naturally, according to the kind of object being 
interpreted. Beginning from a comprehensive perspective helped us recognize the shortcomings 
of assimilating natural meaning with either semantic information or ecological affordances 
simpliciter. It helped to highlight and characterize some of the ways that accounting for linguistic 
meaning generates distinctive challenges, and to clarify the ways that environmental and social 
factors can contribute to the way terms can be used to refer. It warns against conflating questions 
about meaning with questions about content at large. 
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My reasons for developing and presenting the CI account, however, weren’t just to 
provide an occasion to show the way that old controversies can be recast (if not resolved) in new 
terms. Instead, I think that a comprehensive understanding of meaning is essential to a full 
appreciation of meaning’s ethical dimensions—in both the way that meaning, as a practice, 
generates distinctive sorts of ethical challenges, and correlative ethical obligations; and also in the 
way that the concept MEANING is deployed in ethical discourse (like when we aspire to lead 
“meaningful” lives). In the next chapter, I offer an analysis of “meaning” in ethical contexts, 
showing that the CI account of meaning helps us to better understand worries meaning in and of 
our lives. In the final chapter, I turn my attention to irony, showing how the comprehensive-
interpretive account of meaning provides the resources for developing a satisfying account of 
irony’s nature, in whose terms we can better understand the aesthetic and ethical controversies 
irony generates.  
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ETHICAL MEANING 
A Comprehensive-Interpretive Account of Meaning in and of Life 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the mid-1960s, Nina Simone had a conflict with her husband and manager, Andrew Stroud, 
over the trajectory of her career. Simone wanted to use her music to address the black struggle for 
civil rights, but Stroud disdained these activities, arguing (probably correctly) that they limited 
Simone’s commercial appeal. Their daughter Lisa described the difference like this: “My father 
had a strategic plan in terms of how mom’s career was going to go. He wanted her to be able to 
win all the awards and to become the huge star that he knew she could be…But she wanted 
something more. There was something missing in her—some meaning.”1 
This distinctively ethical sense of “meaning” is a familiar and important part of our 
everyday ethical discourse. We invoke it when we make major life decisions, like which career 
path to pursue, or when we attempt to describe the special sort of value we assign to marriage or 
child-rearing or friendship. In more extreme circumstances, the conviction that life has meaning 
has given some people the will and courage to endure almost unimaginable suffering, even when 
all hope of personal happiness seems lost.2 Conversely, when we’re afflicted with depression, even 
material comfort, professional success, and a conventional family life are no safeguard against 
despair: life, and the relationships and activities it comprises, seem meaningless. And many of us, 
like Simone, suffer more or less recurrent bouts of anxiety about the meaning (or 
meaninglessness) of or in our lives. But what is it, exactly, that we worry is missing? 
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The answer I offer in this chapter aims to help us achieve a better understanding of our 
curiosity, rather than its through satisfaction. My goal, in other words, is to clarify the concept of 
meaning as it functions in ethical contexts (henceforward, “ethical meaning”), rather than to 
argue for a particular conception of ethical meaning. I depart from much of the recent 
philosophical literature on this topic by regarding the way “meaning” functions across discursive 
contexts (the linguistic, natural, and literary senses of “meaning,” for example) as centrally 
significant to understanding the way it functions in ethical contexts: understanding ethical 
meaning requires understanding meaning in general. 
It’s easy to see the attraction of treating meaning’s different senses separately. We 
shouldn’t, for example, expect that a theory of semantics that neatly explains the compositionality 
and generativity of language will provide the antidote to what William James called “the 
nightmare or suicidal view of life”;3 nor should we expect even a deep understanding of life’s 
meaning to answer questions about, say, reference in intensional contexts. In fact, attempts to 
assimilate meaning’s senses risk impoverishing one or more of its dimensions to accommodate 
another. Consider the triviality of a position that Thaddeus Metz canvasses (but does not endorse) 
in his recent survey of theories of meaning in life—that statements about life’s meaning are not 
“well-formed propositions” because “to be meaningful is just to be a symbol, and since life cannot 
be a symbol, life is not the sort of thing that can be meaningful.”4 We shouldn’t rule out the 
possibility that our thought and talk about ethical meaning is confused, but we’re right to be 
unimpressed by the pedantic diagnosis that the confusion arises from an inability to distinguish 
lives from words. 
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Nonetheless, I believe that a substantive, articulable integrity underlies our use of 
“meaning” across contexts, and that appreciating the character of that integrity helps us better 
understand meaning in its more specialized senses—particularly, for my current purpose, its 
ethical sense. In the previous chapter, I proposed that we understand meaning, in general, 
according to its role in the structure of interpretation. Whether the context is ethical, aesthetic, or 
linguistic, meanings are the outputs of acts of interpretation.5 Reflecting on the distinctive 
characteristics of interpretation in general, and then considering the way these function in ethical 
contexts, usefully clarifies what we mean when we use “meaning” in its ethical sense, and provides 
natural answers to several of the central questions that arise from that usage. 
My attempt to substantiate that claim is an effort in three parts. First, I’ll try to develop a 
richer sense of the challenge a theory of ethical meaning should meet. What, broadly, is the kind 
of work we expect the concept of meaning to do in everyday and theoretical ethical discourse? 
And what are the central philosophical questions those discursive responsibilities raise? A good 
theory of ethical meaning ought to explain how and why many of these responsibilities are 
coherently assigned to a unitary concept and, if there are contexts in which our use of the concept 
is confused or inapt, it ought to identify the source of the problem. Second, I’ll briefly review the 
comprehensive account of meaning that, I contend, provides the foundation for an understanding 
of ethical meaning capable of meeting the challenges presented in Part 1. (Following my usage in 
Chapter 1, I’ll refer to my proposal for a comprehensive account of meaning as the “CI 
account”—short for “comprehensive-interpretive”—and the approach to understanding narrower 
senses of meaning on its basis the “CI approach.”) Finally, I’ll apply the general features of 
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meaning adumbrated in Part 2 to the questions about ethical meaning raised in Part 1, detailing 
which features of meaning in everyday and theoretical ethical discourses the CI approach 
vindicates (and how), along with proposing and motivating some of the revisions to discursive 
practice taking that approach involves. 
 
§1 Meaning in Ethical Discourse  
 
A good philosophical account of ethical meaning should be faithful to the way we employ the 
concept, in everyday discourse, to frame ethical issues. This faithfulness criterion, however, 
doesn’t require the supposition that there is a single, rigorous, coherent set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions implicit in our “meaning” talk, waiting to be uncovered: as with most words 
with even moderate currency in our talk and thought, this isn’t the case. Some degree of well-
motivated stipulation is inevitable. Nor should the faithfulness criterion forbid us from proposing 
revisions to some of what is largely implicit in our “meaning” talk. But, if an account of ethical 
meaning is going to have any bearing on the concerns we articulate in its name, it needs to keep 
faith with a reasonable quorum of the central features implicit in our everyday discourse. Lisa 
Stroud’s diagnosis of her parents’ conflict, quoted at the outset, illustrates several of these.   
First, we generally speak of meaning in life as something valuable or desirable: something, 
all things equal, worth wanting; something whose absence is cause for regret or discontent. 
Second, meaning in life is elusive—the kind of thing that goes missing easily enough. People often 
worry that it’s lost, or was never there; finding or making it is a significant challenge; possessing it 
is an accomplishment. Third, ethical meaning has a kind of depth, in the sense of depth that 
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stands in contrast to more “superficial” values or desires, like fame, material wealth, “base” 
pleasures, or other outward markers of status or success. In William James’s words, considering 
meaning in life involves turning our attention away from “the buzzing and jigging and vibration 
of small interests and excitements that form the tissue of our ordinary consciousness,” toward 
“the profounder bass-note of life.”6  
In addition to its role in everyday ethical discourse, meaning is also a tool and, somewhat 
less frequently, a target in ethical theory. Charles Taylor, for example, contends that all cultures 
are entitled to a presumption of equal worth if they “have provided a horizon of meaning for large 
numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long period of time.”7 
In a similar vein, Kwame Anthony Appiah invokes meaning to explain the ethical importance of 
identity—a person’s sense of who she is. Neither moral considerations nor natural constraints are 
sufficient, he thinks, to give our lives a definite shape: “even when we have taken these things into 
account, we know that each human life starts out with many possibilities…everybody has, or 
should have, a variety of decisions to make in shaping a life.”8 We need, then, some additional 
source of reasons to make these choices meaningful: “One thing identity provides is another 
source of value, one that helps us make our way among those options. To adopt an identity, to 
make it mine, is to see it as structuring my way through life.”9 Should we lose touch with this 
source of value, even if by an excess rather than a lack of power, life, Appiah contends, would 
become “meaningless.”10  
The use to which Appiah puts meaning in the discussion above accords well with the 
idea, commonly espoused in the literature that makes ethical meaning its primary target of 
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inquiry, that “meaning” names a distinctive realm of value, reducible to neither duty nor self-
interest, narrowly construed. Metz, for example, objects to purpose-centered conceptions of the 
meaning of life because “they fail to differentiate the meaning of life from other normative 
categories,” and he takes one of the philosophical questions definitive of a conceptual 
investigation of life’s meaning to be: “What should an agent strive for besides obtaining happiness 
and fulfilling obligations?”11 Wolf finds in “meaning” a vocabulary for articulating a richer 
conception of practical reason than those, prevalent in contemporary philosophy, that regard it as 
exhausted by considerations of prudence and morality: in her influential treatment, she casts 
meaning as “a third sort of value a life can possess…not reducible to or subsumable under either 
happiness or morality.”12 Robert Nozick’s work represents an interesting variation on the 
distinctiveness theme. In his parlance, meaning and value are two distinct facets of “worth,” so 
that it makes sense to ask if there might “be a conflict between the meaning and value of a 
person’s life,” or to wonder if there’s “any meaning even to a valuable life.”13 
Appiah’s discussion evokes a second theme that has recently preoccupied philosophers of 
ethical meaning—the question of whether meaning is, in some sense, “subjective” or “objective”.14 
On one hand, the sort of meaning that Appiah claims identities generate for their bearers is, in an 
important way, particular to them: for Mr. Stevens (the narrator of Kazuo Ishiguro’s Remains of 
the Day), for example, becoming a great butler matters not only because of the objective 
importance of the service he provides, but because this was his father’s profession15 On the other 
hand, as we saw above, identity generates meaning in ethical contexts by providing the kind of 
structure of external constraint within which rational choice is possible. Is the meaning that Mr. 
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Stevens’ professional achievements confer on his life diminished by the fact that his master, whose 
judgment and influence Stevens reveres, turns out to have been a Nazi dupe? And to what extent 
does Stevens’ own attitude toward that question determine its answer? 
Consider a strangely ghoulish complementary case. Addressing a group of college 
students at the end of the 19th Century on the question “Is Life Worth Living?”, William James 
suggested that the reflective life, so susceptible to the “skepticism and unreality that too much 
grubbing in the abstract roots of things will breed,” leads us “to the edge of a slope, at the bottom 
of which lie pessimism and the nightmare or suicidal view of life.”1 In his attempt to provide 
whatever remedy reflection can offer for the diseases it breeds, James recalls a formative 
experience from his medical education: 
Consider a poor dog whom they are vivisecting in a laboratory. He lies strapped on a 
board and shrieking at his executioners, and to his own dark consciousness is literally in a 
sort of hell. He cannot see a single redeeming ray in the whole business; and yet all these 
diabolical-seeming events are often controlled by human intentions with which, if his 
poor benighted mind could only be made to catch a glimpse of them, all that is heroic in 
him would religiously acquiesce. Healing truth, relief to future sufferings of beast and 
man, are to be bought by them. It may be genuinely a process of redemption. Lying on his 
back on the board there he may be performing a function incalculably higher than any 
that prosperous canine life admits of; and yet, of the whole performance, this function is 
the one portion that must remain absolutely beyond his ken.2 
 
Should we be consoled by the suggestion that we might share this dog’s plight? Do the good 
consequences of his sufferings make them, or the extinguishing life they harrow, meaningful? Or 
must meaning be appreciated to be had? And would either of these versions of meaning, should 
they be realized, make life worth living? 
                                                          
1 James, “Is Life Worth Living?,” 39. 
2 Ibid., 58. 
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We can find an illustrative theoretical contrast on the objectivity/subjectivity issue in 
Susan Wolf’s and Richard Taylor’s accounts of ethical meaning. Taylor proposes, as a thought 
experiment, that we reimagine the Sisyphus myth, so that, in addition to being consigned to roll 
his boulder up a hill, again and again, for all eternity, Sisyphus is also blessed (or, depending on 
your appraisal of the experiment, cursed) with an injection that gives him an insatiable desire to 
do just this, and causes him to find the activity endlessly engaging.16 If we’re tempted to dismiss 
the potential meaningfulness of this scenario, Taylor argues, we should think more carefully. If we 
imagine that our own lives possessed or could possess some meaning significantly different in 
kind from what Sisyphus, fulfilled, finds in his rock rolling, we’re deceived: the only difference is 
that “whereas Sisyphus himself returns to push the stone up again, we leave this to our children.” 
Properly appreciated, though, this is no cause for despair. As long as we realize plans, however 
ephemeral, that engage our interests, no further questions need be asked: “The day [is] sufficient 
to itself, and so [is] the life…The meaning of life is from within us, it is not bestowed from 
without, and it far exceeds in both its beauty and permanence any heaven of which men have ever 
dreamed.”17  
Though Wolf joins Taylor in recognizing a subjective component of ethical meaning—a 
meaningful life, she thinks, is one its subject must “find fulfilling”—she appraises Taylor’s 
“Sisyphus Fulfilled” scenario differently. On Wolf’s view, ethical meaning has an objective as well 
as subjective component: an activity that inspires our passion and engages our interest only makes 
our lives meaningful if it also involves “participating in or contributing to something whose value 
is independent of oneself.”18 No matter how engaging, fulfilling, and worthwhile an agent might 
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find a given activity, if its object is not “worthy of love”—if it possesses no value whose source can 
be rightly described as “outside the agent”—then it doesn’t confer meaning on the agent’s life. 
Perhaps, having received his injection, Fulfilled Sisyphus is “better off” (though Wolf questions 
even this, pointing out that the badness of being deluded might be worse than the purely 
hedonistic benefits the injection confers), but, according to Wolf, his life has been made no more 
meaningful. Neither are the lives of more familiar characters meaningful, like the “personal 
assistant to a Hollywood star…seduced by the glitter and fame that surround her into thinking 
that catering to her employer’s every whim is a matter of national significance,” or the ambitious 
young attorney who sees “his ardent defense of an unscrupulous corporate client as a noble 
expression of justice in action.” Their activities, however subjectively engaging, fail to meet Wolf’s 
standard of objective worth.19   
This brief survey of the way ethical meaning has been used and theorized in recent 
philosophical work adds to the list of questions raised by our discussion of meaning in ordinary 
ethical discourse. We want an account of meaning that, in addition to accounting for the 
desirability, elusiveness, and depth the concept evokes in everyday ethical discourse, helps us to 
clarify and respond to questions like these: Is the way that ethical meaning is valuable distinct 
from other sorts of value, like those that rationalize and/or motivate moral and egoistic activity? 
Or, as Nozick thought, is meaning distinct even from value itself—a second component of a more 
general category of worth? Insofar as meaning is distinctive, what is its character? How does it 
relate to other normative categories relevant to ethics, like well-being, self-interest, moral duty, 
and pleasure? Can it be possessed simply on the basis of certain subjective states, or does it require 
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some objective component? By what process can we come to possess meaning in our lives? Do we 
see it, find it, or make it? 
I claimed, above, that reflecting on meaning as it functions across discursive contexts—
not only in its ethical dimension, but in, for example, its linguistic or literary or natural modes as 
well—provides insight into the questions just posed. Specifically, an account of meaning couched 
in terms of its distinctive role in the practice of interpretation succeeds in comprehending 
meaning across this broad range of discursive contexts, and a careful examination of the nature of 
interpretation as a practice discloses features of meaning that, applied to ethical contexts, provide 
a strong foundation for meeting the challenges developed in this section. I briefly review this 
comprehensive-interpretive (CI) account of meaning (presented in more detail in chapter 1) 
below. 
 
§2 The Comprehensive-Interpretive Account of Meaning 
 
To review: according to the CI account, meaning is united across its varieties by the distinctive 
role it plays in the general form of interpretation. Interpretation is a functionally structured, 
mentally mediated activity, undertaken by an organism situated within an evaluative context, 
subject to norms of fruitfulness and validity. 
(1) Functionally Structured: interpretation is functionally structured in the bare sense that it 
can be usefully described as taking an input and issuing an output. I’ll refer to the input of 
an interpretation as its object and the output (if the interpretation goes well) as a meaning. 
Simplifying a particularly famous case, Luis and Walter Alvarez interpreted the high 
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concentration of iridium in the K-Pg layer of the geological record (object of 
interpretation) to mean that a massive asteroid struck Earth ~65 million years ago 
(meaning). 
(2) Mental Mediation: interpretation is mentally mediated, rather than automatic. Items are 
objects of interpretation rather than, say, objects of perception when they are, in Clifford 
Geertz’s formulation, “on their surface enigmatical”: their import is not immediately 
apparent.20 Interpreters attend to objects of interpretation as media, possessed of features 
independent of the meanings they disclose, in a way that perceivers (we now think) 
generally do not attend to the “sense data” posited by certain indirect theories of 
perception. Interpretation stereotypically involves a kind of conscious effort that basic 
sensory perception, for example, doesn’t. 
(3) Undertaken by Organisms Situated in an Evaluative Context: interpretation is 
undertaken by agents for the purpose of guiding action, affection, or belief. The cognitive, 
affective, or practical goals that rationalize an act of interpretation, along with the 
complex of constraints and potentialities presented by the interpreter’s environment, 
constitute the interpretation’s evaluative context. For example: both the positions of trees 
in the forest and the footprints on the forest floor carry information, in Fred Dretske’s 
sense, but only the latter are particularly meaningful in the evaluative context of a hunter 
tracking prey. 
(4) Subject to Norms of Validity and Fruitfulness: a good interpretation should be both 
valid and fruitful. Interpretation should be fruitful in the sense that its output ought to be 
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relevant with respect to the evaluative context in which it’s undertaken. (We rightly call 
certain objects or states of affairs “meaningless” when they afford no insight into the task 
at hand.) Second, regardless of their fruitfulness, interpretations should be valid: their 
objects must relate to their outputs in a way that licenses concluding the latter on the 
basis of the former. If the iridium in the K-Pg layer were not causally related to an 
asteroid strike, for example, then it wouldn’t be rightly interpreted as meaning that the 
asteroid struck—even if the asteroid did, in fact, strike just when the interpreters 
conclude it did. 
(5) Clarification: An object has the meanings it does relative to potential rather than actual 
acts of interpretation. Just as a substance can be nutritious for an organism whether or 
not it’s actually ingested and metabolized, an object can be meaningful with respect to a 
potential interpreter in an evaluative context whether or not it is actually interpreted.21 
 
§3 The CI Account Applied 
 
In the first section of this essay, I posed several questions about meaning in ethical contexts. What 
explains the characteristic depth and elusiveness of ethical meaning? What, if anything, is 
distinctive about the sort of value that meaningfulness confers on life? How does meaning relate 
to other sources of motivation, like self-interest and moral duty? Is ethical meaning subjective or 
objective, or does it involve components of both? What’s happened when we lose the sense that 
our lives are meaningful? And how should we describe the process by which we might come to 
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experience our lives as meaningful?—do we simply see the meaning in our lives, or must we find 
it, or make it? 
 Having summarized, in §2, a proposal for understanding meaning across its contexts of 
use, I want now to consider what that comprehensive account implies about how we should 
approach these questions about meaning in its ethical dimension. First, though, I’d like to develop 
a terminological distinction that the CI account puts us in position to make. 
 
§3.1 Meaning in Life and Meaning of Life 
 
Some philosophers use the phrases “the meaning of life” and “meaning in life” roughly 
interchangeably, but for others, the distinction is important. Susan Wolf, for example, favors the 
“meaning in” construction as a way of distancing her work from the relatively grandiose questions 
stereotypically evoked by the “meaning of” construction. As Stephen Macedo puts it, Wolf’s 
subject “is not the question of the ultimate meaning of human life: whether humans are part of a 
larger narrative or higher purpose,” nor does she aim “to fend off existential dread.” Instead she 
hopes to explain what we seek when our aim is find meaning in life: “Is it distinctive, or deducible 
to other aims and conceptions? Is it a helpful category for thinking about good lives that are 
worth living?”22 The structural machinery introduced by the CI account of meaning puts us in a 
position to make this distinction more precise, in a way that will be useful in the discussion that 
follows. 
 According to the CI account, ethical meaning arises when we engage in interpretive 
practice whose objects are distinctively ethical—related, essentially, to the project of living well. In 
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the simplest case, ethical meaning arises when we treat our own lives as objects of interpretation 
(situated, therefore, within some larger evaluative context). These cases are best captured by the 
“meaning of” construction, which accords with Macedo’s usage, above. However, as we’ve already 
noticed, ethical meaning seems to arise on other occasions as well: it’s often natural to 
characterize as ethical the meaning we ascribe to important relationships, activities, or 
mementoes, for example.23 In these cases, our lives themselves aren’t the objects of interpretation. 
Instead, they provide the evaluative context within which our interpretation of a given object 
takes place: we interpret a relationship, activity, or memento according to how it does or might 
contribute to, or hinder, our effort to live well.24 For cases like these, we should employ the 
“meaning in” construction. Interpretations of meaning in a life, of course, will often be made in 
light of a certain conception of the meaning of that life, but this needn’t be the case: a life can 
provide the evaluative context for the interpretation of other objects without being itself regarded 
as meaningful, in the “meaning of” sense. (I’ll have more to say on this topic below, in my 
discussion of Nozick’s worry that ethical meaning generates an infinite regress.) I’ll use the phrase 
“ethical meaning” as general, capturing both meaning of life and meaning in life. 
 With these terminological preliminaries complete, let’s turn our attention to the 
questions I posed in this section’s introduction.  
 
§3.2 Depth and Elusiveness 
 
In the discussion, in §1, of Nina Simone’s conflict with her husband over the direction her career 
should take, we noticed that ethical meaning is often regarded as elusive—something easily lost, 
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whose secure possession is a genuine achievement—and also characterized by a particular sort of 
depth, in contrast to more stereotypically superficial desires or ambitions, like fame, wealth, and 
base pleasures. The CI account enables us to explain these features of ethical meaning in tandem, 
by the fact that meaning, across contexts, is mentally mediated. 
 Meaning, that is, arises when interpretation is required to appreciate an object’s import, 
or value—when its worth, to speak metaphorically, lies somewhere beneath the surface. 
Stereotypically superficial goods like wealth, social status, and pleasure wear their desirability on 
their sleeves: absent some reflective effort, we’re often motivated to pursue them thoughtlessly, 
automatically. Nor does their appreciation or enjoyment seem to require significant interpretive 
effort: pleasure, for example, needn’t be regarded as being situated within some larger evaluative 
context to be desired, nor even be consciously represented to be enjoyed. In fact, when we do 
apply critical reflection to our superficial desires and satisfactions—when we represent them to 
ourselves consciously, and ask of our pleasure, or wealth, or social status, what real meaning it 
has—we risk becoming alienated from their apparent value, and they may cease, at least 
temporarily, to motivate or satisfy us.25 
 Treating something as an object of ethical interpretation, then, involves an expectation 
that it should possess depth. When we ask, for example, if our high social status or wealth is 
really meaningful, we demand that it justify itself by something more than its superficial 
attractions and satisfactions; we want to recognize it as having some positive import in a larger 
evaluative context. Does the wealth I’ve earned reflect the positive contribution I’ve made to my 
society, or has it come at the expense of others? And have I, or will I, use it in a way that matters? 
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Is my high social status a reflection of who I really am—or am I just a fraud? Do I really like or 
respect the people whose admiration I command? And do they really like me, or are they just 
faking, too? 
It should be clear enough that the characteristic elusiveness of ethical meaning is 
intimately related to its depth. Interpretation regards surfaces as surfaces, whose objects are 
situated in larger evaluative contexts, and possess internal and relational properties that require 
effort to uncover and comprehend. When, psychologically, we distinguish between appearance 
and reality, medium and meaning, a psychological precariousness is activated that isn’t present in 
immediate, automatic enjoyments. It’s a precariousness with multiple dimensions, which I’ll 
discuss in more detail below, when I address the questions of how we can come to possess and to 
lose ethical meaning. 
 Before leaving the topics of depth and elusiveness, however, I want to note a revisionary 
implication of the way the CI account explains these features of ethical meaning. Understood in 
contrast to the kind of depth ethical meaning has, superficiality isn’t necessarily pejorative—
despite the fact that, in everyday ethical contexts, it’s hard to use the term without pejorative 
force. A good might motivate us automatically, requiring no interpretive effort for its enjoyment, 
yet still be of great ethical worth. Sheer pleasure, for example, might be a significant component of 
the good life, regardless of the way it’s produced, or its role in some broader evaluative context. If 
deep ambitions and satisfactions really are of greater ethical value than superficial ones, we should 
produce a substantive explanation for that fact. From the CI perspective, that value asymmetry 
isn’t built in to the meanings of the terms.26  
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§3.3 Desirability and Distinctiveness 
 
As much of the language above indicates (for instance “goods” and “apparent goods”), I’ve 
proceeded, to this point, under the assumption that ethical meaning is something desirable and 
valuable—an assumption largely reflected in our everyday discourse. We also noticed that many 
philosophers have regarded the kind of value meaning confers on life to be, in some important 
sense, distinctive: in most cases, distinguished from reasons of self-interest, on one side, and 
moral duty, on the other—but, in at least one interesting case, distinct from value altogether, 
standing alongside it as one of two dimensions of ethical “worth”. The CI account of meaning 
suggests that we revise both assumptions—value/desirability and distinctiveness. The revisions, 
elaborated below, better serve the way we use “meaning” in everyday discourse, preserving what’s 
intuitively important in both assumptions, but forestalling confusions that arise from the 
oversimplifications that, unrevised, they effect.  
 
§3.3.1 Distinctiveness 
 
Let’s begin by taking a closer look at the versions of distinctiveness favored by Susan Wolf and 
Robert Nozick. According to Wolf, meaning constitutes its own “category or dimension of value” 
because it arises when we respond (with some measure of success) to reasons of love, rather than 
reasons of self-interest or moral duty. “When I visit my brother in the hospital,” she writes, 
or help my friend move, or stay up all night sewing my daughter a Halloween costume, I 
act neither for egoistic reasons nor for moral ones. I do not believe that it is better for me 
that I spend a depressing hour in a drab, cramped room, seeing my brother irritable and 
in pain, that I risk back injury trying to get my friend’s sofa safely down two flights of 
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stairs, or that I forego hours of much-wanted sleep to make sure that the wings will stand 
out at a good angle from the butterfly costume my daughter wants to wear in the next 
day’s parade. But neither do I believe myself duty-bound to perform these acts, or fool 
myself into thinking that by doing them I do what will be best for the world. I act neither 
out of self-interest nor out of duty or any other sort of impersonal or impartial reason. 
Rather, I act out of love.27 
 
A proper understanding of meaning, Wolf thinks, ameliorates the distortion generated by dualist 
conceptions of practical reason, which require us to recast (often unconvincingly) concerns like 
the ones illustrated above as either self-interested or morally required—or, worse, to abandon 
them altogether. 
While Wolf attempts to rescue meaning from the sort of grandiose existential pretensions 
with which it’s often popularly associated, Nozick embraces its traditional role in articulating 
those concerns. “From the point of view of the universe,” he asks, “is there any importance to 
ethical behavior, is there any meaning even to a valuable life?”28 This question makes at least 
preliminary sense in Nozick’s idiom, unlike in Wolf’s, because Nozick treats meaning and value as 
independent qualities a life can have, rather than regarding meaning as a distinctive kind of 
ethical value. A second contrast between Nozick’s approach and Wolf’s—one that constitutes a 
kinship between Nozick’s account and the one I advocate—is that Nozick thinks that ethical 
meaning ought to be understood in a way that makes it continuous with the way other sorts of 
entities mean: one species of a larger genus.  
That latter consideration provides the basis for Nozick’s distinction between the meaning 
and value of life. To ask of anything what its meaning is, Nozick claims, “is to ask how it is 
connected, perhaps in specified ways, to other things.”29 Specifically—in concurrence with the CI 
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account—Nozick contends that recognizing something’s meaning involves seeing its importance 
within a wider context.30 Applying this general idea to ethical discourse, he stipulates that “the 
value of a person’s life attaches to it within its limits, while the meaning of his life attaches to it as 
centered in the wider value context beyond its limits.” A life’s meaning and its value stand 
alongside one another as the two independent components of its overall worth: “Value, we now 
see, was only part of the picture—meaning is the other.”31 
Though each of these conceptions of the distinctiveness of ethical meaning has its 
attractions, neither is fully satisfying. Wolf is right to draw our attention to reasons of love, and to 
urge us to resist their assimilation to reasons of self-interest or moral obligation. But restricting 
the domain of ethical meaning to activities that arise from these reasons alone unnecessarily 
narrows the concept in a way that fails to do justice to the role it plays in ethical discourse, and 
creates an unmotivated discontinuity between ethical meaning and meaning in general. When we 
interpret our lives as possessing import with respect to a larger evaluative context, for example, 
our moral projects frequently take on a central significance.32 Our most meaningful relationships, 
moreover, matter not only because of the love they (sometimes) sustain, but also because of the 
duties they engender. Abraham Lincoln’s life illustrates both points. It would be strange to deny 
that the fight against slavery in which Lincoln ultimately found his calling was a central source of 
meaning in his life, or that his engagement in that effort was motivated by a profound sense of 
moral duty—a conviction that, in acting as he did, he did what would be best for the world.33 
Lincoln’s relationship with his wife, Mary, highlights a narrowness in the other direction. He 
often conceived of their marriage in terms of duty rather than love, and, though the quality and 
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content of the relationship’s meaning might certainly have been contingent on the balance it 
ultimately struck between those two forces, the bare fact of its meaningfulness was not. Even if 
Lincoln’s marriage were wholly loveless, it would be implausible to deny that it played an ethically 
meaningful role in his life. In short: our moral projects are too central to the meaning we find in 
life, and the value of our meaningful relationships too thoroughly bound up in the duties they 
involve to make the segregation between meaning, happiness, and morality that Wolf proposes a 
sensible rendering of the role meaning plays in ethical discourse. 
Nozick’s proposal, as we’ve noticed, shares with the CI approach the general idea that 
something’s meaning is constituted, at least in part, by its import in a wider context. But the 
subsequent suggestion that we regard meaning, alongside value, as a distinctive category of 
“worth” creates unnecessary confusions. For instance, Nozick asks “How meaningful is it to 
achieve value?”—as if, absent confirmation that achieving value is meaningful, we might be 
rightly unmotivated to achieve value. (He worries that, “unless it can be shown how our lives and 
existence can have meaning…ethics and value themselves will seem meaningless.”)34 But the CI 
account suggests, sensibly, that worries like these are misplaced. Meaning isn’t the ultimate 
measure of mattering—some independent dimension on which value must register to generate 
reasons, or to count, motivationally. Instead, “meaning” is vocabulary for a certain way of 
recognizing or appreciating value: without the presumption of a shared evaluative context, the 
demand to know something’s “meaning” is incomprehensible.  
Relatedly, Nozick’s way of conceiving ethical meaning’s distinctiveness creates an 
unnecessarily demanding standard for its possibility (and, complementarily, a too radical account 
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of meaning’s elusiveness). Almost any claim to ethical meaning, Nozick argues, can be undercut 
simply by adopting an ever-wider perspective, from which the purported meaning can be called 
into question: “However widely we connect and link, however far our web of meaningfulness 
extends, we can imagine drawing a boundary around all that, standing outside looking at the 
totality of it, and asking ‘but what is the meaning of that, what does that mean?’”35 Meaning, in 
other words, is like importance: “to be important for something which itself is unimportant is for 
these purposes to be unimportant”; similarly, having meaning within a context that cannot itself 
be shown to be meaningful is to have no meaning at all: “When the concern is the meaning of our 
life or existence…we want meaning all the way down.”36 Given this problem of infinite regress, 
the only scenario that Nozick can imagine in which ethical meaning is possible is one that 
involves connecting with a limitless being, like God. (Limitlessness, Nozick thinks, makes it 
possible for something to be its own meaning—though he doesn’t explain how or why the issue of 
meaning should arise at all with respect to a limitless being.)37 
While the CI approach doesn’t deny the possibility that ethical meaning is, ultimately, 
achievable only by way of connection with some infinite being, it does deny that we can arrive at 
this conclusion simply by reflecting on the concept of meaning, as Nozick does. The regress that 
arises from regarding meaning as independent from value, satisfying only if it goes “all the way 
down” (that is, has a source that is itself meaningful), isn’t generated by the CI approach, which 
requires only that meaning be understood in some value-laden, rather than some necessarily 
meaningful context. If the end or ends in whose context a life has meaning have intrinsic value, 
that meaning isn’t undermined if those ends themselves have no further meaning with respect to 
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some wider context.38 In many cases, from the CI perspective, the sort of endlessly iterative 
demands for meaning that Nozick describes are pathological rather than genuinely challenging: 
the “problems” they pose require dissolution rather than solution. (Nonetheless, the CI approach 
offers a satisfying explanation for why such demands for meaning at least appear to be endlessly 
iterable—one I’ll give when I discuss the particular ways in which meaning can be lost, below.)  
 
§3.3.2 Desirability  
 
My focus, so far, has been on the supposed distinctiveness of the value of ethical meaning, but the 
first of the two questions I raised at the outset of this section—the question of whether ethical 
meaning is necessarily valuable or desirable at all—remains. My analysis, in §1, of the role of 
meaning in ordinary discourse, might tempt us to build the desirability of ethical meaning right 
into the concept: implicit in much of our ethical discourse, I noted, is the idea that meaning is 
something worth wanting, something whose absence is cause for regret or discontent. And this 
apparent feature of everyday discourse is largely reflected in the theoretical literature on ethical 
meaning: Metz, for instance, limits his survey of philosophical work on the meaning of life with 
“writings that take a meaningful life to be one desirable facet of a person’s existence.”39 In this 
case, however, the broader perspective afforded by treating ethical meaning as one mode of a 
larger phenomenon is salutary. By introducing considerations beyond meaning’s role in ordinary 
ethical discourse (the requirement, that is, that ethical meaning be understood in accordance with 
the features of meaning in general), the CI approach highlights aspects of ethical meaning which, 
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though, on reflection, do play an important role in ethical discourse, are easily overlooked when 
we make ordinary discourse our only guide.  
In particular, the CI approach recommends a qualified revision to the assumption of 
desirability: that there is an important sense in which ethical meaning is not necessarily something 
good or desirable or valuable. Remember that, according to the CI account, an object’s meanings 
are its interpretive affordances. The import uncovered by interpretation, though its appreciation 
should be useful to a doxastic, affective, or practical agent, needn’t be all-things-considered 
positive with respect to the evaluative context in which it arises. Dark clouds, for example, may be 
meaningful but unwelcome to a group of people enjoying a picnic. 
In the ethical context, an important consequence of this observation is that the 
meaningful aspects of a person’s life (meaning in) won’t all be sources of satisfaction, 
accomplishment, or fulfillment: a failing marriage, from the CI perspective, may be as meaningful 
as a successful one; a relationship with a cold or estranged parent as meaningful as a relationship 
with a loving parent. Similarly, if lives themselves take on meaning with respect to a broader 
evaluative context (meaning of), this meaning may not be positive. It may be that leading a 
meaningless life necessarily counts against a person’s having lived well (though that’s not a claim I 
commit to here); but, from the CI perspective, having led a meaningful life doesn’t necessarily 
count in favor of a person’s having lived well. 
Accommodating this observation requires less revision to everyday discourse than might 
initially appear, and makes sense of meaning-related phenomena that might otherwise be 
confused or overlooked. While it’s true that we often speak of meaning and meaningfulness as if 
87 
 
these are desirable or valuable qualities for a life to possess, the presumption that the meaning 
desired or appreciated is positive might be better understood as a pragmatic rather than semantic 
phenomenon. Here, “meaning” is like “importance” or “mattering”: the fact that we comfortably 
articulate our hopes to achieve these without stipulating that it be “in a good way” doesn’t prevent 
us from recognizing that not everything that matters or has importance is for the better rather 
than the worse. Our reluctance to call the lives of people who have perpetrated great evil 
“meaningless” reflects as much; and our hesitation to deny that their lives possess a kind of 
meaning doesn’t involve ethical admiration, or indicate to us that they led lives worth living. It’s 
worth noticing, in this regard, that the existential suffering and sense of alienation that have, in 
some cases (like Lincoln’s), eventually provided the occasion for moral heroism or artistic 
brilliance, have, in others, been a source of extraordinary evil. Humans don’t always respond 
constructively to the painful, desperate feeling that their lives lack meaning, and the fact that 
harmful behaviors can appear to provide relief from the affliction when positive outlets are 
unavailable makes sense in light of the fact that ethical meaning does not entail ethical goodness.40  
 
§3.4 Subjectivity & Objectivity 
 
In §1, we met two characters—Sisyphus Fulfilled (who, by the grace of an injection, experienced 
as deeply meaningful a task that, from an external perspective, seems paradigmatically pointless 
and drudgerous), and William James’s Dog (whose terrible sufferings bring about valuable 
consequences he can’t understand)—that, respectively, raise questions about the role of 
subjectivity and objectivity in ethical meaning. Is the deep sense of fulfillment that Sisyphus 
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derives from his endless stone rolling, though a wholly subjective state, enough to confer meaning 
on his existence? Conversely, though James’s Dog experiences his role in human medical research 
as nothing more than being in “a kind of hell,” is his excruciating suffering somehow redeemed or 
made meaningful by the objective goods it’s involved in bringing about?   
 These cases frame the issue of the subjectivity or objectivity of ethical meaning in terms of 
the importance (or irrelevance) of a certain kind of subjective experience. We can call a theory of 
ethical meaning strongly subjective if it regards a life or activity as meaningful to the extent that it 
involves or gives rise to some relevant subjective state—say fulfillment, rapt interest, or love 
(understanding each of these as purely subjective states). A theory of ethical meaning will be 
strongly objective, conversely, if it regards the subjective states of the liver or the actor as irrelevant 
to the meaning of the life or activity in question. Theories that treat both subjective and objective 
components as important, so that a life or activity must give rise to relevant subjective states and 
possess certain objective features, can called hybrid accounts, and be characterized as both weakly 
subjective and weakly objective. 
 Neither Sisyphus Fulfilled (whose existence, despite its apparent pointlessness from an 
external perspective, might be regarded as meaningful according to a strongly subjective account) 
nor William James’s Dog (whose suffering, on a strongly objective account, might be claimed to 
confer meaning on the dog’s life in spite of his total obliviousness and indifference to the valuable 
consequences that might issue from it) make either extreme position look intuitively attractive. 
Wolf, for example, takes our intuitive reluctance to suppose that Sisyphus’s paradigmatically 
meaningless existence can be made meaningful merely by altering his subjective states to 
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recommend a hybrid position like hers, according to which meaning arises “when subjective 
attraction meets objective attractiveness.”41 Even when subjectively fulfilling, Sisyphus’s stone-
rolling isn’t meaningful because the sense of fulfillment it gives him isn’t merited: his activity has 
no “objective” value—no value independent of the positive feelings it gives him—and doesn’t, 
therefore, connect him with anything larger than himself. The suffering of James’s Dog, by 
contrast, isn’t a source of meaning in his life because, regardless of the objectively valuable 
consequences it might have, it neither engages his interest nor provides him any sense of 
fulfillment. (These absences disqualify independently valuable activities from counting as sources 
of meaning even when the agents who undertake them do recognize their value. An “alienated 
housewife,” Wolf says, may know that her efforts have valuable consequences, but if she 
nonetheless finds the relevant activities unfulfilling, they won’t count as a source of ethical 
meaning.)42  
 The CI approach validates Wolf’s rejection of strongly subjective approaches to ethical 
meaning, and not merely because they give potentially counterintuitive interpretations of certain 
scenarios (like Sisyphus Fulfilled). Recall, from §2, that interpretation has criteria of quality: in 
particular, a good interpretation (one that uncovers a genuine meaning of its object) must be 
valid—licensed by some relevant sort of relationship between an object of interpretation and a 
purported meaning. The fact that interpretations (unlike, say, instances of inspiration) can be 
invalid implies that an object’s being interpreted as possessing a certain meaning does not, on its 
own, entail that the object has that meaning: being meaningful and being experienced as 
meaningful are distinct phenomena, and, generally, each can occur in the absence of the other. If, 
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on the other hand, the strong subjectivist wants to claim that activities and other objects are 
ethically meaningful just because they issue in some positive subjective attitude that itself involves 
no reference to the activity’s meaningfulness (so that the pleasure or sense of fulfillment one gets 
from the object or activity is just brute, rather than an instance of experiencing the object or 
activity as meaningful, or as valuable for any reason other than the pleasure it provides), then, 
given the considerations raised in §3.2, we’re left wondering why the concept “meaning” applies 
at all. Activities or objects that are brutely pleasurable don’t require interpretation to motivate or 
gratify: they don’t, therefore, fall within the purview of “meaning” understood comprehensively, 
nor do they provide us with any clear reason to employ that concept in ethical discourse. 
 The same considerations that lead us to join Wolf in rejecting strongly subjective 
conceptions of ethical meaning, however, should lead us to question the role she gives subjective 
experience in her account. Why should a life or activity be required to give rise to a particular sort 
of positive subjective experience (Wolf’s preferred candidate is “fulfillment”) in order to be 
ethically meaningful? From the CI perspective, no such requirement should be made: an object 
can have a meaning without that meaning necessarily being appreciated, and, at least on the 
conceptual level, a life or activity can have import in a wider evaluative context independent of 
the fulfillment (or any other positive subjective experience) it might provide to the liver or actor. 
The subjective aspect of Wolf’s account, then, appears (partially, at least) to confuse experiencing 
a life or an activity as meaningful with that life or activity being meaningful. 
 Should we regard this consequence as a drawback of the CI approach to ethical meaning? 
Philosophers who have introspected to arrive at a pretheoretical concept of ethical meaning 
91 
 
frequently note (or assume) that meaningless existence is characterized by boredom, alienation, 
and disengagement.43 If subjective states like these are sufficient to undercut ethical meaning, 
then it stands to reason that their rough opposites (engrossed interest, fulfillment, pride) should 
be required for meaning. Though the CI approach denies that requirement, it can explain the 
characteristic association between these subjective states and meaning/meaninglessness. Instead 
of being causes or constituents of meaningfulness or meaninglessness, the CI approach regards the 
associated subjective states as symptoms: loss of interest, boredom, and alienation are natural 
responses to activities we come to regard as meaningless; complementarily, activities we regard as 
meaningful naturally inspire our interest, and, when we engage in them successfully, give us good 
reason to feel fulfilled or proud. In other words, we generally find certain activities and 
relationships fulfilling because they’re meaningful; they aren’t meaningful because we find them 
fulfilling. 
 In fact, we should prefer the symptom understanding of associated subjective responses 
to the causal/constituent understanding for reasons independent of its accordance with a 
comprehensive account of meaning. It isn’t, after all, uncommon for people whose work is 
generally regarded as deeply meaningful to have had ambivalent or even wholly alienated feelings 
about that work. Nina Simone, for example, became disillusioned with the efforts that, earlier in 
her life, had seemed so meaningful: “There aren’t any civil rights,” she told an interviewer who, in 
1993, invited her to reflect on the role of her music in the Civil Rights Movement; “There is no 
reason to sing those songs, nothing is happening, there is no Civil Rights Movement—
everybody’s gone.”44 Kafka famously asked that all his work be destroyed at his death, and burned 
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the large majority of his work himself.45 In neither case should we regard the meaningfulness of 
the work or lives of these artists as fluctuating with their feelings of fulfillment and alienation. In 
fact, it’s hard to imagine either artist’s life and work having the meanings they did without the 
feelings of alienation and discontent that sometimes haunted them: intellectual alienation, as we 
noticed above, isn’t always a pathology; it’s no accident that work of extraordinary imagination 
and expressive power often comes from people who find fulfillment elusive and alienation 
familiar. 
These considerations relate to a more general and important point: the symptom 
understanding of the association of meaningfulness with characteristic subjective responses does 
better justice to depression as a pathology than the causal/constituent understanding does. 
Depressives find it difficult or impossible to have characteristic positive subjective responses (like 
interest, fulfillment, and pride) to experiences, activities, and relationships that naturally and 
justifiably generate those responses in people who aren’t afflicted by depression. But it would be 
wrong to think that this affliction condemns depressed people to meaningless existences. Though 
depression, especially in extreme cases, might make leading a meaningful existence more difficult 
(positive attitudes certainly make the work needed to maintain good relationships and productive 
activities easier to undertake), many depressed people find the courage and resolve to pursue 
meaningful projects and build meaningful relationships in spite of their hardship. In these cases, 
though depression might deprive its sufferers of the important subjective goods that often 
accompany meaningful existence, it doesn’t render their activities, relationships, or lives 
meaningless. 
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 What, then, should we think about people like Wolf’s alienated housewife (her other 
examples are an assembly line worker and a conscripted soldier), who recognize the value of their 
work but remain subjectively disengaged or unfulfilled? In some of these cases, it might be wrong 
to diagnose their negative subjective responses as symptoms of a sense of meaninglessness: they 
recognize what the CI account suggests is the meaning of their activities—their value interpreted 
in light of a larger evaluative context. But it also seems wrong to regard their feelings of alienation 
as pathological or unmerited, as we might in the case of a person whose capacity for positive affect 
has been enervated by depression. There are two important points to be made in such cases. First, 
negative subjective responses like alienation, boredom, and lack of interest aren’t only merited by 
the recognition that an activity or existence is meaningless. We might, for example, rightly feel 
alienated if we’re being exploited, or if, unfairly, we’ve been denied the opportunity to shape our 
own existence—even if the exploitation or coercion involves engaging in activities we recognize 
are meaningful. Second, if exploitation or coercion does give rise to alienation, the exploited or 
coerced party may not see the activities they undertake in those conditions as sources of meaning 
in or meaning of their lives, because understanding life as an ethical (as opposed to, say, a 
biological) object might involve emphasizing our autonomous activities over ways that we’re 
coerced by others. The things we’re coerced to do, according to this line of thinking, aren’t 
features of our ethical selves: only the actions we take freely are. On this interpretation, however, 
the subjective response remains a symptom of an objective condition—being coerced or 
exploited. What’s in question is what gets included in relevant object of interpretation (in the case 
of meaning of) or evaluative context (in the case of meaning in).  
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We might also rely on this line of reasoning to deny that the horrible suffering that 
James’s Dog endures on the operating table confers meaning on his life. Whatever valuable 
consequences might ultimately issue from the research that causes his agony, they’ll have been 
achieved by coercion and exploitation, rather than being the product of the dog’s will. Hence, 
while they may be relational properties of his biological life, they won’t count as features of his life 
in the distinctively ethical sense. But arguments like this draw our attention to a kind of 
inappropriateness about posing questions about the ethical meaning of the lives of many 
nonhuman animals. Presumably, dogs don’t engage in any attempt to interpret their lives within 
some broader evaluative context, nor do they treat their lives as an interpretive frame within 
which certain objects or experiences take on some special sort of significance.46 In this sense, it’s 
inapt to talk about the “meaning” of a dog’s life. If, however, dogs’ lives can sensibly be treated as 
distinctively ethical objects by interpreters who do engage in such practices, then there may 
indeed be an important sense in which the suffering of James’s Dog does confer meaning on its 
life—a kind of meaningfulness not altogether unlike the kind that might provide a mourning 
parent some degree of solace when she learns that the organs of her dead child were used to save 
the lives of other children.47 
Ultimately, then, the CI approach leads us to reject the suggestion that ethical meaning 
necessarily involves the enjoyment of any particular subjective state; but it does offer an 
explanation for the strong intuitive association between ethical meaning and certain characteristic 
subjective states. (The same goes for meaninglessness.) Before moving on, however, we should 
note that the question of the importance or irrelevance of subjective states isn’t the only way to 
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frame the subjective-objective distinction. We might also call a conception of ethical meaning 
“subjective” to the extent that it allows for subject relativity: the possibility that what’s ethically 
meaningful for one person isn’t for another. 
Recall Mr. Stevens, from The Remains of the Day, for whom achievement in the 
profession of domestic service was especially meaningful in part because Stevens’ father was an 
accomplished butler. In this scenario, at least some of the meaning Stevens derives from being an 
excellent butler is subject relative—responsive to particular features of Stevens’s identity. 
(Achievement in bultering wouldn’t be a similar source of meaning for Stevens’s master, Lord 
Darlington, whose heritage is importantly different.) This sort of subject relativity doesn’t entail 
that meaning is strongly or weakly subjective in the sense defined above, and the CI approach 
gives us no reason to abjure it. Given that particular lives differ from one another (and, therefore, 
provide different objects and contexts of interpretation), we shouldn’t be surprised if they give 
rise to different meanings.  
 
§3.5 Meaning Lost & Found 
 
At the beginning of this essay, I suggested that a conceptual account of ethical meaning might 
only clarify, rather than decisively answer, some of the urgent ethical and metaphysical questions 
we use “meaning” to pose. Particularly, I cautioned that even a clearer, more coherent 
understanding of “meaning” in ethical contexts wouldn’t necessarily provide us with easy-to-
follow instructions for making our lives meaningful, nor protect us infallibly against the 
possibility of meaninglessness. Nonetheless, better theory should lead to more graceful practice, 
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and the conceptual framework developed above generates important insights into the processes 
by which we can come to lose and to find meaning in our own lives. I’ll conclude with some 
remarks on that topic. 
 
§3.5.1 Lost 
 
The discussion of subjectivity and objectivity emphasized an important distinction, between 
having and appreciating ethical meaning. Just as we can come, mistakenly, to believe that 
activities, relationships, and experiences are meaningful in ways that they really aren’t, so can our 
lives be meaningful in ways we don’t necessarily appreciate. When we discuss the processes by 
which meaning can be lost, then, we need to distinguish between modes of loss rarely 
disambiguated in everyday discourse. In one case, our lives or activities may lose meaning that 
they genuinely had—our children grow up and no longer need our care as they once did; a terrible 
accident robs a concert pianist of her dexterity; the way of life to which we’ve adapted our skills 
and talents slowly dies.48 In the other case, we lose our sense of meaningfulness. Activities, 
relationships, and experiences that once seemed meaningful (or, at least, gave rise to the 
subjective states that characteristically attend meaningfulness, like engaged interest and 
fulfillment), come, instead, to seem meaningless; we experience, in varying degrees, despair, 
alienation, fatigue, emptiness.  
Though these two modes of meaning loss are conceptually distinct, they frequently 
happen in tandem: a loss of meaning in the “having” sense (henceforward, simply “loss of 
meaning”) is often all too keenly felt by the dispossessed (and, hence, lost in the “appreciation” 
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sense as well)—especially when the loss is sudden. In other cases, however, loss of meaning and 
loss of appreciation happen out of rhythm. We might be beset by a sudden sense of 
meaninglessness even when our external circumstances don’t seem relevantly altered. In her 
memoire Eat, Pray, Love, for example, Elizabeth Gilbert recalls sobbing on the bathroom floor in 
her beautiful suburban home, her husband asleep in the next room, suddenly having noticed that 
she’d “reached a state of hopelessness and life-threatening despair”: 
We’d only just bought this house a year ago. Hadn’t I wanted this nice house? Hadn’t I 
loved it? So why was I haunting its halls every night now, howling like Medea? Wasn’t I 
proud of all we’d accumulated—the prestigious home in the Hudson Valley, the 
apartment in Manhattan, the friends and the picnics and the parties?...I had actively 
participated in every moment of the creation of this life—so why did I feel like none of it 
resembled me?49 
 
Cases like these can be especially terrifying, because they mean either that we’ve lost our ability to 
appreciate what’s meaningful, or that what had always seemed meaningful to us really wasn’t. 
When we suffer a loss of appreciation for no obvious or immediate reason, therefore, it’s not only 
the meaningfulness of our present and future that seems under threat—the supposed meaning of 
past events and satisfactions becomes precarious as well. We’re tempted to reinterpret the past in 
light of the disillusionment of the present, finding there a record of fraudulence and futility. 
 Absent a substantive account of the nature of value and the way it relates to human life, 
the CI approach to ethical meaning has little more to say about loss of meaning in the “having” 
sense than has already been presented. It does, however, offer some additional insight into loss of 
appreciation. Specifically, it suggests that appreciation can deteriorate in two ways (or, be absent 
for two reasons). In one scenario, an interpreter may confidently inhabit an evaluative 
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perspective, but see no relevant role for her life to play. George Bailey becomes convinced of 
something like this in It’s a Wonderful Life, when he concludes that he’s “worth more dead than 
alive.” He doesn’t suffer from existential doubts about the general possibility of life’s meaning—he 
would be fulfilled if he could support his children, make his wife happy, and contribute to his 
community.50 Instead, he loses faith in his ability to accomplish those things. 
 In the second scenario, rather than coming to doubt the import of her life from the 
perspective of a confidently inhabited evaluative context, an interpreter becomes unmoored from 
any evaluative context at all. Here, the problem is not that she finds her particular life 
meaningless, but that she cannot access a perspective from which anything appears meaningful. 
She suffers from what Camus identified as the feeling of absurdity: “the divorce between a man 
and his life, the actor and his setting.”51 As David Foster Wallace described the experience, 
It’s like worse than anything... It’s worse than any kind of physical injury, or any kind 
of—it may be what in the old days was called a spiritual crisis or whatever.  It’s just feeling 
as though the entire, every axiom of your life turned out to be false, and there was actually 
nothing, and you were nothing, and it was all a delusion.  And you were better than 
everyone else because you saw that it was a delusion, and yet you were worse because you 
couldn’t function.52   
 
When people lose their religious faith, experience a drastic philosophical reorientation, or even 
achieve, at long last, some cherished goal, they become vulnerable to this second sort of 
appreciation dissolution.53 In each case, the evaluative context within which they’ve previously 
interpreted meaning suddenly falls away.54 
 
§3.5.2 Found 
 
In “Notes on a Balinese Cockfight,” Clifford Geertz observed that 
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It is in large part because the marginal disutility of loss is so great at the higher levels of 
betting that to engage in such betting is to lay one’s public self, allusively and 
metaphorically, through the medium of one’s cock, on the line. And though to a 
Benthamite this might seem merely to increase the irrationality of the enterprise that 
much further, to the Balinese what it mainly increases is the meaningfulness of it all. And 
as (to follow Weber rather than Bentham) the imposition of meaning on life is the major 
end and primary condition of human existence, that access of significance more than 
compensates for the economic costs involved.55 
 
Viktor Frankl’s professional experience treating suicidal patients and his personal experiences in 
Auschwitz and Dachau led him to a similar conviction, “that man’s main concern is not to gain 
pleasure or to avoid pain but rather to see a meaning in his life.”56 
 These remarks don’t just serve to emphasize the importance of the topic of this final 
section—the process by which lives can come to possess meaning—they also raise, by the subtle 
difference in the way they’re phrased, an important question. Geertz describes the process by 
which human life comes to possess meaning as an imposition—more a contrivance than a 
discovery. Frankl’s vision-based metaphor, by contrast, suggests that the process is better 
understood in terms of appreciation than in terms of creation. Is the meaning of our lives out 
there, waiting to be uncovered and faithfully fulfilled? Or is it, rather, a product of our own 
creation—something altogether new that we bring into the world by the strength of our 
imagination and will? 
 We can consider questions like these with greater clarity by extending the stipulative 
conceptual structure I began developing in the previous section, which distinguished between 
having and appreciating meaning. Let’s add that a person that a person possesses ethical meaning 
when her life has meaning and she appreciates that fact. Further, let’s understand appreciation in 
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two dimensions: one cognitive, depending on whether we recognize the meaning our lives have; 
the other affective, depending on whether we enjoy the meaning of our lives (if, that is, we 
experience the positive subjective responses, like fulfillment, engaged interest, and pride that are 
appropriately generated by living a positively meaningful existence).57  
 We can organize our options for responding to the question raised by the contrast 
between Geertz’s and Frankl’s terminology by distinguishing between three conceptual metaphors 
for describing the process of coming to possess ethical meaning—seeing, finding, and making—
arranged successively along a dimension that emphasizes receptivity at one pole and activity at the 
other. (When we describe the process of coming to possess ethical meaning as seeing the meaning 
in or of our lives, we emphasize the receptive aspect most strongly; when we talk of making 
meaning, we emphasize the active aspect; finding meaning picks out a position intermediate 
between these two.) If the meaning of or in our lives needs only to be seen or found, then it’s 
already, in some important sense, had: our challenge is to come to appreciate it. The seeing 
metaphor suggests that what’s necessary to achieve appreciation is the development of the right 
sort of receptivity. The meaning of your life is right before your eyes, if only you could see it; the 
change required is one of orientation, attention, or focus. Finding, by contrast, suggests that 
appreciation requires a kind of searching activity. The meaning we seek exists, but it’s hidden, or 
at a great distance. The idea that meaning needs to be found evokes the familiar idea of a quest. 
Making, finally, casts having rather than appreciating ethical meaning the primary concern. The 
challenge is neither to open yourself to life’s meaning, nor to discover and fulfill it; instead, you 
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have to make it for yourself. Where finding requires a searching activity, making requires creative 
activity. 
 Which of these three models for coming to possess meaning does the CI approach favor? 
The natural suggestion is the intermediate position, finding. We might first observe that the 
finding metaphor does better justice to the requirement that interpretation be mediated than does 
the seeing metaphor. (In fact, when I described the mediated character of interpretation above, I 
used the relative immediacy of direct perception as an illustrative contrast.) Next, we can notice 
that the validity criterion of quality interpretation mitigates against the creation metaphor. While 
interpretation, like searching, may require creative thinking, it isn’t a fundamentally creative 
enterprise. Put in terms of functional structure, the output of an interpretation is constrained by 
its input in a way that the output of pure invention is not. 
 However natural, though, this line of thinking is too simple. We should, instead, resist the 
question it attempts to answer. Seeing, finding, and making are all useful models for the processes 
by which we can come to possess meaningful lives. Instead of ranking them, the CI approach 
should help us better understand them. Each model, as we noticed above, treats the challenge of 
coming to possess meaning differently—but, depending on her situation, a person might find 
herself facing any of these challenges. It’s important, then, to understand each strategy, and to be 
able to recognize the circumstances in which each is appropriately deployed. 
 
§3.5.2.1 Seeing 
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Cultivating the right sort of receptivity is important when the fundamental features of a 
meaningful existence are already in place, but our ability to appreciate them is inhibited. The 
vision metaphor extends nicely to describe the possible sources of that sort of inhibition: we may 
be deceived by an illusion, or have our focus misdirected, or be blinded by fear, anger, or anxiety. 
I mentioned, above, that George Bailey’s malady is at least largely of this kind: he’s so 
preoccupied, first, by the image of another life he could have had, and, second, by a crippling fear 
of failure, that he fails to appreciate the deep meaning his life already has. What he needs to 
undertake to achieve that appreciation isn’t a quest, but, in the first place, a reorientation of his 
evaluative perspective—one that foregrounds the value of his family, friends, and community; 
and, in the second case, greater sensitivity to his own value. His guardian angel, Clarence, helps 
him accomplish the reorientation by showing him what the world would really be like without 
him—using the desperate sense of loss George is already experiencing to awaken him to the value 
of what he’d previously taken for granted. George’s friends and family do as much as Clarence to 
help him accomplish the second task, when, at the movie’s conclusion, they forestall the failure 
that so preoccupied him by pooling their resources to assist him.  
 In a real-life example, Richard Feynman gave a moving description of the process in his 
advice to a former student, who had written to Feynman in despair, having lost faith in his ability 
to make a significant contribution to fundamental physics. “You say you are a nameless man,” 
Feynman wrote, 
You are not to your wife and to your child. You will not long remain so to your 
immediate colleagues if you can answer their simple questions when they come into your 
office. You are not nameless to me. Do not remain nameless to yourself—it is too sad a 
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way to be. Know your place in the world and evaluate yourself fairly, not in terms of the 
naïve ideas of your own youth, nor in terms of what you erroneously imagine you’re 
teacher’s ideals are.58 
 
Feynman doesn’t promise his student that a great discovery is around the corner; instead, he 
invites him to shift his perspective, and to appreciate the value his life already has. 
 
§3.5.2.2 Finding 
 
In other cases, however, becoming properly receptive isn’t enough, and a person needs to conduct 
an active search in order to come to appreciate the meaning of her life. In these cases, where 
finding is necessary, a person’s life has meaning, but it’s hidden, distant, or otherwise alien. On the 
awful night Elizabeth Gilbert spent crying uncontrollably on her bathroom floor, she hadn’t 
wholly lost her sense of self, or her faith in the meaning of her existence. But she felt trapped in a 
lived structure in which she could no longer recognize herself. Hard as she tried, no effort at 
reorientation could reconcile Gilbert to the suburban family life she had mistakenly committed 
herself to. She needed to make radical changes to the structure of her everyday life before she 
could clearly recognize and enjoy its true meaning. In her case, these active changes included the 
end of her marriage, the sale of her house, a new spiritual practice, and a year of travel and 
writing. 
 Gilbert’s progress from alienation to possession, nonetheless, fits the finding paradigm 
more neatly than the making paradigm: her active process was more search than creation. This is 
most apparent from the perspective of Gilbert’s subjective experience, which is characterized by a 
strong sense of destiny: she embarks on her quest in part because a medicine man in Bali, reading 
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her palm, predicts her return. (“I’m the kind of person who, when a ninth-generation Indonesian 
medicine man tells you that you’re destined to move to Bali and live with him for four months, 
thinks you should make every effort to do that,” she explains.)59 Even for those inclined to 
skepticism about the prophetic powers of medicine men, however, there’s a more prosaic sense of 
destiny by which to understand Gilbert’s search—one that can be discovered or realized in 
something like the way we describe people as finding their vocations. Gilbert’s journey, insofar as 
it fits the finding model, was guided by her sense of self—her already existing talents, tastes, and 
dreams—rather than being an effort to remake herself. Late one night she looked around her 
suburban bathroom and finally saw, clearly, that the life she was living didn’t resemble the person 
living it. She left and, drawing on the talents, passions, experiences, and social connections she 
already had, found one that did.  
 
§3.5.2.3 Making 
 
For people whose critical speculations bring them to a point from which there seems to be no 
evaluative context within which their lives might have meaning, or no distinctive, coherent ethical 
self to be interpreted, the model of making meaning—wringing it from the void by an act of sheer 
will—is an attractive last resort. Something like this appealed to Wallace, during certain phases, as 
a solution to his troubles: “Hyperc[onsciousness] makes life meaningless,” he wrote in a personal 
notebook, “but what of will to construct OWN meaning? Not the world that gives us meaning but 
vice versa?”60 
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 From the CI perspective, as we noted above, the idea of making meaning in this radical 
sense is incoherent: interpretation is not a fundamentally creative act. We uncover the meanings 
of the objects we interpret; we don’t invent them. There is, nonetheless, a way of understanding 
the idea of making ethical meaning friendly to the CI account. For, although we don’t directly 
make the meanings of our lives or their constituents, we often do play a significant role in making 
our lives, along with the relationships, experiences, and accomplishments they comprise. Some 
marriages are successful because each member in the relationship has, by some miracle, found a 
soulmate in the other. Other marriages are successful because the people in them work to become 
soulmates: each person changes major parts of who she is to become a better partner for the other. 
 This last observation highlights an important truth: the finding and making paradigms 
are really two sides of the same coin. (Few if any successful relationships, after all, are wholly 
characterized by either the finding or making model. They generally involve some balance 
between becoming a different person than you were, and finding someone compatible enough 
with the person you already are to motivate the hard-won changes.) Lives aren’t constituted by 
their meanings in the same way words are: for a word to be a word, it must be meaningful; for it 
to be the word that it is, it must have the particular meaning it does.61 Because there is this sense 
in which a life’s identity conditions are less strictly bound to its meanings than a word’s, lives have 
potential meanings in a way that words don’t. In some cases, we realize these potential meanings 
by recognizing them, and then treating them as a guide for living: Gilbert is told her destiny by a 
medicine man, and she undertakes a journey to fulfill it. In other cases, our lives come to possess 
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the meanings they do by creative effort: we make ourselves, as Nietzsche suggested, as a work of 
art.62 Ultimately, however, these are complementary aspects of the same holistic process.  
 The making aspect of the process, however, is especially salient when we consider ethical 
meaning in the context of suffering and misfortune. Shenk described Lincoln as having “forged 
meaning from his affliction,” and his choice of words was well-advised: it would do our 
misfortunes too much credit to attribute to them the value that, with sufficient courage and 
imagination, we can produce in response to them. Here, Viktor Frankl himself is an obvious 
example. Though Frankl drew on his experiences in the Holocaust in his therapeutic practice and 
writing, those meaningful accomplishments were made from, rather than found in those 
experiences. (This isn’t to suggest that the trials Frankl faced were not themselves meaningful—
but the positive ends toward which he redirected his sufferings were of his own making, rather 
than merely being contained, however hidden, in the hardships he bore.) 
 Shenk’s Lincoln is an inspiring illustration of the way that seeing, finding, and making 
ethical meaning work in tandem. “In mythical stories,” Shenk writes, 
a character undertakes a journey, receiving at every step totems that, at the time, have no 
clear value but at the end turn out to provide the essential tools for a final struggle. We 
can see this in Lincoln’s journey. In the first stage, he asked the big questions. Why am I 
here? What is the point? Without the sense of essential purpose he learned by asking 
these questions, he may not have had the bedrock vision that governed his great work. In 
the second stage, he developed diligence and discipline, working for the sake of work, 
learning how to survive and engage. Without the discipline of his middle years, he would 
not have had the fortitude to endure the disappointments that his great work entailed. In 
the third stage, he was not just working but doing the work he felt made to do, not only 
surviving but living for a vital purpose. Yet he constantly faced the same essential 
challenges that had been presented to him throughout. All through his career fighting the 
extension of slavery, and all through his presidency, he faced painful fear and doubt—
indeed, he faced it on an awful scale. But he repeatedly returned to a sense of purpose; 
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from this purpose he put his head down to work at the mundane tasks of his job; and with 
his head down, he glanced up, often enough, at the chance to effect something 
meaningful and lasting. We justly look upon the transcendence of his final days with 
admiration, noticing the amazing balance between earthly works and self-dissolution. But 
even then, he was a product of his journey.63  
 
Conclusion 
 
William James wondered if life was “a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the 
universe by success,” or if, instead, “it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which 
one may withdraw at will.”64 Understanding ethical meaning in light of the comprehensive-
interpretive account of meaning I’ve proposed above doesn’t settle James’ question, or tell us 
whether the dichotomy he poses is a false one. It doesn’t tell us whether the meaning in or of our 
lives has a natural or supernatural source, or whether meaning is possessed by knowing God, 
having and raising children, or standing in awe of natural beauty. It doesn’t even tell us if our lives 
have meaning at all. (It doesn’t itself, that is, justify or vindicate our tendency to treat our lives as 
ethical objects with import in larger contexts of value, or as themselves a context of value within 
which experiences, relationships, and other objects take on a particular sort of significance.) 
Answering these questions, according to the CI approach, requires a substantive account of value 
and its metaphysics. 
 What the CI approach does provide is a clearer idea of the object of the anxieties and 
ambitions we articulate when we use “meaning” in ethical discourse. It vindicates our sense that 
questions about the meaning in and of our lives draw us beyond “the buzzing and jigging and 
vibration of small interests and excitements that form the tissue of our ordinary consciousness,”65 
challenging us to question the routines that give us comfort, and to confront the possibility that 
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we’ve missed or lost something of profound importance. It also, however, cautions us against 
supposing that the concept of ethical meaning itself requires us to adopt especially grandiose 
standards for its possession (like requiring that we commune with some infinite, absolutely 
meaningful being). Ethical meaning is as prosaic or extravagant as the genuine value that 
animates it. 
The CI approach reminds us that meaning in and of our lives shouldn’t be conflated with 
their appreciation, either in its cognitive or affective dimensions. In doing this, I hope it offers 
those of us who suffer from depression some measure of solace, and a reason to persevere in times 
of despair. It warns us that not all meaningful lives are good lives, and that our desire to lead a 
meaningful life can inspire acts of terrible evil as well as acts of great moral courage. Finally, even 
if a clearer concept of ethical meaning doesn’t, on its own, provide us detailed instructions for 
how to lead or appreciate a meaningful life, it does provide the resources for a general description 
of the dynamics of those achievements. If living meaningfully (and appreciating the meaning in 
and of the lives we lead) is possible at all, it requires a cultivated sensitivity to what, among the 
welter of dreams, impulses, and ambitions that impose themselves on us, is genuinely valuable; it 
requires the energy and the courage to search for the things that matter when they don’t come 
conveniently; and it requires the imagination, conviction, and discipline to bring new value into 
the world, even in the face of suffering and misfortune. 
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a different question—perhaps it means, for example, that the king and the rook can, under certain 
circumstances, move in tandem. Finally, imagine an observer who’s uncertain whether what he’s watching 
is a purposeful activity at all. By asking “what does that mean?” he introduces by presupposition the 
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good example is the word “freedom” in the context of American political history. Eric Foner’s extraordinary 
work tracing the way that word’s meaning shifted, over the course of American history, in responses to the 
political challenges it was recruited to address, would be unjustly trivialized if we imagined that the 
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“freedoms” whose succession he documents were nothing more than a set of homonyms. (See Eric Foner, 
The Story of American Freedom (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999).) Nonetheless, the fact that 
the contrast I draw in the body text isn’t absolute makes it no less genuine. Words are more robustly 
constituted by their meanings than lives are. Unlike lives, words are symbols: things made for the purpose of 
bearing meaning, which are what they are to the extent that they serve that purpose.  
62 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann, 1 edition (New York: Vintage, 1974), 232. 
63 Shenk, Lincoln’s Melancholy, 215. 
64 James, “Is Life Worth Living?,” 62. 
65 Ibid., 32. 
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IRONY AS DYNAMIC REVERSAL 
A Comprehensive Account of Irony 
 
 
§1 Irony’s Integrity 
 
Irony’s ambit in contemporary philosophy is nearly as broad as its history is long, and its history 
begins with Socrates. Today, irony preoccupies philosophers of language and psycholinguists, 
who work to integrate irony into broader theories of mind, language, and communication; 
ethicists, who hope to elucidate the role irony plays in the way we understand our experiences and 
ourselves; and ancient philosophers, who wonder whether the “irony” Socrates practiced was a 
kind of deep pedagogy, or just a disingenuous rhetorical trick. Thanks to Richard Rorty, 
“ironism” is even the name for (an appropriately anti-metaphysical) approach to metaphysics—
one that forswears any appeal to truths vouchsafed by mind-independent reality.1 This 
remarkable versatility makes irony interesting, but difficult to understand. 
The difficulty is compounded when we consider how variously we use the word “irony” 
in everyday discourse. Individual utterances can be ironic, but so can entire works of literature. 
Irony can characterize situations as well as linguistic performances. We worry, increasingly, that 
our culture has become “too ironic,” but when we discuss art and literature we often use “irony” 
as a success term, like “beautiful” or “elegant”: consider New Yorker critic James Wood’s distaste 
for David Foster Wallace’s fiction, in which, Wood complains, “irony is starved to sarcasm, and 
sympathy to voyeurism. It is literally impossible for the reader to enter the story.”2 
You might, therefore, suspect that if “irony” names even a family resemblance concept, 
it’s a family like the 19th Century Hapsburgs: big, incestuous, and plagued by a host of illegitimate 
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pretenders. You’d be in good company. Most contemporary treatments of irony make early 
mention of its troublesome promiscuity. Wayne Booth worries that “irony has come to stand for 
so many things that we are in danger of losing it as a useful term altogether,”3 and Jonathan Lear 
laments that “by now ‘irony’ has been used for pretty much everything.”4 Dan Sperber and 
Deirdre Wilson warn against assuming that irony is a natural kind. If it isn’t, they think “it is 
possible that verbal irony and its associated attitude have about as much claim on our attention as 
black bile and the atrabilious temperament.”5  
Irony isn’t the protagonist of an Edith Wharton novel, though, so maybe it isn’t necessary 
to worry ourselves too strenuously about its integrity. A sensible response to the sort of 
apparently promiscuous usage detailed above might just be to divide the disciplinary terrain, 
making progress where it can be had, rather than distracting ourselves with the task of 
comprehending a whole whose unity is questionable to begin with. In his investigation into the 
ethics of ironic experience, for example, Lear doesn’t have much time for detailed disputes about 
whether one- or two-staged models of linguistic comprehension best capture the psychological 
dynamics of producing and understanding the sort of one-off sarcastic remarks adolescents 
typically employ; Sperber and Wilson, meanwhile, can be forgiven if they don’t think a careful 
interpretation of Kierkegaard is the most promising avenue to achieving a better understanding of 
the psychological “natural kinds” that interest them. 
But I think irony’s diverse theorists have more to learn from one another than the current 
state of discourse suggests. We should care about irony’s integrity. First of all, in addition to its 
broad currency in discourse, irony is strangely notorious for a mere figure of speech. Echoing the 
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complaints of Socrates’s interlocutors, Theophrastus characterized an ironist as someone who 
“never can be got to do anything, or to commit himself in speech so that he is forced to take sides 
in an active discussion.”6 Much more recently, Christie Wampole blamed irony for “a vacuity and 
vapidity of the individual and collective psyche,”7 and Maryan Ronagh and Lawrence Souder have 
identified the increasingly common practice of publishing ironic research papers in science 
journals as a violation of research ethics whose dangers have been severely underrated.8 
Interesting as they are, though, ethical, aesthetic, and cultural discussions of irony too frequently 
rely on vague or inadequate definitions of irony (if any definition is offered at all). The careful 
thought and the increasing body of empirical research that philosophers of language and 
psycholinguists have dedicated to irony should help to clarify questions about its ethics and 
aesthetics. 
Second, the problem of apparently promiscuous usage doesn’t just plague the 
interdisciplinary study of irony—it arises within the empirical study of irony as a purely 
psycholinguistic concern. Theorists have become increasingly divided on the range of linguistic 
phenomena that a theory of irony ought to cover. For example, should instances of extended 
discourse (like Jonathan Swift’s “A Modest Proposal”) be treated as cases of verbal irony, or is 
verbal irony properly restricted to irony at or below the level of individual utterances? Should 
researchers treat sarcasm, hyperbole, and understatement as “types” of irony, as Raymond Gibbs 
did in a recent study,9 or is Deirdre Wilson right to protest that “merg[ing such a variety of 
utterances] into a general category of ‘irony’ detracts from, rather than enhances, our 
understanding of how irony works”?10 Taking a broader perspective helps to answer questions 
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like these. Understanding the common character of irony as it arises across media puts us in a 
position to make principled distinctions between purported instances of verbal irony. In fact, 
careful attention to the way that the various kinds of irony (situational, literary, and verbal, for 
example) cohere reveals significant shortcomings in some of the leading accounts of verbal irony. 
None recognize, for example, the fact that ironists can be sincere. 
In this chapter, I offer an account of irony as dynamic reversal, according to which irony 
characterizes the class of interpretive structures whose inputs (or objects of interpretation, or 
media) interact disharmoniously with their outputs (or meanings), so that one reverses or 
undermines the other. (The idea of an interpretive structure draws on the theory of interpretation 
developed in Chapter 2.) The account departs from prevailing psycholinguistic theories of irony 
by identifying irony with a formally characterized class of interpretive structures, rather than with 
any particular psychological mechanism. This methodological shift has a number of advantages 
over traditional mechanistic approaches. First, it does better justice to the increasing body of 
empirical research that shows irony can be effected and interpreted by more than one 
psychological mechanism. (As Gibbs has recently concluded, “ironic talk can serve multiple 
communicative purposes, each requiring different psychological mechanisms.”)11 Second, it 
provides a principled basis for discriminating ironic from unironic usage for the purpose of 
designing and interpreting experiments on the psychology of irony production and 
interpretation, whereas the distinctions offered by mechanistic approaches too often beg the 
question. Third, the interpretive approach to irony does a better job accounting for the 
underlying character that unites irony’s various kinds, rather than disfiguring some to fit the 
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model of others. Finally, the interpretive approach provides the basis for a richer understanding 
of the full range of irony’s uses, including sincere deployments of irony overlooked or ruled out 
by approaches that restrict irony to productions and comprehensions achieved by means of a 
single psychological mechanism. In short, the dynamic reversal account gives better answers to 
questions about irony’s mechanism (how does irony work?), its use (what do we use irony to do?), 
and its continuity (how are different sorts of irony—verbal irony, dramatic irony, and situational 
irony, for example—related to one another?). 
 By providing more complete answers to these questions, the dynamic reversal account 
offers a basis for more productive interdisciplinary exchange, and puts us in a better position to 
address the ethical, political, and aesthetic concerns irony raises. Its aim isn’t to provide an 
occasion for pedantry, by stating a single rule for deciding, definitively, whether a particular 
instance deserves to be called “ironic”—according to the dynamic reversal account irony involves 
a combination of characteristic features, each of which comes in degrees. Instead, the account 
should help us better understand both our temptation and reluctance to include borderline cases. 
More importantly, it should help us recognize irony’s potential both to enrich and to enervate 
human experience and communication—to decide when an irony is elegantly or poorly 
constructed, rightly or wrongly deployed. 
 I’ll begin with a critical review of recent theories of verbal irony: Grice’s standard 
implicature view, Sperber and Wilson’s echoic account, and the pretense theory defended by 
Herbert Clark and Richard Gerrig, and recently updated by Gregory Currie. In the process of 
highlighting the shortcomings of each of these accounts, I introduce, successively, the positive 
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commitments that characterize dynamic reversal: twofold interpretation, dynamism, and reversal. 
I conclude with a discussion of the ways the dynamic reversal account facilitates empirical 
inquiry, encourages interdisciplinary exchange, and provides a foundation for addressing ethical 
and aesthetic questions about irony. 
 
§2 Verbal Irony 
 
§2.1 The Standard Gricean Model 
 
Philosophers who achieve too dominant an influence over a particular field of philosophical 
inquiry risk sharing something like the storyline of the Scarecrow in The Wizard of Oz—a 
strawman that, for most of the movie, everyone tries to light on fire. When that plotline finally 
gets old, the revisionists appear to tell us that the scarecrow had a brain all along. 
 In contemporary discussion of verbal irony, Paul Grice is the scarecrow. Like most 
theories of irony, Grice’s begins with the old idea that ironists mean the opposite of what they say; 
his distinctive contribution was to integrate this basic idea into a broader theory of pragmatics. 
According to Grice, irony is a species of conversational implicature, the phenomenon in which 
speakers, exploiting the shared expectations that govern conversation as a rational activity, 
communicate more than they literally say.12 On Grice’s picture, and ironist flouts (violates in a 
way intended to be transparent to their audiences) the conversational maxim that instructs 
speakers not to say what they believe to be false; and her audience, in order to preserve the 
assumption that the ironist is nonetheless cooperating in the conversation, concludes that she 
122 
 
must not really have intended to communicate what she’s said. In fact, she must really have meant 
to communicate its opposite. For example, when Billy Bones says to Jim  
(1) Silver’s a fine friend!  
 
when Jim and Billy know in common that Silver has betrayed Billy, Jim will recognize that Billy 
has transparently said something he doesn’t believe, and conclude that he must therefore have 
been trying to communicate something other than what he has literally said. “This must be some 
obviously related proposition;” Grice explains, “the most obviously related proposition is the 
contradictory of the one he purports to be putting forward.”13 The basic process Grice posits 
involves an initial, transparent insincerity, signaling an operation of meaning reversal. 
Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson have capably identified the weaknesses of this standard 
Gricean view. First, Grice’s account covers only assertions, but non-assertoric speech acts can be 
used ironically as well. For example— 
(2) Did you remember to water the garden? [uttered in the middle of a downpour] 
(3) Thanks for holding the door! [when someone has just let a door close in your face] 
 
In neither case does the speaker say something she believes is false, so Grice’s insincerity 
condition is, at best, too limited. (2) also calls the reversal condition into question: if questions 
have contradictories or opposites, the plausible candidates (“Didn’t you remember to water the 
plants?” “Did you forget to water the plants?”) are not what an ironic speaker of (2) really means. 
 Second, Sperber and Wilson point out that Grice’s account makes it difficult to see why 
anyone would ever choose to speak ironically. As Grice construes irony’s mechanism, the 
contextual information an ironist’s audience must possess for the irony to be successfully 
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recognized includes the proposition that the ironist is supposedly attempting to communicate. So, 
for instance, in (1), Jim has to know already that Billy thinks Silver is a bad friend in order to 
initiate the reasoning process whose output is the recognition that Billy is using (1) to 
communicate that he thinks Silver is a bad friend. Thus, Sperber and Wilson conclude, “the 
standard approach… would make every ironical utterance uninformative, both on the level of 
what is said and on the level of what is implicated.”14 
Before examining the revisions to the basic Gricean picture that have been proposed to 
remedy these difficulties, let’s take a moment to review the standards for a good theory of verbal 
irony that the discussion above implies. First, a good account of what irony is should provide (or, 
at least, not preclude) an explanation of how irony works—I’ve called this the mechanism 
question. Second, a good account should provide (or, at least, not preclude) an explanation for 
what makes irony useful—the usefulness question. Finally, in line with the considerations I 
mentioned at the outset, a good theory of verbal irony should render perspicuous (or, at least, not 
obscure) its continuity with other recognizable types of irony (e.g., dramatic and situational 
irony)—this is the continuity question.15 With these standards in hand, let’s turn our attention to 
the contemporary accounts that try to meet them. 
 
§2.2 Echoic Mention 
 
Sperber and Wilson suggest replacing the standard meaning-inversion view with an “echoic 
mention” theory of irony.16 They contend, as we’ve seen, that meaning substitution theories 
preclude good answers to both the usefulness and the mechanism questions. So they claim, 
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instead, that irony should be understood as an echoic mention, rather than as a use of the 
proposition ironically uttered. An ironist mentions, by echoing, a piece of propositional content, 
in order to express a dissociative, derogatory attitude toward it. 
 Grasping Sperber and Wilson’s idea of echoic mention requires that we expand our usual 
understanding of both echoing and mentioning. Nonetheless, the basic sort of phenomenon they 
have in mind is familiar enough, as in the following exchange between A and B: 
(4) A: Where can I buy pretzels at this time of night? 
B: Where can you buy pretzels? At this time of night? At Barney’s, of course.17 
 
B clearly “echoes” A’s question. And when she utters the questions she does, she isn’t using them 
in the way A is. Instead, B is “implicitly mentioning” A’s question: she utters the content in order 
to refer to it, rather than to use it. The relevant technical details of the special kind of mentioning 
involved here are (1) the mentioning is implicit (that is, B does not set off the questions she utters 
as an act of quotation by employing an explicit semantic marker, as she would have, for instance, 
if she had instead uttered, “Where can you buy pretzels, you ask?”); and (2) the mention is of a 
proposition rather than a linguistic expression, so B refers to (but does not use) the meaning of the 
questions mentioned, rather than their linguistic features. (It’s not like the kind of mention made 
here: “‘Where can I buy pretzels?’ is a question composed of five words.”) So, in an echoic 
mention, we refer to, without using, the proposition we implicitly mention. 
 Of course, (4) isn’t itself an instance of irony—irony arises, on Sperber and Wilson’s view, 
when the speaker expresses a “dissociative” attitude toward the echoed content, “mak[ing] it clear 
that he rejects it as ludicrously false, inappropriate, or irrelevant.”18 They provide an illustration 
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from Pride and Prejudice, in which Darcy and Elizabeth are discussing Wickham, whom Elizabeth 
pities and admires, but Darcy knows to be a cad: 
(5) “You take an eager interest in that gentleman’s concerns,” said Darcy in a less tranquil 
tone, and a heightened colour. 
“Who that knows what his misfortunes have been, can help feeling an interest in him?” 
“His misfortunes!” repeated Darcy contemptuously, “yes, his misfortunes have been 
very great indeed.”19 
 
On Sperber and Wilson’s analysis, Darcy echoes Elizabeth’s rhetorical question, indicating by the 
attitude he adopts toward its meaning that he regards it as “ludicrously false,” and thereby 
implicates that Wickham “has not been the victim of misfortunes.”20 
 Not all ironic utterances are as immediately amenable to an echoic explanation, of course: 
Sperber and Wilson concede that irony is frequently effected without any direct echo of an 
immediately preceding utterance. Instead, they argue for an extended sense of “echo”—“some are 
immediate echoes, and others delayed; some have their source in actual utterances, others in 
thoughts or opinions; some have a real source, others an imagined one; some are traceable back to 
a particular individual, whereas others have a vaguer origin.”21 Though this extension has drawn 
complaints from some commentators, 22 it’s worth accepting Sperber and Wilson’s terminology—
at least provisionally—to notice the way their proposal remedies some of the problems they 
identified in Grice’s account. 
 First, Sperber and Wilson employ a different, broader version of the insincerity condition 
than Grice does. Instead of requiring an ironist to say (or make as if to say) something she 
believes to be false, an ironist dissociates herself from the propositional content she alludes to, in 
order to ridicule it. This alteration remedies the defect of limiting irony to assertions. Second, 
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instead of viewing irony as necessarily involving meaning inversion, they emphasize irony’s 
expressive function: ironists are primarily concerned with expressing an attitude toward a given 
proposition, rather than communicating propositional content (opposite meaning or otherwise). 
This reorientation effectively addresses the uninformativeness objection. Because, according to 
echo theory, ironists comment on mentioned utterances, rather than simply using their converse 
meaning, the illocutionary force of an ironic utterance is no longer obviated by the conditions 
necessary for its successful interpretation. Finally, an expressivist account ameliorates problems 
associated with traditional approaches to “figurative meaning”—how can interpreters be expected 
to disambiguate the countless potential meanings a single utterance can have if figurative 
meanings are allowed?—and with integrating irony into Grice’s more general theory of 
implicature, which generally involves a speaker implicating something in addition to what she’s 
said, rather than instead of something she’s said. On the echoic mention account, Sperber notes 
approvingly, irony “involve[s] only one meaning, the literal one.”23 
Nonetheless, the echoic theory of irony fails to capture several of irony’s interesting 
features—especially when we turn our attention to subtler, more complex cases. In particular, it 
rules out the interplay between multiple possible interpretations (including sincere 
interpretations) characteristic of a certain class of complex ironies, and it fails to account for the 
important fact that irony offers its users opportunities to modulate the transparency of their 
intentions to achieve a variety of important illocutionary effects. These aspects of irony, I suggest, 
can be better explained by recognizing the “twofold” nature of ironic interpretation, according to 
which interpreters attend to the features of both a medium and its meaning. 
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§2.2.1 Interplay with Sincerity 
 
Consider (5’), a reimagined version of (5) in which there’s a sense, though different from 
Elizabeth’s, in which Darcy really does think of Wickham as having been a victim of misfortune. 
Perhaps Darcy has an opinion something like Socrates’s, according to which committing injustice 
(which Darcy knows Wickham to have done) is the worst thing that can happen to a person. Or, 
suppose he’s just now seen Wickham fall of his horse into a pile of manure, and has this in mind 
when he responds to Elizabeth. In cases like these, there’s a plausible interpretation on which 
Darcy does straightforwardly endorse the literal meaning of the proposition he’s uttered. This sort 
of case is especially vivid when we imagine a second, knowing audience member: suppose, for 
example, that Bingley is also present for the exchange, and similarly witnessed Wickham’s 
mishap. 
 In cases like (5’), awareness of the presence of the sincere interpretation of Darcy’s 
utterance is essential to a full appreciation of Darcy’s irony: because of it, Darcy can appear to 
agree with Elizabeth while, in the very same breath, he completely subverts her meaning. 
(Elizabeth’s suggestion is that the misfortunes Wickham has suffered are grave, and that he 
should, therefore, be regarded with compassion and respect; Darcy’s is that Wickham’s 
misfortune is buffoonish, and makes him a proper object of ridicule. Elizabeth’s comment carries 
the additional implication that Darcy is to blame for Wickham’s misfortunes, while Darcy’s 
suggests that Wickham has brought them upon himself.) 
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If achieving this sort of (appearance of) double meaning is a central feature of Darcy’s 
irony in (5’), the strict criterion of dissociation that Sperber and Wilson advocate is too simplistic 
to capture it (or others like it). For, while the irony does rely, on one hand, on Darcy adopting a 
certain kind of dissociative attitude toward the way Elizabeth means the utterance, it equally plays 
upon another sense in which he does, or can, or pretends to identify with his utterance in the 
straightforward way. So a merely dissociative mention analysis doesn’t capture the full force of the 
irony. Furthermore, echo’s inability to render the complexity of cases like (5’) obscures an 
otherwise clear point of continuity between verbal ironies like Darcy’s and paradigmatic cases of 
literary and dramatic irony, in which a character in a novel or play makes a sincere statement 
whose deeper significance is, nonetheless, grasped only by the novel’s reader, or the play’s 
audience. 
Notice also that, in (5’), it remains up to Darcy how overt he wishes to make his 
subversion. If he delivers the line with a tone of sympathy and compassion, Elizabeth may miss 
the subversive character of Darcy’s utterance altogether, and be deceived into believing that Darcy 
does, after all, agree with her. If he delivers the line relatively tonelessly, or with an air of studied 
inscrutability, she may suspect that he is somehow not in sympathy with the thrust of her 
rhetorical question (as a fully “sincere” interpretation of his utterance would suggest), but that he 
is further hinting at something that he does not want, for some reason, to make fully explicit. If he 
delivers the line in a heavily sarcastic or “dripping” tone, Elizabeth will immediately recognize 
that she is being openly mocked, and will also probably be less sensitive to the possibility that 
there is some deeper meaning, relative to which Darcy’s utterance might be regarded as sincere.24 
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This fact—that irony affords its users the possibility of modulating the transparency of the full 
range of their communicative intentions—is a central feature of some of irony’s most important, 
most interesting uses (and the special risks that attend these). 
 
§2.2.2 Modulating Transparency  
 
During a period in my life when I occasionally ran across the Ben Franklin Bridge (which 
connects Philadelphia, PA to Camden, NJ) I took an interest in a billboard along the route. The 
billboard displayed a stereotypical advertisement for a law firm specializing in personal injury, but 
the ad was (apparently) defaced by a giant, spray-painted message that read, “WE HATE 
THEM!!!” Careful inspection of the lettering, however, disclosed too precise a uniformity of script 
to have been produced by a human hand: the “defacement” was itself a part of the ad. I thought 
the ad was therefore likely to be attempting a kind of irony—speaking loosely, at least. The 
audience was intended to recognize that the sign had not, in fact, been defaced, and that the 
feigned negativity was a playful way to capture the viewers’ attention, and to emphasize the firm’s 
success at defeating now-embittered opponents. I wondered how effective the ad was. 
 Then, one day, I noticed the billboard had been modified. Beneath the declaration of 
hatred, a new, spray-painted signature had appeared, claiming credit for the vandalism. It read: 
“♡, The insurance companies!” The firm had apparently concluded that their ironic intent wasn’t 
sufficiently recognizable, and that too many viewers were associating the apparent defacement as 
a manifestation of widespread dislike for unscrupulous attorneys, rather than a clever allusion to 
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the firm’s winning ways. But I had the strong impression that the added signature had vitiated 
whatever ironic effect the sign once had.  
 Presume, for the moment, that my reaction was apt. Why would the addition of the 
signature line have spoiled the ad’s irony? Well, the addition’s (intended) effect was to weaken the 
surface plausibility of the misleading appearance by which the original irony was produced: the 
added signature makes it much clearer that no vandalism has actually occurred, and signals much 
more blatantly the ad’s intended message, that the firm regularly takes on and defeats the 
insurance companies. So the suggestion is that even if an ironist produces a misleading 
appearance with the ultimate intention that it be so recognized (hence, transparent), the ironic 
effect is strengthened if the misleading appearance retains some fairly robust degree of 
plausibility, and suffers in the converse case. Presumably, this is why the advertisement’s 
designers began with a subtler version of the ad. A skillful ironist strikes just the right balance 
between misleadingness and transparency—keeping us always on the edge of our interpretive 
seats, but never toppling us for good. In other circumstances, she modulates the transparency of 
her irony to include some potential audience members in her ironic intent, but to exclude others. 
 The dissociative echo model of irony production and comprehension does a poor job of 
accounting for this intuitive feature of irony.25 According to the echoic version of the insincerity 
condition, the creation of a misleading appearance has no role to play in the mechanism by which 
irony is produced and interpreted. Instead, irony’s mechanism is thoroughly overt: “When a 
whole utterance such as (1) is interpretively used [read: mentioned], the question of whether the 
speaker has obeyed a maxim, norm or convention of literal truthfulness should not arise”—more 
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general cases of mention (or, in Wilson’s more recent work, “interpretive use”), like free indirect 
discourse or nonironic echoes (as in (4)), aren’t in any way enhanced by modulating their 
transparency, shading toward deception. With mention, there should be no discrepancy between 
what a speaker appears to be doing and what she is doing; at most, there’s ambiguity (I may fail to 
notice the interpretive mode and thereby misinterpret the speaker). But this sort of ambiguity 
seems only to hobble, rather than enhance, mention/interpretive use. 
 The deficiency is particularly stark when we compare echo theory to the competitor 
theory I’ll turn to next: pretense. The pretense theory’s version of the insincerity condition, 
according to which a speaker pretends to execute a speech act, rather than echoing its content, 
provides a natural explanation for the strengthening effects of “garden path” style ironies, in 
which a speaker’s ironic intentions become transparent gradually: whatever delights pretense 
affords are made possible by the pretenders’ (players and audience) ability to treat them, in 
certain ways, as real. It stands to reason, then, that these delights might in many cases be 
amplified by a temporary lack of awareness that any pretending is going on at all. Furthermore, 
unlike echoing, mentioning, or expressing a dissociative attitude, pretense remains itself in both 
opaque and transparent contexts: Alec Leamas (had he really existed) could have pretend to 
betray English intelligence to the East Germans (ideally, opaque); and Richard Burton could 
pretend to be Leamas in the movie The Spy Who Came in from the Cold (transparent). Pretenders, 
therefore, have both the ability and the motivation to modulate the transparency of their pretense 
in the way characteristic of much ironic use. Echoers and dissociators have neither. 
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 These two related deficiencies of echo theory indicate that the general mechanism by 
which irony operates is better explained as a distinctive outgrowth, or exploitation, of the 
“twofold” character of interpretation, rather than as an allusive echo. This commitment, at any 
rate, is the first plank of the positive account of irony I offer in this chapter: irony arises in twofold 
interpretive situations.   
  
§2.2.3 “Twofold” Interpretation 
 
Though I discussed twofoldness in chapter 1, when I presented my general theory of 
interpretation, I’ll rehearse (and expand) some of the basic points here. I borrow the term 
“twofold” from Richard Wollheim, who introduces it in his essay “Seeing-as, Seeing-in, and 
Pictorial Representation.” There, Wollheim argues against E.H. Gombrich’s contention that, in 
order to properly see a scene represented in a painting, we need to suspend our awareness of the 
features of the painting as a representational medium. In contrast, Wollheim contends that the 
kind of seeing required to perceive scenes in pictorial representation has what he calls a “twofold” 
character:  
That the seeing appropriate to representations permits simultaneous attention to what is 
represented and to the representation, to the object and to the medium, and therefore 
instantiates seeing-in rather than seeing-as, follows from a stronger thesis which is true of 
representations. The stronger thesis is that, if I look at a representation as a 
representation, then it is not just permitted to, but required of, me that I attend 
simultaneously to object and medium.26 
 
Though Wollheim uses “representation” in the passage above as an abbreviation for “pictorial 
representation,” his basic insight can be applied to a more general set of interpretive situations 
(including many cases of linguistic interpretation)—and it’s only in in situations like these that 
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intentionally produced ironies can arise. Consider what the discussion above showed was 
necessary to fully appreciate an irony like (5’): the interpreter needed to notice that a single 
utterance admitted of two possible interpretations, and that these related to one another in an 
interesting way. She needed, that is, to attend not only to the utterance’s straightforward 
communicative uses, but also to features that are particular to it as a medium of communication: 
in this case, the fact that it is the sort of thing that admits of different interpretations depending 
on the context in which it is employed. 
Sperber and Wilson’s mention theory advanced our understanding of verbal irony so 
significantly because it captured an important part of this insight. As Sperber had it: “Mention 
theory is based on an extension of the logical notion of mention. When an expression is 
mentioned—as opposed to being used—it refers to itself.”27 But mention theory encounters 
difficulty because the mechanism by which it achieves this insight is categorical, and so closes off 
the possibility of simultaneously attending to the utterances in the usual way. Yet it’s just the 
interplay between these two ways of regarding the utterance that constitutes experiencing its 
irony. Twofold interpretation improves on mention because it not only allows for, but requires 
this sensitivity to the interplay between medium and meaning. 
Nonetheless, we need to be careful not to equate twofold interpretation with irony. 
Consider the way Wollheim qualifies the role of dissociation in his account of “seeing in”: 
I have, however, spoken of ‘relative dissociation’, and advisedly. For the artist who (as we 
have seen) exploits twofoldness to build up analogies and correspondences between the 
medium and the object of representation cannot be thought content to leave the two 
visual experiences in such a way that one merely floats above the other. He must be 
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concerned to return one experience to the other. Indeed he constantly seeks an ever more 
intimate rapport between the two experiences...28 
 
By its talk of a rapport between the experience of medium and the experience of object, the 
passage suggests the way that twofoldness opens up the possibility of such experiences taking on 
an ironic quality: namely when, instead of establishing a rapport, the experience of the medium 
and the experience of the object (or, in my vernacular, meaning) seem to be at odds, or even to 
undermine one another.29 
Here’s an example that illustrates both the way that an irony can arise from a twofold 
interpretive situation, and the fact that twofoldness alone is a necessary but insufficient condition 
for irony. I suggested above that irony arises from twofold interpretive situations when, instead of 
having a rapport, a representation and its object interact disharmoniously, so that one 
undermines the other. This is the kind of experience we encounter in  
(6) David Hockney’s Picture Emphasizing Stillness [figure 1]  
 
which tries, in part, to take itself as its object. 
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Between the leopard and the unsuspecting human, Hockney has inserted a string of text that 
reads, “They are perfectly safe: this is a still.” The effect is to disrupt the usual (relative) harmony 
of the twofold perceptual experience by creating confusion about the boundary between the 
medium and the object of the pictorial representation. By explicitly inviting the viewer to attend 
to an aspect of the representation that, in normal circumstances, would constitute a fact about the 
medium of the representation, rather than its object (namely, “stillness,” which we would 
normally regard as true of the painting as medium, but not true of the state of affairs it depicts), 
Hockney calls into question what the painting’s actual object is. If it were, in fact, the state of 
Figure 1: David Hockney's "Picture Emphasizing Stillness". The text inserted between the leopard and the conversing 
humans reads “THEY ARE PERFECTLY SAFE THIS IS A STILL”. 
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affairs that we’d “see in” the picture had Hockney not inserted the text that he did, then he neither 
would nor could coherently remark, within the picture, on its stillness—because this undermines 
the effect. It doesn’t undermine the effect merely by drawing our attention to the picture’s 
stillness; this, as we’ve learned from Wollheim, is a fact about the medium to which we already 
necessarily attend in the kind of twofold perception appropriate to viewing pictorial 
representations. What undermines the effect is the overt invitation to attend to an aspect of the 
representation that, were the artist actually attempting to depict a state of affairs in which a 
leopard is pouncing on two unsuspecting humans, would be part of the medium rather than the 
object of representation. This upsets our conception of the (implied) artist’s intentions, which, 
according to Wollheim, ground the norm that is distinctive to perceiving pictorial representation. 
Because we can’t square our conception of the artist’s intention (given the presence of the textual 
comment) with what otherwise would have struck us as the picture’s object of representation, 
we’re led to recast our interpretation of what the picture’s object of representation really is. As 
Alexander Sturgis reads the painting, Hockney’s goal is to dramatize, or actually to depict, the 
ironic predicament painters face when they depict motion in a static medium: 
Depicting a figure falling in space, although inevitably suggesting motion at the same 
time, can also draw attention to the stillness of the depiction itself – and indeed to the 
limitations of the still image in conveying movement. The faster the movement the more 
aware one is of its freezing, for we never actually see plummeting objects suspended in 
midair. The point was neatly made by David Hockney in one of the paintings he made in 
the early 1960s...30 
 
Let’s take account. Despite depicting a commentary on the enterprise of depicting motion in a 
still-life, if (6) is, in some sense, a “pretend” painting, it is no less a real painting for that. (6) 
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requires the same twofold attention to medium and object it ironizes, or the irony would dissolve. 
Unless we simultaneously hold in mind the object of representation (and, in this case, that 
includes what would be its object, since it is also a representation) with the medium of 
representation (which, among other functions, is what signals to us the artist’s intentions), we 
cannot see in the painting what Sturgis does.  
 
§2.3 Pretense Theory 
 
I mentioned pretense in my analysis of each of the last two examples, which suggests that an 
account of irony’s mechanism couched in pretense might succeed where dissociative echo falls 
short. Though the two theories are rivals, they share several significant features. Like echo theory, 
pretense theories are generally expressivist (so that ironists primarily express attitudes, rather 
than communicate content); also like echo, pretense theories regard ironists as adopting a 
dissociative stance toward the content of their utterances. The two diverge in their account of the 
manner in which this dissociative attitude is effected, along the lines that their names suggest. 
According to pretense theory, in its simplest form, ironists pretend to use the propositions they 
utter, rather than echoing them. 
Herbert Clark and Richard Gerrig, who first presented pretense theory as an explicit rival 
to mention theory, take their inspiration from H.W. Fowler’s treatment, in A Dictionary of 
Modern English Usage: 
Irony is a form of utterance that postulates a double audience, consisting of one party that 
hearing shall hear and shall not understand, and another party that, when more is meant 
than meets the ear, is aware both of that more and of the outsiders’ incomprehension. [It] 
may be defined as the use of words intended to convey one meaning to the uninitiated 
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part of the audience and another to the initiated, the delight of it lying in the secret 
intimacy set up between the latter and the speaker.31 
 
According to Clark and Gerrig, a person (S) speaks ironically to an audience (A) by pretending to 
be someone else (S’) who sincerely uses the proposition S uttered to an audience (A’), who 
understands the utterance literally. S’’s utterance should be “in one way or another, patently 
uninformed or injudicious,” and S intends A to recognize this fact, along with A’’s risible failure 
to recognize the inadequacy of S’’s statement. Hence S expresses to A his derogatory attitude to 
the proposition he utters ironically.32 
 This way of understanding irony certainly does a better job accounting for (5’). When 
Darcy ironically agrees with Elizabeth’s assessment of Wickham’s misfortunes, Clark and Gerrig 
would say he only pretends to agree—a fact that a sufficiently astute and well-informed audience 
member (as we imagined Bingly being) would appreciate, recognizing that Darcy is in fact 
subverting the assertion he pretends to agree with, and hence recovering the irony.  
Additionally, Clark and Gerrig make an explicit appeal to the continuity desideratum to 
argue for the superiority of pretense to echoic mention, noting that “the rhetorical device of 
irony… is just one of several types of irony.” (They follow Fowler in listing dramatic irony and 
irony of fate as the others.) Echo, they contend, “doesn’t allow for the resemblance among the 
three types of irony,” but their pretense theory does: all three kinds (verbal, dramatic, and irony of 
fate) are supposedly linked by Fowler’s stipulation of the double-audience. For example, the 
dramatic irony in Oedipus Rex consists in Oedipus’s saying things with an intelligible but 
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superficial meaning to his fellow characters, but with a deeper meaning related to his impending 
doom to the theater audience.33  
Gregory Currie has proposed an improvement on Clark and Gerrig’s version of pretense 
theory, replacing their emphasis on a “double audience” with the simpler idea that an ironist 
pretends to occupy a more limited perspective than she in fact does. Irony is then generated by 
the contrast between the pretended and the actual perspective: 
The pretence one engages in with irony is partly one of behavior; one pretends to be 
doing something which one is not doing: speaking seriously and assertively, seriously 
asking a question, seriously expressing a distaste. But the pretence that is fundamental to 
irony is not a pretence of doing; it’s a pretence of being. In pretending to assert or 
whatever, one pretends to be a certain kind of person – a person with a restricted or 
otherwise defective view of the world or some part of it.34 
 
On Currie’s picture, an ironist’s utterance should “be an indication that he or she is pretending to 
have a limited or otherwise defective perspective,” which targets that perspective (or one that 
closely resembles it) as unreasonable.35 The mechanical aspect of this picture evokes my own 
analysis of (5’), in which I described Darcy as “affecting an attitude of mildly unsympathetic 
inscrutability, meant less to implicate to Elizabeth that she is being contradicted, and more to 
suggest that there is a broader perspective on the situation (Darcy’s) according to which 
Elizabeth’s rhetorical question may be taken to mean something quite different than she intends.” 
 Like Clark and Gerrig, Currie counts pretense’s ability to answer to the continuity 
question as among its virtues. Though he calls his theory “modest,” he credits it with a wider 
reach than Sperber and Wilson allow theirs (at least, explicitly): when Currie declares that “irony 
is pretense” in the title of his essay, he means the definition to capture more than just verbal 
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ironies. “Indeed,” he points out, “irony does not even need language; I may stagger back in a 
parody of horrified distaste when confronted by an austerely elegant Sung vase, ironically 
expressing my rejection of your ludicrously demanding aesthetic standards.”36 Though Currie 
doesn’t promise that a pretense of limited perspective can capture irony in all of its forms 
(situational irony in particular he regards as a “bloated” category), he explicitly endorses 
continuity as a desideratum: “an account like my own will gain in strength if it can be shown that 
it sheds some light on these other kinds [of irony].”37 
 I agree that pretense theory does a better job characterizing the mechanism of many 
verbal ironies than echo does; I agree that it gives a better account of continuity as well. 
Nonetheless, pretense’s answers to both the mechanism and continuity questions remain 
incomplete. As it stands, pretense theory yields watered-down accounts of dramatic and 
situational irony which, because they overlook one of irony’s central features, are far too inclusive; 
and it fails to capture an interesting and important form of verbal irony, in which no pretense is 
necessary. In the process of illustrating each of these points, I’ll introduce the two final features of 
my own account of irony: dynamism and reversal. 
 
§3 Situational and Dramatic Irony 
 
This is Currie’s attempt to characterize dramatic irony in terms of pretense of perspective: 
Electra mourns over the ashes she thinks are those of Orestes; Malvolio’s hope is based on 
a letter we know is fake. Through credulousness, wishful thinking, or merely because they 
don’t know the facts, characters in fiction often have a limited perspective, highlighted by 
the more inclusive view granted to the audience. So ‘dramatic irony’ turns out to be 
simply the fictional representation of the kind of contrast between perspectives that one 
pretends to be the victim of when one speaks ironically.38 
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Just as dramatic irony is derivative, in this way, of “irony proper” (the name Currie gives to cases 
covered directly by his pretense theory), situational ironies are derivative of dramatic ironies: 
they’re just actual situations that, were they represented in a performance or literature, would 
count as dramatic ironies. They “mirror” the situations portrayed in dramatic irony, “except that 
there need be no onlooker aware of the disparity at the time.” Alleged situational ironies whose 
incongruity does not “implicate” any limited perspective are only ironic in a “bloated” sense that 
Currie seems to think we are better off discarding.39 
 Neither of these attempts to characterize dramatic and situational irony does its subject 
justice. Consider first Currie’s account of situational irony, since it’s especially feeble. In situations 
rightly described as ironic, according to Currie, “if we had known differently, we would have 
acted differently,” and this fact implicates a contrast between the actors’ limited perspective and a 
theoretical broader perspective that would be available to a knowing audience, were this situation 
being portrayed in a play or a novel. Examples of situational irony Currie gives are robbing a bank 
whose vaults were emptied the day before, or quitting your job the day before you were to receive 
a promotion. (“The representation of any of this in performance of literature would count as 
dramatic irony.”) 40 This account makes it sound as if any instantiation of Robert Burns’s old 
dictum that "the best laid schemes o' mice an' men / Gang aft agley" should count as a situational 
irony, and that any fictional portrayal of such a situation in which the reader is aware, in advance, 
that something is amiss, should count as dramatic irony. But there’s more to irony than that. 
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A contrast between two famous wedding mishaps illustrates the point. Though both cases 
are drawn from literature (broadly construed), I’ll treat them, for the moment, merely as 
hypothetical situations: things that could have happened. (I address the additional complexities of 
literary and dramatic irony later.) The first wedding is from Alanis Morissette’s infamous song, 
“Ironic”: 
(7) It’s like rain / on your wedding day! 
 
The second is Oedipus’s unfortunate wedding, in which 
(8) having already unwittingly killed his father, Oedipus fulfills the Delphic oracle’s prophecy 
by marrying his mother—despite having spent his life trying to avoid precisely this 
fate.41 
 
Oedipus and the unfortunate couple imagined in (7) share the property that Currie says 
characterizes situational (and dramatic) irony: in both cases, had the principals known better, 
they would have acted differently. In both cases, we can posit an interpreter inhabiting a broader 
perspective, who could thereby recognize that both Oedipus and the couple in (7) are on course to 
fall victim to the Burns Dictum. But I think many readers will join me in recognizing that (8) has 
a far more robust ironic quality than (8)—many people, in fact, deny that (7) has any genuine 
claim to irony at all.42 Pinpointing the discrepancy that Currie’s treatment ignores brings another 
of irony’s key features into relief.  
Oedipus’s situation is robustly ironic in a way that mere rain on a wedding day isn’t 
because Oedipus brings about his own undoing by the actions he chooses on the basis of his 
intention to evade that very undoing. A fatalist reading of Oedipus reminds us that we are the 
playthings of the gods, and that any attempt to avoid our fate, no matter how well-conceived and 
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thoughtfully executed, is ultimately doomed. A moralistic reading reminds us that we’ll be 
punished for our crimes.43 But an ironic reading of the play reminds us that we are the authors of 
our own undoing—a theme to which the play returns again and again. Had Oedipus never sought 
knowledge of his identity and fate at the Delphic Oracle, he’d never have learned about the 
terrible prophecy concerning himself and his family. Had he never made the explicit effort to 
avoid that fate, he’d never have fled his adopted home and set out for Thebes; neither would he 
have met and killed his true father on that journey, nor defeated the Sphinx and won his true 
mother’s hand in marriage. If, once king, he hadn’t made it his personal mission to unravel the 
previous king’s murder… well, you get the picture. The play’s ironies are thickest when, for 
example, Oedipus promises personally to punish the murderer of Thebes’s previous king, once his 
identity has been discovered. (Oedipus himself, of course, is the murderer, though he’s unaware 
of that fact when he vows retribution.)  
Unlike in (8), couple (7)’s desire to avoid rain on their wedding day probably wasn’t a 
significant causal factor in their scheduling their wedding for a day on which, unfortunately, it 
happened to rain. So, in (7), all we have is (i) a general scenario that generates or is characterized 
by certain norms, goals, or expectations (e.g. when we imagine a stereotypical wedding, perhaps 
the sun is shining and the weather is pleasant; when couples get married, they generally hope for 
nice weather, etc.), (ii) which expectations (etc.) happen to get violated in the (purportedly) ironic 
course of events. (We can add, for Currie’s sake, that had couple (7) known in advance that it 
would rain on the day on which they happened to have in fact scheduled their wedding, they 
might not have scheduled it for that day—but the point seems tellingly otiose.) In (8), by contrast, 
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we have more than an incongruity between an expectation or an intention and an outcome: the 
reversal Oedipus suffers is dynamic, so that the ultimate incongruity between his intention (which 
plays roughly the structural role of the representation in Wollheim’s twofold interpretation) and 
its outcome (which plays the part of object) is brought about by their interaction: Oedipus forms 
the intention to avoid his fate, and precisely by the actions he takes on the basis of that intention 
he ultimately fulfills it. This is possible because Oedipus’s intention to avoid his fate describes or 
represents a certain picture of his reality (the one Oedipus would like to bring about) while 
simultaneously being a feature of his actual reality, which, through Oedipus, can interact causally 
with other features of that actual reality. Because our practical perspectives are severely limited, 
these interactions aren’t always in harmony with the state of affairs the intention represents.  
Currie’s account of dramatic irony is deficient in a way analogous to his account of 
situational irony. According to Currie, dramatic irony occurs when dramatic tension is created by 
a contrast between the wider perspective enjoyed by a play’s audience  and the limited perspective 
possessed by the fictional character, which is encompassed by the audience’s wider perspective. 
But, again, this account captures too much. The contrast between a reader’s wider perspective and 
a fictional character’s more limited one grounds a great variety of significant literary devices, not 
merely dramatic irony. Foreshadowing often exploits this contrast, for instance. So do suspense-
generating scenes in horror movies, in which we, the audience, know that the monster is in the 
room, but the protagonist doesn’t. Here the contrast between the character’s perspective and the 
audience’s generates real dramatic tension, but such scenes are not necessarily (or even usually) 
instances of dramatic irony. 
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Compare these to a case of genuine literary irony: Mark Twain’s portrayal of Pap (Huck’s 
drunkard father) in Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. In the scene below, Huck, who is essentially 
being held hostage by his abusive father, recounts a long rant he has heard Pap deliver upon Pap’s 
return from a trip into town: 
 
(9) I got the things all up to the cabin, and then it was about dark. While I was cooking supper 
the old man took a swig or two and got sort of warmed up, and went to ripping again. He 
had been drunk over in town, and laid in the gutter all night, and he was a sight to look 
at. A body would a thought he was Adam -- he was just all mud. Whenever his liquor 
begun to work he most always went for the govment. This time he says: 
 
"Call this a govment! why, just look at it and see what it's like. Here's the law a-standing 
ready to take a man's son away from him—a man's own son, which he has had all the trouble and 
all the anxiety and all the expense of raising. Yes, just as that man has got that son raised at last, 
and ready to go to work and begin to do suthin' for him and give him a rest, the law up and goes for 
him. And they call that govment! That ain't all, nuther. The law backs that old Judge Thatcher up 
and helps him to keep me out o' my property. Here's what the law does: The law takes a man worth 
six thousand dollars and up'ards, and jams him into an old trap of a cabin like this, and lets him go 
round in clothes that ain't fitten for a hog. They call that govment! A man can't get his rights in a 
govment like this. Sometimes I've a mighty notion to just leave the country for good and all. Yes, and 
I told 'em so; I told old Thatcher so to his face. Lots of 'em heard me, and can tell what I said. Says I, 
for two cents I'd leave the blamed country and never come a-near it agin. Them's the very words. I 
says look at my hat -- if you call it a hat -- but the lid raises up and the rest of it goes down till it's 
below my chin, and then it ain't rightly a hat at all, but more like my head was shoved up through a 
jint o' stove-pipe. Look at it, says I—such a hat for me to wear—one of the wealthiest men in this 
town if I could git my rights. 
"Oh, yes, this is a wonderful govment, wonderful. Why, looky here. There was a free nigger 
there from Ohio—a mulatter, most as white as a white man. He had the whitest shirt on you ever 
see, too, and the shiniest hat; and there ain't a man in that town that's got as fine clothes as what he 
had; and he had a gold watch and chain, and a silver-headed cane – the awfulest old gray-headed 
nabob in the State. And what do you think? They said he was a p'fessor in a college, and could talk 
all kinds of languages, and knowed everything. And that ain't the wust. They said he could vote 
when he was at home. Well, that let me out. Thinks I, what is the country a-coming to? It was 
'lection day, and I was just about to go and vote myself if I warn't too drunk to get there; but when 
they told me there was a State in this country where they'd let that nigger vote, I drawed out. I says 
I'll never vote agin. Them's the very words I said; they all heard me; and the country may rot for all 
me—I'll never vote agin as long as I live. And to see the cool way of that nigger—why, he wouldn't a 
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give me the road if I hadn't shoved him out o' the way. I says to the people, why ain't this nigger put 
up at auction and sold?—that's what I want to know. And what do you reckon they said? Why, they 
said he couldn't be sold till he'd been in the State six months, and he hadn't been there that long yet. 
There, now—that's a specimen. They call that a govment that can't sell a free nigger till he's been in 
the State six months. Here's a govment that calls itself a govment, and lets on to be a govment, and 
thinks it is a govment, and yet's got to set stock-still for six whole months before it can take a hold of 
a prowling, thieving, infernal, white-shirted free nigger, and—" 
Pap was agoing on so he never noticed where his old limber legs was taking him to, so he 
went head over heels over the tub of salt pork and barked both shins, and the rest of his speech was 
all the hottest kind of language—mostly hove at the nigger and the govment, though he give the tub 
some, too, all along, here and there. He hopped around the cabin considerable, first on one leg and 
then on the other, holding first one shin and then the other one, and at last he let out with his left 
foot all of a sudden and fetched the tub a rattling kick. But it warn't good judgment, because that 
was the boot that had a couple of his toes leaking out of the front end of it; so now he raised a howl 
that fairly made a body's hair raise, and down he went in the dirt, and rolled there, and held his 
toes; and the cussing he done then laid over anything he had ever done previous. He said so his own 
self afterwards. He had heard old Sowberry Hagan in his best days, and he said it laid over him, too; 
but I reckon that was sort of piling it on, maybe.44 
 
If it were our task to make the irony in (9) clear to a group of high school English students, how 
should we proceed?  We might first draw their attention to the fact that, over the course of his 
rant, Pap again and again says one thing, while simultaneously (in so doing, even) shows its 
opposite. He blathers on about being a responsible father while in the act of delivering a drunken 
rant to his son, whom he has kidnapped and is holding prisoner. He rails against the 
government’s effectiveness while simultaneously making it clear to the reader that the laws that 
protect his son from him are just and necessary. He rages against the injustice of a black man’s 
being allowed to vote while simultaneously (though unwittingly) demonstrating that the black 
man in question is a far more responsible and thoughtful citizen than Pap is. He attempts to exact 
revenge on a tub of salt pork by dealing it a mighty kick, but succeeds only in injuring himself. 
Though these events have a more comical quality than (9), they share its essentially ironic form: 
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it’s not just that Pap doesn’t know he’s a worthless citizen and a disgraceful father, and we do; it’s 
that his very protestations against these characterizations provide us with strong reasons to accept 
them. His assertions have propositional content – they make claims about the world (in 
Wittgenstein's vocabulary, they say) – but they themselves are also facts in the world, whose full 
import is not exhausted by their propositional content (they show). And here, what they show 
undermines what they say. 
 We should also notice that, to explain this primary irony, we haven’t yet had to address 
the fact that (9) is a scene in a work of fiction. It would be just as ironic, in the sense covered so 
far, if this scene were real, rather than fictional. Nor have we needed to appeal to any notion of 
pretense in our explanation. But the scene is of course fictional, and for this reason (among 
others) the irony here is literary. Because Pap is a fictional character, we encounter his actions and 
utterances with an awareness that he and they are the inventions of an author, and, given that 
awareness, we have access to a second (higher-order) interpretive level, on which we attempt to 
discern the author’s communicative intentions, as distinct from the character’s.45 We therefore 
regard the irony described in the paragraph above as intended. But that doesn’t constitute some 
additional irony, over and above the one noted in the previous paragraph. Instead, it’s a particular 
way of regarding the irony we’ve already identified. 
 Nonetheless, recognizing (9) as the invention of an author directs our attention to 
important issues that the analysis above hasn’t yet addressed. Because (9) is the invention of an 
author, intentionality functions on multiple levels. On top of the intentions I’ve already appealed 
to in my analyses of (8) and (9)—Oedipus’s intention to evade his fate, and Pap’s various 
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communicative intentions—we also have Twain’s higher-order intentions to consider. From this 
perspective, the conclusions we readers are apt to draw about Pap on the basis of his rant (those 
that undermine what he says in the course of the rant) look like  sayings in their own right; they 
are the conclusions Twain intends us to draw by the way he’s crafted the scene. I’ll call ironies that 
are intentionally authored in this way artificial ironies to distinguish them from mere situational 
ironies (as (8) would be, if it had actually happened).46 Though situational ironies are generated, 
in part, by the intentions of their protagonists, the irony itself is unintentional. But in artificial 
ironies, the irony itself is intended: they therefore pose a version of the mechanism question that 
situational ironies don’t. How does Twain intentionally manufacture the irony in (9)? 
 Now appealing to pretense makes sense. It’s no stretch to describe fiction writers as 
pretending to adopt a more limited perspective than they have; and the affinity to pretense is even 
clearer in plays, where actors actually play the characters and utter the lines.47 In the Twain 
example, the kind of mechanistic use of pretense I’ve been discussing  is, in a superficial but still 
important sense, doubled, because Pap’s rant is recounted to us second-hand, through Huck’s 
narration. We can consider Pap’s remarks as akin to pretended assertions whose author is Twain, 
but they come to us retold by Huck (whose assertions about Pap’s assertions can also be 
interpreted as pretended assertions whose author is Twain). So Twain has two layers of pretense 
at his disposal, and therefore a second order of perspective discrepancies he can exploit. He uses 
this double pretense masterfully throughout the novel, often to create or heighten ironies. (9) is 
no exception: the ironic reversals suffered by Pap are so obvious, and progress so rapidly, each 
more blatant than the last, that they’d be at risk of the kind of vitiating effect I described in §2.2.2, 
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were they not filtered by Huck’s straightforward, guileless retelling. Because Huck himself seems 
either unaware of or unconcerned with the ironies of Pap’s rant (and takes seriously issues the 
reader finds absurd, like Pap’s boasts about the relative legendariness of his string of cursing), 
Twain creates for himself the aesthetic license to contrive a scene far more ridiculous than he 
otherwise could have without losing all sense of subtlety. 
 What, finally, can we glean from this extended discussion of (9), and the comparison 
between (9) and (8) (keeping in mind that, for current purposes, we’re treating (8) as a situational 
irony)? We should notice that we have neither dispensed with the importance of pretense in 
describing some ironies, nor have we found it to be a necessary component of all ironies. In this 
sense, Currie’s “irony is pretense” declaration is an overstatement, but one that inscribes a more 
limited truth—namely, that pretense is central to the mechanism by which many ironies are 
produced. Nor is Currie correct to suggest that the pretense mechanism is the key to 
understanding the continuity between verbal irony and its dramatic and situational siblings. That 
way of rendering the relationship leads, as we’ve seen, to unsatisfying accounts of literary and 
situational irony. 
 But put continuity concerns aside for the moment. Do pretense theories at least provide a 
complete accounting of verbal irony? I don’t think they do. In the next section, I explain why. 
 
§4 Irony and Sincerity 
 
Pretense plays a central role in the production of many artificial ironies, but it isn’t necessary for 
irony—even ironies that are intentionally produced. Two final examples: The first is drawn from a 
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review, by David Foster Wallace, of Joseph Frank’s multi-volume biography of Dostoevsky. The 
review has a peculiar structure: most of the sentences are just the kind you’d expect in a review, 
but those sentences are occasionally interrupted, without warning or explanation, by an ongoing 
series of self-searching philosophical questions, set off from the main text by line breaks and 
before-and-after asterisks. For example, immediately after opining that the fourth volume of 
Frank’s biography is so good that it “ensures Frank’s status as the definitive literary biographer of 
one of the best fiction writers ever,” Wallace writes,  
**Am I a good person? Deep down, do I really even want to be a good person, or do I 
only want to seem like a good person so that people (including myself) will approve of 
me? Is there a difference? How do I ever actually know whether I’m bullshitting myself, 
morally speaking?** 
 
The review then proceeds as if nothing odd has happened: “In a way, Frank’s books aren’t literary 
biographies at all, at least not in the way that Ellmann’s book on Joyce and Bate’s on Keats are.”48 
In the review’s final phase, Wallace (who was, at the time of writing, in the process of finishing his 
great novel, Infinite Jest), reflects on how Frank’s rendering of Dostoevsky is relevant to readers 
and writers in contemporary America: 
(10) Upon his finishing Frank’s books, though, I think that any serious American 
reader/writing will find himself driven to think hard about what exactly it is that makes 
many of the novelists of our own place and time look so thematically shallow and 
lightweight, so morally impoverished, in comparison to Gogol or Dostoevsky (or even 
to lesser lights like Lermontov and Turgenev). Frank’s bio prompts us to ask ourselves 
why we seem to require of our art an ironic distance from deep convictions or 
desperate questions, so that contemporary writers have to either make jokes of them or 
else try to work them in under cover of some formal trick like intertextual quotation or 
incongruous juxtaposition, sticking the really urgent stuff inside asterisks as part of 
some multivalent defamiliarization-flourish or some such shit.49 
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Many readers will join me in registering a strong sense of irony at the passage’s conclusion. Yet 
Wallace apparently means what he says – there doesn’t seem to be any tricky figure of speech at 
work, here, threatening to confound our usual theories of meaning, or requiring some specialized 
interpretive mechanism. Nor is there any fictional character involved, into whose mouth a 
novelist or playwright has slipped some double entendre. Nonetheless, this is doubtlessly an 
artificial irony: Wallace intends the reader to recognize that the most vital point he hopes the 
essay will make is undermined by the form in which he’s trying to make it. If the reader misses 
this irony, in fact, she will have missed something central to the essay’s meaning: Wallace is 
showing, rather than merely saying, the harrowing predicament he finds himself in as a novelist in 
contemporary America. 
Here’s a punchier example, with a similar moral. As we’ve already noticed, Paul Grice 
posits a “Cooperative Principle” that governs conversation, comprised of a set of maxims and 
sub-maxims that conversationalists expect one another to observe. One such maxim (in Grice’s 
taxonomy, the third maxim in the category of Manner) instructs speakers to be efficient in 
expressing their meaning. This is how Grice states the maxim’s content: 
(11) “Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).”50 
 
When I first read the sentence, in a graduate seminar, I assumed that Grice had blundered into an 
almost cosmically inapt pleonasm. Prolixity is, after all, unnecessary by definition, and the entire 
parenthetical that exhorts us to avoid it seems to add little or nothing of significance to the 
imperative “Be brief.” Fortunately, before I had a chance to publicize my clever observation, the 
professor teaching the seminar remarked that Grice was indulging in a bit of irony in (11). But 
152 
 
here, again, Grice certainly means what he says; nonetheless, many readers will join my old 
professor in recognizing Grice’s ironic intent. 
 Still, you might think pretense theorists can account for both of these examples. 
Following Currie, we might say of (11): yes, Grice really does mean that we ought to avoid 
unnecessary prolixity in conversation; he doesn’t merely pretend to make that proscription. 
Nevertheless, (11) is ironic because Grice pretends to inhabit a limited perspective, from which he 
is unaware of the redundancy in his own expression. Similarly, we might say of (10): of course 
Wallace doesn’t pretend to disdain the practice of “sticking the really urgent stuff inside asterisks 
as part of some multivalent defamiliarization-flourish or some such shit”—he does disdain it, and 
that is what he sincerely intends to communicate. Nevertheless, his concluding statement is ironic 
because he pretends to occupy a limited perspective from which he is unaware of his own 
hypocrisy—as if he has forgotten that he himself has just been engaging in the practice that he 
now bemoans, or has failed to realize that his own review is an obvious example of the sort of 
thing he’s now disdaining. 
 Maybe these interpretations appear plausible, but neither is right. We can certainly tell a 
story about (11) in which Grice is pretending in the way Currie might suggest, but no such story 
is necessary to recognize (11)’s irony. Suppose that Grice isn’t pretending to be unaware of the 
fact that his way of stating the third maxim of Manner is itself (unnecessarily) prolix: our sense of 
(11)’s irony is undiminished. That’s because pretense isn’t essential to (11)’s irony, it’s ancillary. 
The essence of (11)’s irony is that it expresses a rule for proper expression, but it is itself an 
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expression that violates that rule. The essence of its irony, in other words, is (twofold) dynamic 
reversal. 
 A forced reading of (10)’s irony is worse than extraneous: it actively disfigures Wallace’s 
meaning. Wallace isn’t merely pretending to find himself in a predicament in which the 
conventions of his culture and his chosen art form can no longer authentically express the themes 
that make art important: he is in this predicament. The effect of the irony in the passage is to 
invest Wallace’s ensnarement with a kind of experiential vitality: as a reader I appreciate it more 
viscerally than I would have if Wallace had phrased the point as I paraphrased it above. The 
pretense interpretation, by positing insincerity in either Wallace’s being in the predicament, or in 
his awareness of it, hollows out this sense of authenticity. The picture of irony as dynamic reversal 
does it justice.  
 A final possibility: if ironies like (10) and (11) can’t be accounted for by echo theory, or 
pretense theory, or some other unified mechanistic account of irony production and 
comprehension, perhaps we shouldn’t count them as verbal ironies at all. Maybe, for example, we 
could class them with situational ironies that just happen to manifest themselves in words. I’ll 
address this general methodological strategy in a bit more detail below, but, for now, here’s one 
reason I don’t think it’s viable. Had the situation depicted in (9) really happened, many of Pap’s 
statements would fit this description (situational ironies manifesting themselves in words), but 
the suggestion can’t fully characterize (10) or (11) because both are artificial ironies. Unlike Pap 
(or Oedipus), Wallace and Grice are using irony; they’re not merely subject to it. Wallace and 
Grice are being ironic. Pap is not. But neither Wallace nor Grice is pretending. 
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I’ve highlighted some of the limitations of the pretense theory of irony, but I don’t want 
to undersell its merits. Theories like Clark and Gerrig’s and Currie’s do a good job with what they 
regard as their primary task: providing an account of a figure of speech by which irony is often 
employed in language (and other forms of communication). And, though pretense theory doesn’t 
provide the “center of gravity” for irony that Currie promises, it does draw our attention to 
important points of commonality between the way this figure of speech operates in verbal irony 
and the way that irony is employed in drama—just as its proponents suggest. 
 
§5 The Virtues of Dynamic Reversal 
 
I’ll conclude by highlighting the virtues of understanding irony as dynamic reversal. But in the 
process, I’d like to consider more carefully a methodological concern I touched on above. In my 
choice of examples, haven’t limited myself to the relatively traditional, simple instances of irony as 
a figure of speech that currently dominate the literature on verbal irony. Further, one of my chief 
objections to the pretense account was its failure to provide the convincing explanation of irony’s 
continuity that its advocates often promise. But what if the ambition to account for irony’s several 
kinds with a single theory is misguided, and the right approach to the continuity question isn’t to 
answer it, but to discard it? 
 
§5.1 What Should Theorists of Irony Study? 
 
Deirdre Wilson has given the most compelling articulation of that sort of view. Faced with a slew 
of counterexamples to the echo theory, Wilson has insisted, not altogether unfairly, that the full 
discursive range of the concept of “irony” isn’t a proper target of interest for pscyholinguists and 
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cognitive science. Responding to Raymond Gibbs’ observation that irony’s diversity “poses an 
important challenge for cognitive science theories of irony,” Wilson asks, “but why assume that 
the goal of a cognitive science theory of irony should be to capture the very broad and vague 
extension of the ordinary language sense of the term?” Instead, she thinks, “The goal of a theory is 
to identify mechanisms and see what range of phenomena they explain.” Having identified the 
mechanism central to “typical” cases of verbal irony, further empirical studies should be directed 
toward illuminating these mechanisms, rather than muddying the water with fringe cases. When 
experimentalists include as legitimate cases of irony examples that don’t exploit the favored 
mechanism, “propos[ing] to merge these into a general category of ‘irony,’” they “detract from, 
rather than enhance, our understanding of how irony works.”51 
 Wilson is right to insist on the danger of presuming that the categories of classical 
rhetoric will map neatly onto the cognitive structure of the mind—a distinctive mechanism for 
each trope. She’s also right to insist that the study of such cognitive architecture is a central 
concern of cognitive science and pscyholinguistics. Her concern that the variety of cases counted 
as “ironic” in the growing experimental literature is unprincipled in ways that lead to confusion is 
well founded. But she’s wrong to advocate for an approach to irony studies—in cognitive science 
or anywhere else—that makes the identification of irony as a legitimate object of study with any 
particular cognitive mechanism a matter of methodological stipulation. I’ll give two reasons why 
this is so: one external to Wilson’s professed concerns, one internal. In each case, the deficiency is 
remedied by understanding irony as dynamic reversal. 
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§5.1.1 Begging Questions 
 
First, the internal reason. Suppose that Wilson is right (as I believe she is) that the empirical study 
of irony has drifted too far toward an indiscriminate ecumenicalism about irony at the level of the 
utterance. (In a passage Wilson quotes disapprovingly, for example, Raymond Gibbs notes that, 
because “irony is a single category of figurative language, but a variety of types,” a corpus study he 
conducted on the use of irony among college students “did not even distinguish irony from 
sarcasm, hyperboles, [and] understatement.”52) Methodological restrictivism presents itself as a 
principled solution: identify “core cases” of irony with some natural kind (a mechanism), and 
distinguish between the variety of cases Gibbs includes according to whether their production and 
comprehension employs the privileged mechanism. 
The problem, of course, is that a methodological stipulation like this risks begging the 
question with respect to some of the central issues empirical studies hope to resolve. For example, 
a central question in the empirical literature is whether irony can be produced and interpreted by 
a variety of cognitive mechanisms, as Gibbs and Colston contend it can, or whether a single 
mechanism is essential to all instances of pragmatic irony, as Sperber and Wilson claim. Instead 
of making this question empirically tractable by providing a clear, shared concept of irony that 
can be used to design and interpret experiments, methodological restrictivism obviates the 
question as an empirical concern altogether, settling it instead by methodological stipulation. The 
same general dynamic applies to the frequent disputes about whether particular classes of 
utterance should be counted as “ironic” for the purpose of psycholinguistic experiments whose 
aim is to discern which mechanisms are involved in irony production. Wilson, for example, has 
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contended that praise-by-blame and jocularity commonly counted as instances of irony in 
empirical studies (e.g. Filippova & Astington, 2010,53 and Glenwright & Pexman, 201054)—cases 
like 
(12) You’re really bad at lifting weights! [to someone who has just lifted an impressively 
large weight] 
(13) I’m not all that good in the sack anyways, so you’re not missing out. [uttered with the 
transparent intention of suggesting the opposite]55 
 
—shouldn’t be counted as genuine cases of irony. If speakers in such cases aren’t “echoing a 
manifest doubt or suspicion that someone had previously thought or expressed,” they should be 
regarded as “non-ironic playfulness, banter, or teasing”—even in the cases where interpreters 
successfully recover the speaker’s intended meaning in spite of the absence of an echo. Because 
“there is no evidence from Gibbs’ discussion that his examples were echoic…including them in 
experimental studies of irony sheds no light on the mechanisms for irony comprehension.”56 At 
its extreme, mechanistic restrictivism begs rather than answers questions about irony’s 
mechanism. 
 By contrast, the approach underlying the dynamic reversal account of irony provides the 
needed discriminatory power without begging questions. Identifying irony with a formal property 
of interpretive structures is neutral with respect to the question of which cognitive mechanisms 
can be used to produce or interpret such structures, but it offers a principle for distinguishing 
irony from related phenomena. Wilson is right to object to a lump inclusion of understatement in 
the category of irony, for example: some understatements are used to ironic effect, while others 
aren’t. The dynamic reversal account provides the basis for distinguishing these classes: 
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understatements that reverse the figure’s usual function, amplifying the content that 
understatement is conventionally used to downplay, are the properly ironic instances. Similarly, 
irony provides the resources for distinguishing, along a continuum, irony from sarcasm: the more 
conventional cues or blatant signaling serve to effect the reversal, rather than a twofold 
interaction between medium and meaning, the more likely we are to call an utterance sarcastic 
rather than ironic. (Few dispute that there is at least great overlap between these categories, 
though, so we place them on a continuum rather than in a dichotomy.) As we noted above, 
sarcasm becomes more itself the more overt it is, but with irony, the opposite is true.   
 
§5.1.2 Why Does Irony Interest Us? 
 
Now, the external reason. Mechanism restrictivism does a poor job of accounting for such a wide 
range of the manifestations of irony that interest us aesthetically, ethically, and historically, that it 
can’t provide a good basis for interdisciplinary collaboration. If cognitive scientists and 
psycholinguists adopt a methodology that treats discourse-length irony as either spurious or 
ancillary to their endeavor, then artists, literary theorists, cultural critics, and historians will 
understandably be less inclined to regard the work in those fields as relevant to their own 
endeavors. For those of us who think, first, that an understanding of irony’s potential range of use 
is an important step in developing good theories of its proper or elegant uses (its ethics and 
aesthetics); second, that understanding the psychological mechanisms by which irony can be 
produced and understood sheds light on the question of how irony can be used; and, third, that 
the study of irony at the level of the utterance has much to reveal about the mechanisms by which 
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irony can be produced and understood, the disciplinary balkanization that restrictivism 
encourages is regrettable. 
 By providing a thorough, satisfying answer to the continuity question, the dynamic 
reversal account of irony encourages the opposite trend, offering theorists of irony a point of 
intersection they can use to learn profitably from one another. In addition, by acknowledging the 
full breadth of irony’s manifestations, the dynamic reversal account broadens our appreciation of 
irony’s possible uses, so that we can understand not only irony’s power to undercut (as Twain 
used it so effectively to reveal the ridiculous bankruptcy of Pap’s racism), but also to express a 
certain kind of experience more deeply and authentically (as Wallace used it to bring his artistic 
predicament home to the readers he hoped to engage), or covertly (as, several commentators have 
argued, Dmitri Shostakovic’s symphonies did during Stalin’s rule in the Soviet Union).57 
 
§5.2 Irony from the Ground Up 
 
Even theories with ambitions to account for continuity, like many versions of pretense, begin with 
the presumption that irony should be understood on the model of a mechanism, and try to extend 
their accounts from there: situational and dramatic irony are understood in terms designed 
primarily to accommodate their dominant, figurative cousin. This is why imaginary but oddly 
inert audience members or speakers are such familiar figures in the irony literature: irony requires 
a commentator and an interpreter, and when none are to be found, they need to be invented. 
The dynamic reversal account of irony suggests that this traditional approach has the 
proper order of explanation reversed. It suggests that we should share Jonathan Lear’s conviction 
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that the experience of irony, rather than its intentional production, or even its interpretation, is 
explanatorily fundamental.   
The best way to see what I mean by this is to compare the way the dynamic reversal 
account comprehends irony with the way the CI account, from chapter 1, comprehends meaning. 
At first glance, the two strategies look congruent: meaning’s varieties are comprehended 
according to their shared role in the structure of interpretation; irony is similarly united across 
various media by appeal to certain features of interpretation. Irony, as I’ve said, characterizes a 
class of interpretive structures that share a distinctive formal feature. 
But careful attention to the discussion above shows my claim to have been incomplete, 
because, unlike meaning, irony isn’t confined to interpretive structures. Though meaning is 
united by the structural role it plays in interpretation, irony is united by dynamic reversal, a 
formal property that obtains analogously in interpretive and practical structures. Consider the 
way I integrated (8), the Oedipus myth (treated as a natural rather than dramatic irony) into the 
dynamic reversal account. Oedipus’s intentions, I claimed, occupied the role of the medium in 
twofold interpretation, and the consequences of the actions he took on the basis of those 
intentions occupied the role of meaning. But these are role analogies, not identifications. 
Oedipus’s flight to Thebes, his murder of Laius, his marriage to Jocasta—these aren’t mere acts of 
interpretation. And though Oedipus needs to interpret these actions from the proper perspective 
to appreciate their irony, the irony isn’t itself effected by his interpretation; its structure may not 
be ironic in the way interpreting Hockney’s painting, or Wallace’s review, is. Instead, it’s the 
practical structure—the complex of Oedipus’s intentions and the consequences that issue from 
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the actions they inspire—that’s a paradigm case of dynamic reversal. The congruence between CI 
integration of meaning and the dynamic reversal integration of irony extends only to artificial 
ironies, which are, fundamentally, matters of meaning and interpretation. Artificial ironies 
intentionally occasion (or, in weaker forms, mimic) ironic experience, or ironic predicaments. We 
understood the irony in (9) (Pap’s rant) first in terms of the relationship between his intentions 
(in this case, mostly communicative, but unironic, intentions) and their consequences, and only 
secondarily from the broader perspective of the ironist who produced the scene. We understand 
artificial ironies in terms of natural ironies, not the other way around. 
 
§5.3 Concluding Thoughts: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Irony 
 
Restructuring our understanding of the relationship between the kinds of irony along the lines 
advocated in §5.2 has enormous implications for the ethical and aesthetic questions I raised at the 
outset. Explanations of irony that treat understand it fundamentally on the model of figurative 
language invariably privilege its artificial modes, and become preoccupied with the question of 
how the artifice is accomplished. They provide real insight into some of irony’s ethical and 
aesthetic modes: the particularly vivid ways irony can be used to undercut illusion, or to subvert 
the forces of repression by manufacturing a distance between meaning and overt responsibility 
that can only be bridged by a degree of shared knowledge and sympathy; the dangers of 
emptiness, alienation, self-deception—of becoming a person, to paraphrase Proust’s description 
of Swann, who always takes care to sterilize his opinions by using a “special intonation, 
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mechanical and ironic, as though he had put the phrase or word between inverted commas, and 
was anxious to disclaim any personal responsibility for it.”58 
 But approaches preoccupied by the mechanisms by which irony is intentionally produced 
too often fail to appreciate the shared, fundamental feature of human experience out of which 
irony arises. As Socrates was eager to remind us: it’s possible to occupy a limited perspective while 
retaining our awareness its limitations. Because recognizing the limitations of a perspective is not, 
unfortunately, to transcend them, self-conscious occupation of limited perspective doesn’t need 
to be pretended , as Currie suggests it must: if Socrates is right, it’s the human condition. 
Nonetheless, despite our predicament, we develop beliefs, convictions, and values; and on their 
basis we put forward claims, develop intentions, and take action: we “pretend” in the capacious 
sense that David Hume uses the term. But when we pretend in this way, we become subject to an 
odd and particularly poignant sort of reversal: sometimes, like Oedipus, we not only fail to 
achieve our goals, but by our very efforts we undermine them. We become the authors of our own 
undoing. This fact, I have argued, is irony’s center of gravity, and so there is a sense in which 
Currie was nearly right to declare “irony is pretense” – just not precisely the sense in which he 
intended. Sincere modes of ironic modes of interpretation and expression enable us to 
understand and share these experiences of reversal: to be aware of the gaps between appearance 
and reality, to be patient with the unfamiliar, and to find some source of beauty, forgiveness, or, at 
least, humor, in the times when we are the agents of our own undoing.  
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